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OUTLINES
OF
MENTAL AND MORAL
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OUTLINES

OF

MENTAL AND MORAL SCIENCE.

"If it were inquired, what is to be regarded as the appropriate intellectual occupation of MAN, as *man*, what would be the answer? The statesman is engaged with political affairs; the soldier with military; the mathematician with the properties of numbers and magnitudes; the merchant with commercial concerns, &c.; but in what are *all* and each of these employed?—employed, I mean, as *men;* for there are many modes of exercise of the faculties, mental, as well as bodily, which are, in great measure, common to us with the lower animals? Evidently in *reasoning*. They are all occupied in deducing, well or ill, Conclusions from Premises; each concerning the subject of his own particular business. If, therefore, it be found that the process going on daily, in each of so many different minds, is, in any respect, the *same*, and if the principles on which it is conducted can be reduced to a regular system, and if rules can be deduced, from that system, for the better conducting of that process, then, it can hardly be denied, that such a system and such rules must be especially worthy the attention—not of the members of this or that profession merely, but—of every one who is desirous of possessing a cultivated mind. To understand the theory of that which is the appropriate intellectual occupation of man in general, and to learn to do that *well*, which every one *will* and *must* do, whether well or ill, may surely be considered as an essential part of a liberal education."—*Archbishop Whately's Logic;* preface, pp. 15, 16.

"The study of the phenomena of mind presents a subject of intense interest, not to the moral philosopher only, but to every one who has in view the cultivation of his own mental powers, or the proper application of them to the investigation of truth in any department of knowledge."—*Abercrombie.*

"We are persuaded that the *science of mind* wears an air of far more hopeless and inaccessible mystery than rightfully belongs to it."—*Chalmers.*

"THE TRUE SCIENCE OF EDUCATION—that noble science which has the charge of training the ignorance and imbecility of infancy into all the virtue, and power, and wisdom of mature manhood—of forming of a creature, the frailest and feeblest perhaps which Heaven has made, the intelligent and fearless sovereign of the whole animated creation, the interpreter, and adorer, and almost representative of the divinity—is THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND, APPLIED PRACTICALLY TO THE HUMAN MIND; enriching it, indeed, with all that is useful or ornamental in knowledge, but, at the same time, giving its chief regard to objects of yet greater moment; averting evil, which all the sciences together could not compensate; or producing good, compared with which all the sciences together are as nothing."—*Brown.*

OUTLINES

OF

MENTAL AND MORAL SCIENCE:

INTENDED AS INTRODUCTORY TO THE

LOGIC, METAPHYSICS, AND ETHICS,

OF THE

UNIVERSITY COURSE;

AS WELL AS FOR THE USE OF THE HIGHER CLASSES OF THOSE WHOSE
EDUCATION TERMINATES AT SCHOOL;

AND FOR THE PURPOSES OF GENERAL INSTRUCTION;

WITH A TECHNICOLOGICAL LEXICON,

AND

A BRIEF VIEW OF METAPHYSICAL WRITERS.

BIBLIOTHECA BODLEIANA

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JAMES M'GLASHAN, 21, D'OLIER-STREET;
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1461.

PREFACE.

THE object of the writer, in this elementary work, is to give such a summary of the First Principles of the Science of Mind and Morals, as every well-educated person should possess; and which, on the one hand, may prevent a youth entering college from being unacquainted with even the phraseology of Metaphysical and Ethical writers, and, on the other, enable one destined to the pursuits of active life, intelligently to enter into the great discussions which, in the present day, occupy the minds of men, as well as to derive instruction and enjoyment from the current literature of the age. And in furnishing such information to both classes, he has endeavoured to combine the accurate knowledge of a sound philosophy, with the reverential regard due to the word of God.

The author has had no intention of adding another to the numerous theories which already exist, on either of the subjects that are embraced in this little work. As in Physics, all was confusion—though there was a continual accumulation of facts, from the time that Bacon pointed out the true way to knowledge, that of Inductive Observation—till God raised up Newton to expound that system of the universe, which all succeeding discoveries have illumined while consolidating its foundations; so has there been, since the days of Locke especially, a constant accession to the knowledge of facts, in the science of mind; but the *aliquis exoriatur* has not yet appeared, out of them to frame the system of the moral universe. Brown, following in the wake of Reid and Stewart, who avowed themselves but pioneers, attempted it; but however valuable his work is, and though, in some respects, superior to any that preceded it, it is not "the Principia" of Metaphysics. To form *that*, there must be a knowledge of human nature as profound, combined with Logic and Metaphysics as accurate, as was possessed by him.

> . . . . Ripa nutritus in illa,
> Ad quam delapsa est Gorgonei pinna caballi.

And though not inspired, in the same sense as *he* was, besides being in Mental and Moral Science what Newton was in Physics and Milton in Poetry, like them he must drink deeply at the fountain of Inspiration. For, just as every fresh discovery in Geology and Astronomy, instead of placing these sciences at variance with the Bible, only manifests their more close approximation to it; so, though the Scriptures were no more intended to teach the Philosophy of Mind than of Physical Science, the sounder any system of that science is, as in the case of the latter, the more perfectly will it harmonise with the word of God.

It is hoped that this attempt to make plain, subjects that have been generally regarded as too abstruse for youth, may lead to the introduction of the book into the course of an enlightened and liberal education both for males and females; and the writer will be gratified if it prove a contribution to a more intellectual system of education than that which too generally prevails—that of combining information with mental discipline. A very high authority in such matters, recommends the Elements of such studies to follow the Elements of Mathematics; and forty years' experience has convinced the writer, that it is either the indolence or the incapacity of teachers, that leaves out of the ordinary course of education so much that is of the highest value; that makes education itself so often consist in a merely mechanical exercise of memory, instead of the expansion and cultivation of all the faculties of the mind ; and that limits it to some specific object—as Classics, Mathematics, or Accounts, according to the particular profession in view—when the attention and judgment of a well-informed teacher, with a little additional trouble, would have made it complete within the usual period ; securing a perfect knowledge of what was indispensable to the particular design, in connection with a general acquaintance with all that should form the attainment of a highly-cultivated mind.

The writer trusts that Parents, Teachers, and Clergymen, will regard with favour this attempt not only to simplify subjects heretofore considered too abstruse for general study, but to do so in the way of connecting Philosophy with Revelation ; of leading to the investigation of human nature in the light of Inspiration; of applying to the study of both the same principle of close and accurate examination, as being the productions of the same God, and containing, each its own peculiar lessons, to be learned in the same spirit of single-minded inquiry and fervent prayer to "the Father of Lights:" instead of relinquishing the field to the enemy—suffering a false and sceptical philosophy to occupy the vantage ground, and then mourning over the ruins it has created. This, especially in the present day, when a vicious philosophism pervades the cheap literature so industriously provided for the lower classes; with which, too often, the better educated are not trained to cope.

In conclusion, the author has only to request attention to the Lexicon, as containing, in itself, a mass of useful information, worthy of being treasured up in the mind, without which, even many common topics and phrases would not be intelligible; though familiarity with the terms imposes upon the judgment as if they were perfectly understood—just as an acquaintance with the phraseology of Scripture and the technical terms of Theology imposes upon multitudes, as if they thoroughly understood "the Mind of the Spirit," and the doctrines of religion; a mistake which, in both cases, an attempt to express the supposed meaning in the person's own language, will soon rectify. A glance at some of the longer articles, such as Truth, Metaphysics, Logic, Moral, Analysis, &c. &c., will afford some idea of its utility, and the labour expended upon its compilation.

The Enumeration and Brief Review of Writers prefixed, will not only point out what works should be read by those who wish to pursue the subjects, but will answer the question so often proposed by the young student, What is the precise description of information which each writer affords? And, for what should each especially be consulted?

CONTENTS.

GENERAL VIEW.

Page.

Brief Notices of Authors on Mental and Moral Science, - - - - xiii

MENTAL SCIENCE (defined). MORAL SCIENCE (defined). Nature, differences, and respective departments of Mental and Moral Science. Mental and Moral Science farther distinguished. Metaphysics and Ethics, - - 1

MENTAL SCIENCE.

CONSTITUENT PARTS OF MAN. Mind and Matter. Principle of Investigation. Difference in the mode of investigating Matter and Mind. Illustration. Knowledge and Probable Opinion. Theory and Fact, . . . 4

GENERAL DIVISION OF THE FACULTIES OF THE HUMAN MIND.

DIVISION OF THE MENTAL POWERS into those of the UNDERSTANDING and those of the WILL. On Divisions of the Powers of the Mind, - - 9

FIRST CLASS—THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS.

I.—PRIMARY FACULTIES OF THE INTELLECT, - - . - - - 12

1. SENSATION OR PERCEPTION.—The Five Senses. Sensation by all the Senses—General Principle. SMELLING. TASTE. HEARING—Language. LIGHT—The Eye—Vision. TOUCH—Dr. Brown on the Sense of Touch. The Brain—The Mind, - - - - - - 13

2. REFLECTION.—Conscience and Consciousness. Discrimination of Terms. Perception. Sensation. Idea—Impression. Reflection. Origin of our Knowledge. Difference between the Knowledge we derive from Revelation and all other Knowledge, - - - - - - 18

3. MEMORY.—Laws of Memory. Qualities of Memory. A Habit of Memory. Systems of Artificial Memory. Importance of Memory. Memory in relation to Things and Events, - - - - - 20

4. JUDGMENT.—Popular uses of the term Judgment. Characteristics of Judgment—Simple—Intuitive—Inferential. Categories and Predicables, - - - - - - - - - - 22

5. REASONING.—Popular acceptations of the term Reason. Reason and Wisdom. Locke's Four Steps. Analytical Reasoning. Analogical Reasoning. Syllogistic Reasoning. Fallacies in Reasoning. The Syllogism and Induction. Logic—Varieties of Reasoning—Aristotle's Dictum. Views of the utility of Logic and the Syllogism. Fallacy—Sophism. Lord Bacon's Idols. Dilemma. First or Intuitive Principles of Belief, that lie at the Foundation of all Reasoning. First or Intuitive Truths always Admitted, - - - - - - 23

II.—SUBORDINATE FACULTIES OF THE HUMAN INTELLECT, - - - 3

1. ATTENTION.—Attention in its power of Intensity. Attention and Consciousness. Attention in the Singleness of its Exercise. Concluding Inference, - - - - . - - - 32

Page.
2. CONCEPTION.—Conception implies merely previous knowledge. Shakspeare's Epithet for Conception. Difference between Conception and Imagination, - - - - - - - - - 34
3. ASSOCIATION.—Principles which regulate Association. Aristotle's Classification of the Principles of Association, - - - - 35
4. ABSTRACTION AND GENERALIZATION.—Genera and Species. Archbishop Whately's Definition and Illustration. Nominalists, Realists, and Conceptualists, - - - - - - - - 36
III.—CREATIVE POWERS OF THE HUMAN INTELLECT, - - - - 38
1. IMAGINATION.—Imagination confounded with Sensation. Used by Dr. Reid as synonymous with Conception. Materials for the exercise of Imagination. Nature of Imagination. Province of Imagination. Everyday use of Imagination. Character of Imagination. Importance of Judicious Cultivation. Dreams and Reveries. Influence on the Body, - - - - - - - - - - 38
2. TASTE.—Term figurative. Sublime and Beautiful. Emotions of Taste. The Ludicrous. Wonder—Astonishment—Surprise. Novelty. Curiosity. Importance of a well-regulated Taste, . - - 42
3. GENIUS.—Criteria of Genius. Varieties of Genius. True application or perversion of Genius. Characteristics of Genius, - - - 44

SECOND CLASS—THE ACTIVE POWERS, OR POWERS OF THE WILL.

THE WILL.—The Will, in the extended meaning of the Term—in its Restricted Sense. Volition. Will—Desire—Command. Dr. Cairns on Volition. Actions. Accountability. Characters of Actions. Principle of Actions. Intellect and Will in relation to Logic and Rhetoric. Ethics and Logic. Lord Bacon. First Truths in regard to Man's Moral Nature, - - 46

DIVISION OF THE POWERS OF THE WILL, OR ACTIVE POWERS.

ON CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE POWERS OF WILL, OR ACTIVE POWERS, - 51
I.—ANIMAL PRINCIPLES OF ACTION.—1. Instincts—Habits—Control of both by the Will, through the Intellect. 2. Appetites—Universal in Sentient Beings; in selves not praise or blameworthy, - - - - - 54
II.—SELF-LOVE.—Two aspects of Self-Love. Differs from Selfishness and Conscience. Distinguished from Appetites and Affections, - - 55
III.—DESIRES.—Desire and Fear opposites. Different forms of Desire. Differs from Appetites. Varied as objects, - - - - - - 57
IV.—AFFECTIONS.—General Division. 1. Benevolent Affections. Natural Affection. The Affection which leads to form the conjugal relation. Sympathy. Esteem. Friendship. Gratitude. Patriotism. General Observation. 2. Malevolent Affections—Emulation. Resentment. Anger. Revenge. Malice. Cruelty, - - - - - - - 58
V.—PASSIONS.—Ten Primary; Five Agreeable—Love. Desire. Hope. Joy. Pleasing Recollection. Five Disagreeable—Hatred, Aversion, Fear, Grief, Regret. Dr. Campbell on Affections and Passions, - - 61
VI.—CONSCIENCE.—Conscience in its Nature. Conscience compared with Reason. Supremacy of Conscience. Connection with Belief. Its Oneness, - - - - - - - - - - - 63

MORAL SCIENCE OR ETHICS.

Ethics generally divided. Ethics and Physical Science, - - - - 66
I.—THE EXISTENCE AND REVEALED CHARACTER OF GOD. General Principles. *Cause* and Effect. Kant, Hume, and Price. Dr. Brown. Ar-

Page.

gument *a priori* and *a posteriori*. Hume self-confuted. The First Cause, the constantly operating Cause. Proofs. Reason evinces the being of a God. 2. Creation, in general, declares it. 3. Man attests it. The Intellect and its Relations. The Will with the Moral Feelings. Existence of God mysterious as important. The Ineffable Absurdity and Folly of Atheism. Douglas' Summary and Improvement of the Argument, - 68

II.—The Holy Scriptures.—Outline of the Evidences for the Holy Scriptures. Revelation and Creation in their respective provinces and displays. The Creator a necessary truth, - - - - - - - 80

III.—The Immateriality and Immortality of the Soul; the Resurrection of the Body; and so the Everlasting Life of Man in his Whole Being.—The Soul is Immaterial and Immortal. Proofs. Aristotle on the Distinction between Mind and Matter. Evidence for Mind stronger than of Matter. Immateriality and Immortality. 2. The Resurrection of the Body and Everlasting Life, - - - - - - 84

IV.—The Supremacy of the Moral Faculty and of its Rule—Revelation.—General Office of the Moral Sense. How and Why Conscience Obliges. Revelation supplies the Deficient Obligations. Rules of Conscience, supreme and subordinate. Moral Distinctions Eternal. The Moral Sense and its Anomalies, - - - - - - - 90

V.—The Criterion of Morals—Responsibility.—General Remarks. Criterion of Morals, and Theory of Morals. Responsibility. Conscience and the Moral Attributes of God. Self and Identity. Moral Emotions and Moral Judgments. Free Agency and Free Will, - - - - - 93

VI.—The Character of Actions in Themselves and their Relations.—General Remarks. Varied Aspects of a Simple Action. What Essential to Constitute a Good Action. 1. The Agent. 2. The Principle. 3. The Rule. 4. The End, - - - - - - - - - - 97

VII.—Scriptural Summaries of Moral Obligations.—The Two Great Commands. Their Developments in the Decalogue. Principlés of Application. The Triple Aspect of Scriptural Morality, - - - - 99

Lexicon, - - - - - - - - - - - 103

BRIEF NOTICES OF WRITERS ON MENTAL AND MORAL SCIENCE.

The earliest modern writer on the Science of Mind is **Locke**, in his "*Essay on Human Understanding*," which, besides its intrinsic excellence, must be read, from the continual references made to it, by succeeding writers.

Reid's "*Inquiry into the Human Mind*," and "*Essays on the Intellectual Faculties*," 8vo., 1843, and "Essays on the Active Powers," 8vo., 1843, are all valuable, from following out, or correcting the views of Locke; refuting the sceptical philosophy of Hume, and the visionary theory of Berkeley, as well as those statements of Locke and preceding philosophers on which they were founded; and laying the foundations on which all succeeding writers have built in an appeal to consciousness and experience. In the *first*, which treats chiefly of Perception by the senses, are some unguarded statements and expressions; such as the use of the term "instinctive" for intuitive truths, and "common sense" for the faculty which discerns them; but Reid's works deserve a thorough perusal, from the multiplicity of facts, lucidly stated and felicitously illustrated by appropriate examples, as well as from their pointing out the true way of studying mind. The *second*, on the Intellectual faculties, is more complete than the *third*, on the Active Powers, though it unnecessarily multiplies the *original* faculties of the mind. The latter consists, mainly, of a multitude of detached sentences, grouped under general heads, and designated "Essays."

Stewart's "*Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind*," 8vo., 1843, and "Philosophy of the Active Powers," 2 vols. 8vo., 1828.—These books contain the *substance* of the author's lectures when Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh. The *value* of the *former* consists, chiefly, in the *corrections* it furnishes to the errors of Reid, whose pupil he had been, and whom he generally follows, and in the mass of judiciously collected *facts* regarding mind, and *observations* on the proper mode of studying it; and its *charm*, in the accurate and elegant diction in which they are communicated. The *latter* is valuable from its refutation of Materialism, and its assertion of the moral faculty or conscience. The "*Philosophical Essays*," 8vo., are supplementary to both, as discussing at large some topics slightly touched upon in them.

Brown's "*Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind*," 1 vol. 8vo., 1837.—The successor of Stewart in the chair of Moral Philosophy in Edinburgh, delivered these "lectures," which were, after his death, published as they had been addressed to his class;

and, taken as a whole, they are *facile princeps* on the philosophy of mind and morals; as being *complete*, going over the whole subjects—the mind, both as to the intellect and emotions, the being and attributes of God, and moral duties; as recognising revelation; as being, in point of style, perspicuous and eloquent; and though the worth of the book is slightly impaired by a fondness for originality, yet to him who has but one book on the subject, it is the best.

Abercrombie's "*Philosophy of the Intellectual Powers,*" and "Philosophy of the Moral Feelings," each 1 vol. 12mo., are written in an attractive style, and in a Christian spirit; and they consist, principally, of a condensed and judiciously divided summary of Brown's system; with many useful observations the result of the author's own professional experience. They have done much to make the study popular; but there is little solidity and less learning in them, and the knowledge of the subjects they give is very superficial.

Chalmers' "*Natural Theology*" is contained in vols. I. and II., and his "Sketches of Moral Philosophy" in vol. V. of his collected works. The *former*, including the substance of his "Bridgewater Treatise," is peculiarly valuable on the subject of Hume's Atheism; on the proofs for the being and character of God from man's mental and moral constitution, and their adaptation to external nature; and on the supremacy of conscience. The *latter* contains much that is valuable on the distinction between the philosophy of Mind and that of Morals; and on the Emotions. The third and fourth volumes contain his work on the "Evidences of Christianity," with many valuable additions, especially on Hume's objection to Miracles, and on the internal and experimental Evidences.

Payne's Elements of Mental and Moral Science, 8vo., 1817.—The first part is mainly an abridgement of Brown, whose pupil the author was; and the work, intended for the use of one of the English Dissenting Academies, was published immediately after the Lectures of that great philosopher came forth with all their dazzling splendour; the second discusses, chiefly, the two questions, What is rectitude? and what is the rule of rectitude?

Beattie on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, 1 vol. 8vo., and Elements of Moral Science, 2 vols. 8vo., 1817, are both still deserving of perusal; though in a great measure superseded by more recent works. They came out at the time when the sceptical works of Hume and of the French philosophers had deeply infected Metaphysical Science; and being written in a lively and attractive style, were much read. They, with the writings of Beattie's cotemporary, Campbell, give a clear account of intuitive principles of belief, and show the absurdity of attempting to prove first principles in the sciences of Mind and Morals, equally as Mathematical axioms.

Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric, 8vo., 1819, would not attract the student of the Philosophy of Mind and Morals from [illegible] *title; but* the whole of the first book is deserving of being studied, particularly the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh chapters, in which will be found many acute observations upon most of the subjects that come under consideration, both as regards the Intellect and the Active Powers of the human mind.

ARCHBISHOP WHATELY'S WORK ON LOGIC, 8vo., 1830, and that ON RHETORIC, 8vo., 1831, have removed much of the difficulty that encircled the study of these subjects; and, while asserting their utility, have rendered them easy, attractive, and popular. His EASY LESSONS IN REASONING, and his INTRODUCTORY LESSONS ON THE CHRISTIAN EVIDENCES, have shown how possible it is to makesubj ects apparently the most learned and abstruse, quite level to the capacities of the young.

LORD BROUGHAM'S DISCOURSE ON NATURAL THEOLOGY, 12mo., as an Appendix to Paley, in the most valuable edition of his work on Natural Theology, that, accompanied by the illustrations of Sir Charles Bell, renewed the question of the possibility of proving the immateriality and immortality of the soul, *without the aid of revelation.* The reader will find it amply discussed in the old controversy of Dr. S. Clark, and Dodwell, in Clark's Works, fol. vol. iii. Dr. TURTON'S work on *Natural Theology*, 12mo., is intended to be corrective of, and supplementary to, these. It was published in small 8vo., 1840.

BUTLER'S ANALOGY, in works 8vo., 1842. The great object of this work—which is read by every one who reads anything on the subject—is to show that all the *probabilities* derived from what we see, and know, and must admit, upon the principles of reason and experience, are in favour of a future life; and that, a life of happiness or misery, according to our present character and conduct: and that the principle we proceed upon in this branch of *morals*, is the same as in *physics*, in which, from the known laws of matter, in our own region of the universe, we conclude as to their existence and operation in regions beyond the sphere of our observation. Even against miracles, there is no argument from antecedent improbability, as Creation, the production of the first human pair, the first pairs of the inferior animals, &c. &c., were miracles. The germ of the argument seems to have been found in a passage which he quotes from Origen, in which that writer says that he who believes the Author of Nature to be the same as the Author of Scripture, may well expect to find the same sort of difficulties in the *latter* as in the *former;* and so the existence of such difficulties, in *Revelation*, as are found in the course of *nature* and the administration of *Providence*, is an argument in favour of, rather than against, the divine original of the word of God. His sermon on *Conscience*, in the volume which contains his collected works, contains the *sum* of the doctrine on the subject, developed in the writings of Chalmers, Mackintosh, and others; and he is particularly clear and satisfactory on the subject of *personal identity*.

DOUGLAS' PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND, 8vo., 1844.—This very acute writer takes a rapid review, *in detached portions*, of the most important subjects which the title of his book embraces; and, though rather dogmatically, corrects a good deal of what was erroneous in previous writers, and divests the subjects which he discusses of much extraneous matter. The work, however, is rather a collection of detached essays than a consecutive treatise, and presupposes, rather than imparts, a knowledge of the subject.

Cairns' Essay on Moral Freedom, 8vo., 1842.—Besides what the title of the work would lead one to expect, namely, a discussion of the great and important question of Moral Liberty and Necessity, on which he has thrown more light than any of his predecessors, there is a great deal of cool philosophical dissertation on most of the questions that enter into the Science of Mind; but requiring, in the reader, much attention, from the very involved phraseology which the author's philosophical caution leads him to employ.

Mackintosh's Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy, *with a Preface by Whewell*, 8vo., 1837, is a continuation of Stewart's Dissertation on the other department of the same science; and after a brief retrospect of the Ancient and Scholastical Ethics, he traces the history of the different systems of the Moderns from Grotius to Brown. He gives a fair and impartial view of the chief writers and the controversies that arose out of their works, in flowing and eloquent language.

Whewell's History of the Inductive Sciences, 3 vols. 8vo., 1840, though more especially devoted to the Physical Sciences, contains much valuable information on the records of Mental and Ethical Science.

Mill's System of Logic, 2 vols. 8vo., 1843, is based upon Materialism.

OUTLINES

OF

MENTAL AND MORAL SCIENCE.

GENERAL VIEW.

Mental Science.—The object of **Mental Science** is, to investigate the nature, powers, operations, and laws of the mind of Man.

Moral Science.—**Moral Science** has for its object, the application of the knowledge of the human mind—to ascertain its *relations* to God and our fellow-men; as well as the grounds, laws, and limits of our *Moral Obligations*.

The *nature, differences,* and *respective departments of Mental and Moral Science,* may be thus illustrated. The mind, like the body to which it is united, may be regarded as a substance possessing certain qualities—as possessing various faculties, affections, and emotions, which constitute mental phenomena; and as there is the *physiology of the body,* which, by *observation and experiment,* traces the changes that take place in our material part, and classifies them under the various functions of respiration, circulation, nutrition, &c.; so there is the *physiology of mind,* which marks its operations and changes, and the laws that regulate their succession, and arranges them in classes, as perception, memory, judgment, &c. &c.; but there is this difference. When we have obtained the knowledge of the *physiology of the body*, its structure, its organs, the changes in their functions, our work is done. We know all that can be known of *matter*, when we know its appearances in all situations, and the manner in which it acts or is acted on; and we have only to apply this knowledge, to keep all its movements in their natural order, or to restore them when deranged. But when we have learned the *physiology of mind*, its faculties, emotions, passions—their connexion, exercises, changes, and reciprocal influence, there is still the further inquiry—beyond that of *whether* they act, and *how* they act—namely, in what manner, in any given case, they *ought* to act? Every enjoyment that man can possess or confer on his fellow-man, and every evil that he can inflict or suffer, become the objects of a *further science*—the *Ethics of Mind.* Thus, there is the *Intellectual analysis*, which traces the mind through all its internal changes, operations, and emotions, as well as in the external manifestations of them, simply as *mental phenomena:* this is *mental science.* And there is the *Ethical analysis*, which views all these in their relation to God, ourselves, and our fellow-men; not merely in regard to *what is done* and *what is thought*—discriminating some element of moral good or evil in all the physical good or evil we can execute or conceive—but what *ought* to be the state of *mind*, and *thought*, and *feeling*, as well as the embodiment of these in *actions.* Thus, then, as in the *Physical Sciences*, the object throughout all their provinces is to answer the question, *What is?* as it regards *matter;* they consisting only of facts, arranged according to their likeness, and expressed by general names, given to every class of similar facts; so in *Mental Science* the object is to answer the *same question*, as it regards *mind;* and to describe its various states, operations, and emotions, as well as those laws of thought which alone render any other sort of knowledge possible. But *Moral Science* has for its object one still higher, that of answering the questions, What we *ought, and what we ought not*, to *think*, to *feel*, and to *do?* It ascertains the *rules* which are to regulate voluntary actions, and the *laws* by which those dispositions of mind, which are the source of voluntary actions, are to be governed; and so it decides upon what *ought* to be, and what is *not right*—what is *duty* and its *opposite*,—in themselves, and in their bearings upon ourselves and our fellow-men; as well as the great, and benevolent, and glorious Author of our being.

Mental and Moral Science.—*Mental Science* investigates the *facts* regarding man as an intellectual and moral being; *Moral Science* deals with the *relations* arising out of these facts when ascertained: the *former* has for its object the *quid est*, (*what is*)—the other, *quid oportet*, (*what is right*). For the one, which regards the *facts*, there is experience, and induction of particulars, and deducing of conclusions; for the other, which regards the rightfulness and wrongfulness, there is the moral faculty, and the revelation of God which appeals to it.

It is deplorable to think, that the great mass of writers on morals, though professed believers in revelation, studiously avoid all appeals and references to its decisions, and that on the very subjects it was given to decide and regulate; acting thus, as the astronomer who would rely exclusively on calculations, the result of the observation of the naked eye, casting away the telescope. Dr. Chalmers compares the *two*—the *relations* and the *facts* in morals, to the *abstract principles* of mathematics, which are eternally and immutably the same if all *substances* were swept away; and the application of these same principles in reference to material existences. Were there no *material existences*, the *relations* exist; bring the existences *into being*, the relations are ready; the mathematics are ready for all facts: however endlessly multiplied the facts, there are no new mathematics. So of the moral relations, between benefit and gratitude for instance; the relation is applicable to all facts of the kind. Revelation appeals to these eternal and immutable relations.—*Chalmers' Works*, vol. i., chap. 1.

Metaphysics and Ethics—are other terms frequently used to denote the *respective sciences* of *mind* and *morals*. The *former*, Metaphysics, (*μετα τα Φυσικα*, *after the Physics*,) was a name first given by Andronicus of Rhodes, to a work of Aristotle's in fourteen books, published 163 years after his death; meaning, either that it was the work of that philosopher, next *after* his work on Physics, or that as referring to *mind*, it should be studied *next after* his work on *Physics* or *Matter*. Hence the term came to denote, FIRST, the *order* in which the *sciences* that refer to *matter* and *mind*, respectively, should be studied; for while, in the *order of nature*, we should begin with *causes* and proceed to *effects*, and so begin with *mind*—the Supreme Intelligence—and thence advance to all existing intelligences, and so to all material things; in the *order of study* it was thought we should begin with *material things*, and so proceed to *immaterial mind*. NEXT, the term *Metaphysics* came to mean the *science itself*, which was to be studied in this order. Metaphysics, thus, came to be applied as denoting the whole of *Mental Science;* and hence *metaphysical* came to be a term for whatever was *abstruse*, *subtle*, and *recondite*.—DUVAL. *Synopsis Doctrinæ Peripateticæ.*

The *latter term*, ETHICS, (*ηθος*, *mos*, *manner*, *moral disposition or habit*,) has been used either in a narrow sense, to designate *the science* which investigates the nature of *the moral principle*, the source of *moral obligation*, and the *criteria* of moral feelings and actions; or, more widely, in the sense of *practical Ethics*, in which sense it includes all *moral duties*, and so embraces both *religion and politics*—man's duty to God, to himself, and to his neighbour; both as an *individual* and as a member of the *civil community*.

MENTAL SCIENCE.

CONSTITUENT PARTS OF MAN.—Man consists of *body* and *soul*, *matter* and *mind;* the *former* he possesses in common with the inferior animals; the *latter*, with the highest order of created beings.

The BODY is material, corruptible, mortal; the SOUL is immaterial, incorruptible, immortal. The noblest part of man, therefore, is *mind;* for this constitutes him an active, a social, a moral, and a religious being.

MIND AND MATTER.—*The mind* is that part of our being which thinks and wills, remembers and reasons. . . . . By means of the senses, it holds intercourse with the things of the external world, and receives impressions from them. *How* we know not. . . . . . *Matter* is a name we apply to a certain combination of properties, or to certain substances which are solid, extended, and divisible, and which are known to us only by these properties. The term *mind*, in the same manner, is a name which we apply to a certain combination of functions, or to a certain power which we feel within, which thinks, and wills, and reasons, and is known to us only by these functions. *Matter* we know only by our *senses*—*mind*, by *consciousness:* of the *essence* of either we know nothing; we know them by their *properties*, and therefore conclude they have nothing in common. . . . . . One might as well assert *matter* to be the result of a particular manifestation of mind, as to assert *mind* to be the result of a particular modification of matter.—*Abercrombie on the Intellectual Powers*, pp. 19–24.

Of all the truths we know (says Dugald Stewart) the existence of mind is the most certain. Even the system of Berkeley, concerning the non-existence of matter, is far more conceivable than that nothing but matter exists in the universe. Men (says Baxter) were formerly credulous and easy perhaps; now they are affectedly wise, with the air of more philosophy and knowledge; but our moderns forget, that he who believes that dead matter can produce the effects of life and reason, is a hundred times more credulous than the most thorough-paced believer that ever existed.

As we say of *gold*, that it is that which is of a certain specific weight; yellow, ductile, fusible at a certain temperature, and capable of certain combinations—because all these properties have been observed by ourselves or others—so we say of the *mind*, that it is that which perceives, remembers, compares, and is susceptible of various emotions or other feelings.—*Brown.*

Matter and mind, however, are both creatures of God, and, as such, were pronounced, when he formed them, "very good." The *Oriental philosophy*, so designated from its having prevailed in the East—called, also, *Manicheism*, from Manes a Persian, its supposed founder—taught that *matter* was *uncreated* and *eternal*, the source of evil, and called it *darkness;* as *mind* was the source of *good*, and was called *light;* in opposition to which Jehovah, the one uncreated Being, the cause of all things, declares that he "created both light and darkness, good and evil." Is. xlv. 7. It was this "false philosophy" that led some to deny that our Lord took a *real, material body*, or "came in flesh," (1 John iv. 3.); and to affirm that he only took it in *appearance*, and hence were called *Docetæ*, (δοκηται, from δοκεω, to *seem*). It is only as liable to decay and death—as bearing, in disease, and in being the instrument of sin, the exhibitions of the fall—and as contrasted with "the same body," *risen, incorruptible, spiritual*, and *glorious*, that it is called a "vile body." Phil. iii. 21.

PRINCIPLE OF INVESTIGATION.—The mode of conducting the investigation into the nature and properties of *matter*, is—by *observation* and *experiment;* into those of mind, by *attention* and *consciousness.* According as these modes are pursued or neglected, the result will be—fact or hypothesis, knowledge or theory, certain truth or mere opinion.

Difference in the Mode of Investigating Matter and Mind.—In examining *matter*, it is the *mind* which perceives, compares, and arranges; but the *phenomena* and the *instruments* are all *without.* In the investigation of *mind,* it is the *same mind* which examines; and the *phenomena* and the *instruments* are all *within.* Though the *subject* to be investigated, therefore, is more difficult, being not cognizable by *the senses,* yet it has its facilities, in that it is ever *present,* and that no complex or cumbersome apparatus is requisite; *that,* like the *subject itself,* being ever *near*, and always *ready;* and it is, on all accounts, a matter of inconceivably more *interest* and *moment;* so that it is disgraceful to be able, by the aid of the telescope and mathematics, to calculate the disturbing forces of a satellite of Jupiter, and to be ignorant of the power within by which all is accomplished, and which, while it looks out on all phenomena, has its own peculiar phenomena besides.

The great boon Lord Bacon conferred on the sciences, which he may almost be said to have created, was the turning of men's minds away from speculation to experiment; for science is the result of individual discoveries, and discovery is the result of experiment and observation; and thus the foundation was laid, and the elements were prepared, in the physical sciences, when the master mind of Newton arose to shape and form them. The materials in the science of mind have been in process of collection since the days of Locke; but the master mind—the Newton to mould them—has not yet arisen.

Illustration.—That the magnet attracts steel is a fact—the result of observation and experiment; but that it is by an invisible fluid emitted, or by any other mode, is but theory, and gives rise to nothing higher than opinion. That the planets move round the sun in elliptical orbits, in certain periods, and reflect his light to our earth, are *facts,* the result of observation; that they are inhabited, however probable, is but *opinion.*

KNOWLEDGE AND PROBABLE OPINION.—"Knowledge implies, 1st, firm belief; 2nd, of what is true; 3rd, on sufficient grounds. If any one is in doubt, *e. g.* respecting one of Euclid's demonstrations, he cannot be said to *know* the proposition proved by it; if, again, he is convinced of any thing not *true*, he is mistaken in supposing himself to *know* it. If two persons are each *fully confident*—one, that the moon is inhabited, the other that it is not, (though one or other of the *opinions* must be *true*,) neither of them could properly be said to *know* the truth, since he cannot have sufficient proof of it."—*Whately's Logic*, p. 251.

The following is a fine specimen of the accumulation of *probabilities*, without reaching *certain truth*, from the impossibility of *proof*:—

"We have something more than the mere *magnitude* of the PLANETS to allege in favour of the idea that they are inhabited. We *know* that this earth turns round upon itself, and we *observe* that all those celestial bodies, which are accessible to such an observation, have the same movement. We *know* that the earth performs a yearly revolution round the sun, and *we can detect*, in all the planets which compose our system, a revolution of the same kind, and under the same circumstances. They have the *same succession of day and night;* they have the *same agreeable vicissitudes of the seasons;* to them *light and darkness succeed each other;* and the gaiety of summer is followed by the dreariness of winter. To each of them the heavens present as varied and magnificent a spectacle; and this earth, the encompassing of which would require the labour of years from one of its puny inhabitants, is but one of the lesser lights which sparkle in their firmament. To them, as well as to us, has God divided the light from the darkness; and he has called the light day, and the darkness he has called night. He has said, Let there be lights in the firmament of their heaven, to divide the day from the night; and let them be for signs, and for seasons, and for days, and for years; and let them be for lights in the firmament to give light upon their earth; and it was so. And God has also made to them great lights. To all of them he has given the sun to rule the day, and to many of them has he given moons to rule the night. To them he has made the stars also. And God has set them in the firmament of their heaven, to give light upon their earth; and to rule over the day, and over the night, and to divide the light from the darkness. And God has seen that it was good. . . . . . It is now ascertained, not merely that all of them have their day and night, and that all of them have their vicissitudes of seasons, and that some of them have their moons to rule their night, and alleviate the darkness of it. But we can see of one, that its surface rises into inequalities—that it swells into mountains, and stretches into valleys; of another, that it is surrounded by an atmosphere which may support the respiration of animals; of a third, that clouds are formed and suspended over it, which may minister to it all the bloom and luxuriance of vegetation; and of a fourth, that a white colour spreads over its northern regions as its winter advances, and that on the approach of summer this whiteness is dissipated, giving room to suppose that the element of water abounds in it—that it rises by evaporation into its atmosphere—that it freezes upon the application of cold—that it is precipitated in the form of snow—that it covers the ground with a fleecy mantle, which melts away from the heat of a more vertical sun, and that other worlds bear a resemblance to our own in the same yearly round of beneficent changes."—*Chalmers' Sketch of Mod. Astron; works* vii. pp. 22-24.

THEORY AND FACT.—The "Nebular hypothesis" affords a most instructive example of the danger of confounding *theory*, however plausible and well-supported by argument—by ingenuity in framing the outline, and by the apparently natural sequence of the supposed facts that fill it up and give it probability—with *fact, the result of a completely inductive observation.* It was first proposed by Sir William Herschell; was next constructed into a system by the genius of La Place; became the favourite subject of speculation to some of the most able astronomers—among others Dr. Nichol of Glasgow; and was so plastic as to allow of being made subsidiary to Revelation by Dr. Keith in his "Evidences," and to Atheism in the "Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation." It professed to introduce us into the mysteries of creation; not to *an examination of the facts as they are*, but into *a knowledge of the manner in which they became so*; tracing the formation of worlds from their incipient condition of *nebulæ*, through their various evolutions, till the result became a system such as our own. The advocates of the theory had staked its existence on the expanse in Orion, as the best specimen of a *nebula* in an observable situation; and Lord Rosse's "monster telescope," like a genuine "Baconian," has resolved it into "a distinct cluster of stars," and sent the *hypothesis* after the *vortices* of Descartes. Not only thus has the *modus operandi* of creation been vainly conjectured, but we have an additional source of admiration at the "understanding infinite" of the Creator who "telleth the number of the stars, and calleth them all by their names;" since all those cloud-like appearances in the heavens are now to be regarded as systems—the stars of which are too remote to be distinctly seen by the naked eye, but, blending their light, render a spot in the heavens whitish—many of the aggregations consisting of innumerable spheres, and branching off into space to distances altogether inconceivable.

GENERAL DIVISION OF THE FACULTIES OF THE HUMAN MIND.

THE Powers or Faculties of the Mind of Man may be properly classed under two great divisions: the *Intellectual* and *Active* Powers, or powers of the *understanding* and powers of the *will*. Some writers have proposed to substitute the terms, *states*, and others, *functions*, for the terms *powers* or *faculties*; and for the phrase, "powers of the will," *moral powers*, or *emotions*; but the *exercises* of the mind are so *blended together*, that it is not possible to treat of them with *perfect distinctness*, or to use terms that shall be *exclusively* applicable to one class or other of them. Thus, if it be improper to use the term *active*, when speaking of the *will*, because the exercises of the *intellectual* powers are *active*, it is no less so to use the term *moral*, for the powers of the intellect are also moral; nor is intellect *exclusively* applicable to the class of faculties designated intellectual. In classing them we must use the term *most* characteristic, and therefore the usual terms, powers of the *understanding*, or *intellectual*; and powers of the *will*, or *active*, may be used.

Division of the Mental Powers into those of THE UNDERSTANDING *and those of* THE WILL.—Besides this, the usual division, and which is Dr. Reid's own, he says there is another, namely, into the *solitary* and *social*. A man, he says, may understand, and will—may reason, and judge, and apprehend, though there were no intelligent being in existence but himself. But when he asks for information, or receives it—when he bears testimony, or admits that of another—when he begs a favour, or accepts of one—when he gives or submits to a command—these are social acts of intelligent beings; and suppose something besides understanding and will—that is, society with other beings. They are intellectual; but they do not come under the classes of apprehension, judgment, reasoning, or any combination of these.

It is but justice to Dr. Reid—who did more for Mental Science than any other of the moderns—to state, that he expressly teaches that the operations of the mind are so complicated and involved, that the will is connected with the intellectual operations; and that the understanding directs and influences the acts of the will, while, for convenience, they must be considered separately.—*Reid on the Intellectual Powers*—1843—p. 46.

ON DIVISIONS OF THE POWERS OF THE MIND.—Mind, like matter, is known only by its *properties*, *qualities*, or *operations*; of its *essence* we know nothing; and therefore whether certain faculties, or powers, are *distinct* and *different*, or whether they are the *same faculties*, exhibiting mental phenomena, directed to *different objects*, operating in a *different manner*, and viewed under a *different aspect*; or whether it is the mind, as *one, and indivisible*, that *perceives* in one exercise, *remembers* in another, *judges* in a third, are topics on which writers on metaphysics are not agreed.

Dr. Abercrombie classes the mental faculties under, First, simple intellect; or those powers by which we perceive, remember, and combine facts or events, and compare them with each other; such as perception, memory, imagination, and judgment. Second, passive emotions; those by which the mind is affected by certain pleasurable or painful feelings, which are or may be confined entirely to the individual who is the subject of them. These he ranges in two classes: those excited by our relation to other sentient and intelligent beings, as love, hope, joy, and sorrow; and those excited by material or inanimate things—the emotions of taste, the sublime, the beautiful, the terrible, or the ludicrous. Third, the active emotions, or those which tend directly to influence the conduct of men, either as moral and responsible beings, or as members of society, the former including morals and religion, and the latter political economics.

Dr. Brown objects to the division into powers of the understanding and powers of the will as illogical, "Since the will which, in this division, is nominally opposed to the intellect, is so far from being opposed to it in reality, that even by the asserters of its diversity it is considered as exercising, in the intellectual department, an empire almost as wide as in the empire allotted to itself. We reason, and plan, and invent, at least as voluntarily as we esteem, or hate, or hope, or fear." But those who adhere to that division, as upon the whole most simple and intelligible, are well aware that the mind, which is one and indivisible—in the exercise of its various functions will often have these blended one with the other; so that it is not easy to contemplate any one exercise of any one of its powers, intellectual or otherwise, as wholly distinct and separate from every other. He then says: "All the feelings and thoughts of the mind are only the mind itself, existing in certain states." These states or affections he classes into, first, those that arise in consequence of the presence of external objects, and secondly, those that arise in consequence of certain preceding affections of the mind itself. The one set, the result of the laws both of matter and of mind, implying in external objects a power of affecting the mind, as well as in the mind a susceptibility of being affected by them. The other set result from the susceptibilities of the mind itself, which has been formed by its divine Author to exist in certain states, and to exist in these in a certain relative order of succession. The affections of the one class arise, because some external object is present; the affections of the other class arise, because some previous change in the states of the mind has taken place." Thus he divides the phenomena of mind into its "external and internal affections," using the term *affection* to denote "a mere change of state." The internal affections he subdivides into "intellectual states" and "emotions." To follow this division out, however, would require a new nomenclature in mental philosophy; and, after all, he says he is not to be understood as asserting that they "never are combined." "On the contrary, they frequently concur." In further following out this arrangement, Dr. Abercrombie gives the following summary:—He (Dr. Brown) refers all our mental processes to the two principles of simple and relative suggestion. We have no direct voluntary power over the succession of our own thoughts; but these follow each other in consequence of certain principles of suggestion, by which conceptions, in certain circumstances, call up or suggest other conceptions which are in some manner related to them. We have the power, only, of fixing the mind more intensely upon some images of this series, when they arise, in consequence of approving of them, as referring to some subject of thought which is before us, while we disapprove of others of the series as less allied to it. The former become more fixed and vivid, in consequence of this approbation, while the latter are allowed to sink back into oblivion. What systematic writers have called the faculty of conception, is, according to this system, the simple presence in the mind of one of these suggested or recalled images. Memory is this simple suggestion, combined with the impression of past time. In imagination, again, which has been considered as a voluntary power of forming conceptions or images into new combinations, by a peculiar mental process, Dr. Brown believes that we have only the power of perceiving them, as they are brought up by the established principles of suggestion, approving of some which thus become fixed, and disapproving of others which thus pass away. In thus approving or disapproving of the suggested images, we are guided by a perception of their relation to any particular subject which is before us, and which we may desire to cultivate or illustrate. According to this writer, therefore, what is usually called conception is simple suggestion; memory is simple suggestion with a feeling of past time; imagination is simple suggestion combined with desire and with a perception of relation. The relative suggestion of Dr. Brown, again, is, that perception of relations arising out of the comparison of different facts or objects, which is more commonly termed judgment; and the mental process, usually called abstraction, he resolves simply into a perception of resemblances.

FIRST CLASS.

THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS.

These have been differently arranged by different writers on the science of mind, according as they have been desirous, in their analysis, to *simplify*, or to be *comprehensive.* There is, however, one thing common to them all—the use of the *same terms;* those who reject the usual terms in their *definitions*, employing them of necessity in their subsequent *discussions;* the difference being, merely, whether those terms denote *original and distinct* mental faculties, or the *exercises and modifications* of *other faculties* more simple and uncompounded.

As our object, however, is, by familiarizing the mind with the terms and topics, to introduce them to the works of the great writers who have treated of the subject, rather than to produce a complete work stamped with logical accuracy, we shall arrange the powers, or faculties, or intellectual states and exercises into, first, primary; second, subordinate; third, creative.

I.—PRIMARY FACULTIES OF THE INTELLECT.

These are sensation, or perception; reflection; memory; judgment; and reasoning.

As it is the *same power* which, when directed to *external objects,* is termed *sensation*—that is, when occupied about the *mind itself,* called *reflection;* and the *same mental exercise* which, when employed with *propositions,* is *judgment*—that is, when directed to the *results* of judgment, properly designated *reasoning;* this first class of the intellectual powers [illegible] been made to consist of sensation or perception, memory, and judgment. But the views of the youthful student will be more distinct, by considering them separately.

I.—SENSATION, OR PERCEPTION.

Sensation, or perception, is that power or faculty of the mind by which, from external objects, we obtain ideas, notions, or sensations, through the medium of the SENSES.

These are five: SMELLING, TASTE, HEARING, SIGHT, TOUCH.

THE FIVE SENSES.—The process by which we acquire knowledge of external things is usually divided into two stages—*sensation* and *perception;* the former implying the *corporeal*—the latter, the *mental* part of it. Others apply the term perception to both. According to Dr. Brown, sensation is the simple impression made upon the organs of sense; perception is an association formed between this impression and an external substance which we have ascertained to be concerned in producing it. Our senses, by which this knowledge is acquired, are generally reckoned five: sight, hearing, taste, smell, and touch. Dr. Brown proposes to add our muscular frame, and, says Dr. Abercrombie, apparently with good reason; for there seems ground for believing, that it is by resistance to muscular action that we acquire the notion of solidity, and that this could not be acquired by touch alone.—*Abercrombie*, pp. 36, 37; *Brown, lec.* xxii.

SENSATION BY ALL THE SENSES—GENERAL PRINCIPLE.—In sensation there is *assumed* the existence of the *external object* and of the *organ;* the *feeling in the mind* is that alone of which we are *conscious;* but the perceiving *mind* can, in no instance, be conceived to be the same as the *matter* it perceives. The ancients used the term *ideas* (from *ιδειν ιδεα*) for *little images* of the external objects, which they were supposed to throw off in all directions, and which, *floating* about, entered the mind through the organ. When this *theory* was exploded, and it was ascertained that in perception there are but the *object*, the *organ*, and the *mind*, the term continued to be used—since the days of Locke, that is—in the same sense as *notion*, or *sensation*.

1. SMELLING is the sense which receives impressions by means of *effluvia*, or odours from certain external objects mixing with the surrounding air, and carried to the brain through the *olfactory nerves*. According as the effluvia are

fragrant, or *fœtid*, or *pungent*, will the sensations produced be *agreeable*, or *disagreeable*, or *mixed*. There is, however, no *resemblance* between the external object and the *feeling;* between the *fragrance* of the rose and the *sensation* it excites; the latter term denoting merely the mental state. Thus, in this, as in all the other senses, there is the *object*, the *organ*, and the *feeling*, or *sensation*, or *notion*.

2. TASTE is the sense through which we perceive certain qualities of objects by means of the mouth, lips, palate, and tongue. These are termed the *organs* of taste; and the bodies, whose qualities are perceived by them, are called *sapid bodies*.

3. HEARING is the sense through which we receive impressions, by means of sound—that is, undulations of the air, produced by the percussion of elastic *bodies*—conveyed to the mind by the organ of hearing—the ear. Sounds from a violin, for instance, might at first be supposed to be caused by the touch of the bow on the strings; but we soon learn that there would be no sounds without the *vibrations of the instrument*, so constructed as to produce them; and that these would be insufficient without the *vibrations of the elastic medium*, interposed between it and *the ear*, through which, by a complicated machinery, they strike the *auditory nerve*, and so reach *the brain;* the result is the *sensation of hearing*. But, as in the case of the other senses, we know nothing of the manner in which the effect is produced. God has so constituted us.

To this sense we are indebted for language, whether *natural* or *artificial;* the *former* consisting of certain sounds, indicative of corresponding thoughts and feelings, and the *latter*, verbal language, to use the eloquent words of Dr. Brown, so peculiarly distinctive of man, that in the poetical phraseology of one celebrated country, it gave him his name *as a divider of the voice;* or, in other words, an utterer of articulate sounds.

Language is the instrument by which Socrates brought wisdom down from heaven to earth; and Newton made the heavens them-es, *and* all the wonders they contain, descend, as it were, to be grasped and measured by the feeble arm of man. But its noblest benefit is the permanent transmission of thought, which gives to each individual the power and the wisdom of his species, or rather—for the united powers and wisdom of his species, as they exist in myriads at the same moment with himself upon the globe, would be comparatively a trifling endowment—it gives him the rich inheritance of the accumulated acquisition of all the multitudes, who, like himself, in every preceding age, have inquired and meditated, and patiently discovered; or, by the happy inspiration of genius, have found truths which they scarcely sought, and penetrated, with the rapidity of a single glance, those depths of nature which the weak steps and dim torchlight of generations after generations had vainly laboured to explore. By that happy invention, *which we owe indirectly to the ear*, the boundaries of time seem to be at once removed. Nothing is past; for every thing lives, as it were, before us. The thoughts of beings who had trod the most distant soil, in the most distant period, arise again in our mind with the same warmth and freshness as when they first awoke to life in the bosoms of their authors. The system of perpetual transmigration—which was but a fable as believed by Pythagoras—becomes reality when it is applied, not to the soul itself, but to its feelings. There is then a true metempsychosis, by which the poet and the sage, in spreading their conceptions and emotions from breast to breast, may be said to extend their existence through an ever-changing immortality.—*Brown, lec.* xx.

The importance of this sense, as that to which we owe language, rises infinitely when we consider it as the medium through which the revelation of God's will is given to man.

4. SIGHT is the sense which receives impressions from rays of light, reflected from luminous objects, meeting and forming images on the *retina* of the eye.

To this sense we owe, especially, our ideas of the *sublime and beautiful.*

The Eye.—The human eye is of a globular form, and inclosed in several coats, the outer one, from its hardness, being named *sclerotica;* and to this are attached the various muscles by which the eye is moved. It is deficient in front where the *cornea* exists—a transparent horny substance, behind which is a space filled with a clear fluid named the *aqueous humour;* behind which is the *iris* or coloured part of the eye, in the centre of which is a circular opening named the *pupil.* Next is the *crystalline lens,* and in the centre is the *vitreous* humour, named from its resemblance to glass; on which the optic nerve, spreading out into the *retina* or network and lining the back of the eye, conveys the impressions formed there to the brain, and thence to the mind; in a way unknown to us.

Vision.—The following remarks on vision will interest the reader; but as the limits would not permit a full illustration of the subject, he must be referred to Paley, and the illustrations of Sir Charles Bell. We see an object at a distance—a tower, suppose—on a hill, on the opposite side of a river. The tower, like all luminous objects—that is, objects that reflect the light they receive—reflects the rays of light to the eye. But why do not the rays of light that fall in confusion from every body within the sphere of vision—from wood, rock, bridge, river—give distinct impressions of these objects as well as those from the tower? Because the eye is formed with such a refracting power, that the rays of light that fall confusedly on its surface *converge* within it, and form distinct images of the objects from which they come, on that part of the eye which is an expansion of the *nerve of sight.* This is connected with the brain, and thus we have vision. . . . . By an apparatus of great simplicity, light—which from every quarter strikes upon the pellucid part of the ball of the eye, and which, if it continued to pass in the same direction, would thus produce one mingled and indistinct expanse of colours—is so *refracted* or bent from its former direction to certain *focal points*, as to be distributed again, on the retina, in distinct portions, agreeing with the portions that come from each separate object so as to form on it a miniature landscape of the scenery without. Nor is this all. That we may vary at our pleasure the *field* of this landscape, the ball of the eye is furnished with certain muscles, which enable us to direct it more particularly towards the objects which we wish to view; and according as the light which falls from these may be more or less intense, there are parts which minister to the sensibility of the eye, by increasing or diminishing in proportion, the transparent aperture at which the light is admitted. There are then in this truly wonderful and beautiful process, in the first place, as determining what objects, in the wide scene around us, are to be visible at the moment, the contraction of certain muscles on which the particular field of our vision depends, and which may almost be said to enable us to increase the extent of our field of vision, by enabling us to vary it at will. In the second place, the light emitted from all the objects within this radiant field which on its arrival at the retina is, itself, the direct object of vision. Third, the provision for increasing or diminishing the diameter of the pupil in proportion to the quantity of that incident light. Fourth, the apparatus by which the dispersed rays of light are made to assume, within the eye, the *focal convergence* (or gathering towards one point) necessary for distinct vision. Fifth, the expansion of the optic nerve, as a part of the great sensorial organ essential to sensation. . . . . The difference of the phenomena produced by the varieties of the external light itself, is exhibited in almost every moment of our waking existence; and the diversities arising from other parts of the process are not less wonderful. There are peculiar diseases which affect the optic nerve, or other parts of the sensorial organ immediately connected with it. There are other diseases that affect the refracting apparatus; others which affect the iris so as to present the diminution or enlargement of the pupil when different quantities of light are poured on it; others affect the muscles, which vary the position of the ball; and in all these, as might be expected, we find corresponding differences of the phenomena. . . . . To open our eyes at present is not to have a single, simple feeling; it is, as it were, to have innumerable feelings. The colour, the magnitude, the figure, the relative position of bodies, are seen by us at once. . . . It is not a small expanse of light which we perceive, equal merely to the narrow expansion of the surface of the optic nerve. It is the universe itself. We are present with stars, which beam upon us at a distance that converts to nothing the whole wide diameter of our planetary system. It is as if the tie which binds us down to the globe on which we dwell, belonged only to our other senses, nd had no influence over this, which, even in its union with the ody, seems still to retain all the power and unbounded freedom f its celestial original. . . . .

In perception the true object of vision is not the distant body, ut light; and so we can vary our visual notions of bodies without altering these bodies, by interposing substances to modify the ight. The paper that is white, seen through a glass that absorbs ll the light but rays of a particular colour, will have that colour, nd will be larger or smaller as seen through a convex or concave ens, which leaves the object as it was, only affecting the direction f the rays. The *object* is the same, yet our *perception* is different, rising from the body interposed.—*Brown.*

5. TOUCH is the sense by which we perceive the qualiies of bodies in general, such as heat and cold; hardness nd softness; roughness and smoothness; solidity, motion, xtension, and impenetrability.

Dr. Brown on the Sense of Touch.—Dr. Brown reduces many f those qualities that are perceived by the sense of touch, and hat have usually been considered as distinct qualities, to that of *esistance;* thus, *hardness* and *softness,* he considers as denoting nerely *greater* or *less resistance; roughness* and *smoothness,* as *irreularity* or *uniformity* of *resistance; liquidity* and *viscidity,* as *yieldingess;* and *solidity,* as *excluding* it—all, merely modifications of resistnce. Other qualities he considers as modifications of *extension;* as *igure,* the *boundary* of extension; *magnitude* what comprehends it. All the information we have from touch, he considers as limited to hese two—*resistance* and *extension,* except *motion;* and even these, ot alone to touch, but to our *muscular frame,* which he makes a istinct organ, considering *the sense of touch* as chiefly applying to he hand as its principal organ.

THE BRAIN—THE MIND.—The great organ of sensation s the BRAIN; to this the *immediate objects,* or *external auses* of sensation—the particles of light, for example, in vision, or of odour, in smell—arrive by means of the nerv and thus come into contact, as it were, with the senso organ or substance. The result is, the *sensation*, *idea*, *impression;* but the *connection*, or *how produced*, is in plicable. Such is the constitution of our nature.

II. REFLECTION.

This power, enables us to receive *ideas of mind*, throu the medium of *consciousness*.

Conscience and consciousness.—Let the distinction be w observed between *conscience* and *consciousness*. The *lat* is, the mind's being privy to its own thoughts; the *form* is, the heart's sitting in judgment upon the subjects of own consciousness.

Consciousness.—Consciousness, by Dr. Reid and others, v represented as a distinct mental power; making our various fe ings, not to constitute our consciousness, but the objects of "Sensation," in opposition to this view, says Dr. Brown, "is the object of consciousness, different from itself, but a particu sensation is the consciousness of the moment; as a particu grief, or fear, or hope, or resentment, or simple remembran may be the consciousness of the next moment. . . . . . There not sensations, thoughts, passions, and also consciousness, a more than there is a quadruped or animal, as a separate being, be added to the wolves, tigers, elephants, and other living cr tures, which I include under those terms. . . . . . Consciousne then, I conclude, in its simplest acceptation, when it is understo as regarding the present only, is no distinct power of the mi or name of a distinct class of feelings, but is only a general te for all our feelings, of whatever species these may be—sensatio thoughts, desires; in short, all those states or affections of mi in which the phenomena of mind consist; and when it expres more than this, it is only the remembrance of some former st of the mind, and a feeling of the relation of the past and t present as states of one sentient substance."—*Brown, lec.* xi.

Discrimination of Terms.—Let the student, who wou habituate himself to the accurate use of language, attend the following distinctions:—

Perception, when used to denote a *mental faculty*, diff from SENSATION, when likewise used to denote a *men* *faculty*, in this—that while the *latter* regards the operatio of *mind* receiving ideas of external objects through t medium of the *senses*, the *former* regards the operations *mind*, alike in reference to the *objects of external nature*, through the medium of the *senses*, and those of the *mind itself* through the medium of *consciousness*. Thus it is equally proper to say, "I perceive a mountain," and, "I perceive a truth."

Sensation is often used to denote—not the *faculty* of mind, philosophically so called, but—the *feeling* or *impression* occasioned by any external object, through the medium of the organs of sense.

Again. "The philosophic use of the term 'sensation,' does not necessarily imply what, in its popular use, is considered always as involved in it; that is, it is not confined to feelings which are pleasurable or painful, but extends to every mental affection that is the immediate consequence of impression on our organ of sense; of which mental states many, and, as I am inclined to think, by far the greater number, are of a kind that cannot be termed either agreeable or disagreeable."—*Brown, lec.* xvii.

Idea—Impression.—These terms, like most others, are figurative, the *former* being originally applied to that class of perceptions obtained through the organ of *sight;* the *latter*, borrowed from the application of *the seal to wax.* But now, *ideas* and *impressions* mean *all* clear, accurate, vivid, and distinct notions, either of *external objects* through means of the *senses*, or of *mind* through consciousness.

Reflection.—This term is often used, in a general sense, to denote—not the *power or faculty* of intellect so designated, but that *complex exercise* of the mental faculties in general which is the result of deep thought or calm deliberation.

Origin of our Knowledge.—Among writers on the science of mind, there was formerly much controversy in regard to the origin of our ideas. Some maintained that they are derived entirely from perception through the senses; others considered them as being obtained partly from consciousness or reflection; and some added a third class, that of innate ideas; but this last, that is something in the mind, distinct both from the mind itself and the external object perceived, is utterly exploded. . . . . The impressions derived from external things are to be considered as the *occasions* on which the various powers of the mind are brought into action. These powers themselves then become the objects of consciousness or reflection; and by their further exercise we acquire certain notions which arise out of the mental operations. This doctrine gives no encouragement to the scheme of materialism; for it is clear that we cannot remember, till we are furnished with some fact to be remembered; but this can never be supposed to affect our belief in the existence of the power of memory, before the fact was so furnished. . . . . . The origin of our knowledge, then, is referable, in a *philosophical* point of view, to perception and reflection.

The doctrine of *innate ideas*—that is, ideas in the mind before its connection with the body, either *inherent in it*, or the *remains of knowledge* in a former state of being—was received into the schools from the Platonic philosophers of ancient times, and gained currency from its supposed connection with the Scripture doctrine of *original sin*. It was, however, a part of the bad philosophy of the age; a sounder philosophy would have taught men that the truths of *pure revelation*, "which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man conceived; but which God hath *revealed* by his spirit," (1 Cor. ii. 9, 10)—are to be received by *faith*, upon the *testimony* of God; and that instead of framing *theories* and *hypotheses*, to account for them, the same principle is to be applied to the book of Revelation as to the book of Nature—that of inquiry. What is written there? How readest thou? The *truths* of the one book are to be ascertained in the same way as the *facts* of the other; both being, in different forms, the *productions* of the same God.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE KNOWLEDGE WE DERIVE FROM REVELATION AND ALL OTHER KNOWLEDGE.—It is through the senses that God speaks to us in his *word*—no less than through his *works*, each *book* containing its *own peculiar lessons;* and just as it is possible for man to be ignorant of the lessons taught in the one, however plainly written, so of the other; but there is this difference: whereas the lessons of Revelation are opposed to the blinded mind and depraved heart of man, so that "the natural man receiveth not the things of the spirit of God; neither can he know them because they are spiritually discerned;" the same Revelation that contains the lessons, contains the promise of the Holy Spirit, their author, to give a spiritual discernment of them, and so to *cause* them to be known, believed, felt, and loved.

III. MEMORY.

Memory is the power or faculty of the mind by which sensations, feelings, and ideas are retained, recalled, and referred to, independently of the cause which first produced them.

Memory is, thus, an original mental power, and equally important and necessary as sensation or reflection; for, while these powers are active in observation, discovery, and arrangement, memory gives stability, permanence, and effect to their acquisitions: is the cement of the edifice of Truth.

Laws of Memory.—There are certain principles according to which the operations of memory are regulated. The chief of these are the two following:—

First. The *vivacity* of the feelings awakened by the *perception* of any thing, causes it to be *longer remembered* and more *easily reproduced.*

Second. The *frequent reproduction* of an idea, fixes it in the memory by the instrumentality of *attention.*

Qualities of Memory.—Memory is sometimes *voluntary;* that is, by a strong effort the mind is *kept* on some subject of past experience; or there is an effort made to recall it. This is *Recollection.*

Memory is sometimes *involuntary;* that is, thoughts and feelings arise in the mind without any volition for reproducing them. This is *Remembrance.*

Susceptibility of memory is, the ease and readiness with which ideas are *stored up* in the mind.

Facility denotes, when applied to memory, the promptitude with which that faculty can *call up,* in the mind, and fix, the ideas formerly acquired.

Rententiveness is the power of keeping the reproduced idea before the mind, till the desired effect is produced.

A Habit of Memory.—As habit, *in general,* denotes a facility of acting, arising from the frequent repetition of the same act, so, when applied to memory, the term denotes that readiness in the exercise of all the powers of memory, which is the result of the regular and constant employment of them.

Systems of Artificial Memory.—It is generally admitted that there are original differences in the power of memory; and no less so, that by attention and exercise it may be strengthened and improved. In connection with this, and the principles of association, various systems of artificial memory have been constructed. These have been classed under the heads of—PHILOSOPHICAL; that is, when a fact or statement on which the attention is fixed, is, by a mental process, associated with some fact previously known, to which it has a relation, or with some subject which it is calculated to illustrate; LOCAL OR INCIDENTAL ASSOCIATION, when a fact or impression is associated with the person by whom it was communicated, or the place where the communication was made, and is recalled to the mind when the place or person is seen, mentioned, or thought of; and, third, ARBITRARY OR FICTITIOUS ASSOCIATION, in which the association is produced by a voluntary effort of the mind, and the facts associated are not connected by any relation except what arises out of this effort. This last consists in establishing a connection between something we wish to remember, and something we are in no danger of forgetting; such as connecting the divisions of a discourse to be delivered with the various parts of furniture of the building in which it is to be delivered, a practice said to have been in use among the ancient orators; and of this kind was the system introduced by Feinagle, whose principle was especially useful in the remembrance of dates, the figures of which were to be changed for corresponding letters of the alphabet, to be formed into words; as Henry IV. of England was born in 1366, which date, changed into letters, gave *mff*, muff.—*Abercrombie*, 85–89.

Importance of Memory.—The Greeks, in their Theogony, by a happy illustration of the importance of memory to all the exercises of fancy and the understanding, fabled the muses to be the daughters of Mnemosyne (memory). They might, with equal truth, have given the same parentage to the virtues.—*Brown*.

Memory, in relation to THINGS *and* EVENTS.—In reference to THINGS, thoughts may arise without suggesting any idea of the past, or any reference to time; but in regard to EVENTS, the idea of time is a necessary concomitant of memory.

IV. JUDGMENT.

By Judgment, that faculty is meant, of the mind of man, which is exercised about the relations of things—that which, by a comparison of objects, whether mental or material—whether of sensation or reflection, ascertains their mutual relations; and whose proper *expression* is *a proposition.* (See LEXICON, under the term PROPOSITION.)

This faculty peculiarly distinguishes human beings; for, whereas the inferior animals have sensation, and, to a certain extent, memory, they are, by the law of their nature, incapable of judgment.

Popular uses of the term Judgment.—In common language the term judgment is often used as synonymous with *prudence, sagacity*, or *intelligence;* and thus denotes—

not a *simple* and *original* faculty of the mind, but the *result of the proper exercise of all its powers.*

The term judgment is also used in the sense of *mental determination expressed;* that is, that something is *affirmed or denied* of another. In this sense it is borrowed from the *courts of justice*, in which, after examination of the evidence, the decision or *judgment* is pronounced.

Characteristics of Judgment.—Judgment *simple* is that which is the *direct result* of the comparison of things, whence we ascertain their relation.

Judgment intuitive is that which ascertains their relation at a glance, without the usual elaborate process of comparison.

Judgment inferential is that which is founded on, and results from preceding demonstration.

CATEGORIES AND PREDICABLES.—The *former* of these terms is Greek, the *latter*, Latin, having a similar meaning; and both were used to denote an enumeration of propositions, by the most extensive classes into which things could be distributed. These classes were therefore so many highest predicates, one or other of which was supposed capable of being *affirmed* with truth of every nameable thing. The categories were, according to Aristotle, TEN—*ουσια*, *substantia*, *substance; ποσον, quantitas, quantity; ποιον, qualitas, quality; προς τι, relatio, relation; ποιειν, actio, action; πασχειν, passio, passion, suffering; που, ubi, place; ποτε, quando, time; κεισθαι, situs, position; εχειν, habitus, possession.* Mill thinks it, a mere catalogue of the distinctions rudely marked out by the language of familiar life; with little or no attempt to penetrate by philosophical analysis, to the rationale of even those common distinctions.—*Logic.*

The predicables, according to Porphyry, were FIVE, embracing a fivefold division of general names, founded upon a difference in the *kind* of class they denote: *γενος*, *genus*, genus; *ειδος*, *species*, species; *διαφορα*, *differentia*, difference; *ιδιον*, *proprium*, property; *συμϐεϐηκος*, *accidens*, accident. They express, not what the predicate is in its own meaning. but the relation it happens to bear to the subject of which it is predicated.—*Mill.* (See Lexicon, under the terms *category*, and *predicable.*)

V. REASONING.

By Reasoning is understood that mental power, or combination of powers, by which we compare the *results of judgment;* draw conclusions, discern truth, and so pursue it.

Reasoning, therefore, differs from judgment, as it presupposes a series of judgments—just as judgment presupposes the materials for *its* exercise in single objects or ideas; and so is not a simple faculty of the mind.

It follows that reasoning must be true or false, according to its *data*—must be founded on evidence, probable or demonstrative—and is accompanied by belief, according to the perceived or fancied cogency of its conclusions.

Popular acceptations of the term Reason.—In common language, *reason* denotes the power by which we distinguish truth from falsehood, right from wrong, employ means for the accomplishment of ends; and is sometimes, also, used in the sense of proof or argument, which is the *result* of the exercise of the mental faculty termed Reasoning, as well as the *instrument* by which it pursues its further investigations; but, in strict, philosophical propriety, *Reason* is the power by which we distinguish *truth* from *falsehood*, as *conscience* or the *moral faculty* enables us to discriminate *right* from *wrong;* and it also enables us to employ *means* for the accomplishment of *ends*, and to draw *conclusions* from *premises*, and is thus contrasted with *instinct* or *natural impulse.* In the language of the poet—

> And *reason* raise o'er *instinct* as you can,
> In *this* 'tis God directs—in *that* 'tis man.

In common language, *reason, judgment, understanding,* are used with little, if any, *distinction;* as we say "a sound judgment, or understanding, or reason."

Reason and Wisdom.—Reason differs from wisdom in this: wisdom fixes on the right end, and seeks its attainment by appropriate means; whereas reason is occupied with relations, whether the attainment, which is the result of the comparison of them, be desirable or its opposite.

Locke's Four Steps.—In the *exercise* of the faculty of Reasoning, in order to the attainment of the end in view, Locke enumerates four steps: first, the discovery of proofs by which a truth may be brought to light; second, the arranging of the proofs ascertained, that their force and connection may be perceived; third, the perception of that connection in all its bearings; fourth, the deduction of right conclusions; which last, *alone*, is properly reasoning.

Reasoning, according to Archbishop Whately, comprehends inferring and proving, which are not two different things, but the same things regarded in two different points of view. He who infers, proves; and he who proves, infers; but the word "infer," fixes the mind *first* on the premises, and then on the conclusion; the word "prove," on the contrary, leads the mind from the conclusion to the premises. . . . . One might, therefore, define *proving*, "the assigning a reason (or argument) for the support of a *given* proposition," and inferring "the deduction of a conclusion from *given* premises." . . . . To infer, is the business of the philosopher; to prove, that of the advocate.—*Logic.*

ANALYTICAL REASONING.—When in reasoning we proceed from what is *complex* to what is *less complex*, we are said to reason *analytically*. The following is a specimen given by Dr. Brown:—Man is fallible; he may therefore err, even when he thinks himself least exposed to error; he must not expect all to think as he does, even on points which appear to him to have no obscurity; he should not therefore, dare to persecute those who merely differ from him, and who *may* be right even in differing from him; and, in consequence, any legislative act of intolerance is absurd. This is *analysis*, each *predicate* becoming the *subject* of a new proposition, and all that is contained in the last being included in the first, equally as any of the intervening ones; and might be stated, in regular form, thus—Man is fallible; he who is fallible may err, &c.; and so on to the end.

ANALOGICAL REASONING.—When, in reasoning, *resemblances from relations* which are on all hands admitted, are employed, either to establish some truth or to overthrow error, the argument is said to be from *analogy*. This is the mode of argument employed by Bishop Butler in his justly celebrated "Analogy," in which he does not *ground* the truths of religion on *analogy*, but makes use of it to answer objections; upon *the principle*, that when objections are made to the truths of religion, which may be made with equal strength against what we *know* to be true in the course of nature, such objections cannot possibly have any weight.

SYLLOGISTIC REASONING—*The Syllogism.*—Every argument or process of reasoning consists of two parts—that which *is proved*, and that *by which it is proved;* BEFORE the process commences, the *former* is called *the question;* WHEN it has been concluded, and the proof completed, it is called *the conclusion;* if that which is employed as the *proof* is stated *last*, it is called *the reason;* if *the conclusion*, or *thing proved*, is stated *last*, that which is used *to prove* it is called *the premises:* both premises together are called *the antecedent.* A syllogism is an argument so constructed, as that from two propositions, called the major and minor premiss, a third follows, which is called the conclusion; and since *such* an argument—that is, from something laid down and granted as true, (*the premises*,) something else, following necessarily from the other, (*the conclusion*,) must be admitted as true; it follows that a syllogism (which is merely the regular, logical form of stating an argument), must be an argument so expressed as that the conclusiveness is manifest *from the mere form of the expression.* The rules for syllogisms, and the whole doctrine regarding them, are given very clearly and simply by Whately.—*Logic*, 73, *et sequen.*

A syllogism, therefore, having two premises and a conclusion, is not a *peculiar kind* of argument, but an argument expressed in regular logical form, to which *every* legitimate argument may be reduced; and *the principle* on which it is constructed is the universal principle of reasoning. When *one* of the premises is suppressed, the argument is called an *Enthymeme.* (For other forms of the syllogism, as *Sorites, Dilemma*, see Lexicon, under the term LOGIC.)

A very curious controversy, and one deserving of more investigation than it has yet received, has been raised as to whether the syllogistic reasoning was originally a Greek discovery, improved and perfected by Aristotle; or borrowed from Hindoostan. Sir William Jones found the syllogism in use in the Brahminical literature; and as it is on record that Callisthenes transmitted to his uncle Aristotle, a technical system of logic, it has been argued, on the one hand, that this may have been the groundwork of the Aristotelian logic; on the other, that the Mohamedans having carried the system into India, from them the Brahmins may have learned it.

FALLACIES IN REASONING.—These are of kinds almost innumerable, but in books on logic they are classed under general heads, and one principal use of the mode of reasoning by syllogism is their detection. Not a few of the phrases employed to describe them have become current in works of general literature, and are so convenient in use that it would not be easy to find substitutes. Such are, the mistake of reasoning *a dicto secundum quid, ad dictum simpliciter*—that is, from what is true regarding *some particular thing*, or *in some particular respect*, to what is true *in itself, simply or generally; ignoratia elenchi*, ignorance of the confutation, or *mistake of the proper proof; non causa pro causa*, reasoning from what is *not* a cause *to a cause*, or assigning that which *does not account for* the matter in hand; *petitio principii*, begging the question, or taking for granted the subject in dispute; *post hoc*, and *propter hoc*, confounding that which is *subsequent* with what is an *effect*. On this subject, however, see the chapter on fallacies in Whately's Logic.

THE SYLLOGISM AND INDUCTION.—Induction proceeds from particulars to generals, and is perfect according to the completeness of the enumeration; the syllogism proceeds from generals to particulars.

LOGIC—*Varieties of Reasoning—Aristotle's Dictum.*—When we analyse the mental process by which we reason, and investigate the *principles* that guide us in such a procedure, Logic is *a science—the science of reasoning;* when we lay down *rules*, founded upon this analysis, for conducting the process correctly, Logic is an *art—the art of reasoning.*

Dr. Whately says, "There are three operations of mind in argument—*apprehension*, that is the notion in the mind analogous to perception by the senses; *judgment*, the comparing of two notions that are the objects of apprehension; and *reasoning*, proceeding from one judgment to another, founded thereon, and producing the result. The *expression* of the *apprehension* is a *term;* the *expression* of the *act of judgment* is a *proposition;* the *expression* of an act of *reasoning* is an *argument.*"

"Logic, which is, as it were, the Grammar of Reasoning, does not bring forward the regular syllogism as a distinct mode of argument, designed to be substituted for any other mode; but as the form to which all correct reasoning may ultimately be reduced, and which, consequently, serves the purpose when we employ logic as an *art*, of a test to try the validity of any argument, in the same manner as by a chemical analysis we develope, and submit to a distinct examination, the elements of which any compound body is composed, and are thus enabled to detect any latent sophistication and impurity."

Reasoning, therefore, when right, and sound, and true, is always the same; and "Metaphysical" reasoning, "Political" reasoning, "Theological" reasoning, &c., are not *different kinds* of reasoning, but the *same reasoning* applied to different subjects; nor is logic a *peculiar method of reasoning*, but a method of unfolding and analysing our reasoning; for it is impossible to reason *correctly* without reasoning *logically*.

The keystone of the whole art is said to be the DICTUM of Aristotle, called the *dictum de omni et nullo.* "Whatever can be predicated (that is affirmed or denied) of any class of beings universally, can be predicated of any thing comprehended in that class." Of this celebrated *dictum*, Dr. Whately says, its simplicity, in connection with its comprehensiveness, is its great excellence and beauty. Stewart, on the other hand, asserts it to be a mere truism, and the art founded on it to be comparatively worthless. Mill, instead of Aristotle's *dictum*, gives his own; "Things which co-exist with the same, co-exist with one another; and a thing which co-exists with another thing, with which other a third thing does not co-exist, is not consistent with that third thing."

For very different views of the Aristotelian logic, the reader may consult Dr. Whately's Logic on the one side; and on the other, Dr. Reid's Analysis of the Aristotelian Logic, and Stewart's Elements of the Philosophy of the Mind, 8vo.—1843—411-435.

Views of the utility of Logic and the Syllogism.—This instrument of reasoning, which had been, for ages, not only in almost exclusive possession of the schools, but cultivated as the primary object of human attention, has, since the days of Lord Bacon, become, by a kind of reaction, progressively decreasing in the estimation of the cultivators of the philosophy of the mind. Locke, and still more recently, Reid, Stewart, Campbell, and others, have written with great disparagement of it, as an instrument for the investigation and communication of truth; but recently Dr. Whately, in his deservedly popular work on Logic, by stripping it of all frivolities, and giving it its just place among the Metaphysical sciences, has created a revival of the taste for its cultivation. Dr. Brown thinks logic more useful in contending with others, than as an instrument of discovery; and in accounting for giving it a place in his lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, he says it was "not on account of any merits which I supposed it to possess as a useful instrument, but merely from that interest which even error itself acquires when it is regarded as the error of all the wise, or at least of all who were considered the wise for many ages."

The truth seems to be, that as a branch of a liberal education—as affording discipline to the mind, and as familiarizing the young to phraseology, with which the whole of English literature is impregnated, it is indispensable; apart from the consideration of its utility as an instrument for the discovery of truth and the detection of error.

FALLACY—SOPHISM, (*fallo*, I deceive, and σοφος, *sophos*, *wise;* and thence used to denote one who claimed pre-eminence in wisdom—a sophist—a *pretender* to wisdom).—"Any *deceptive* argument or apparent argument whereby a man is himself convinced, or endeavours to convince others, of something which is not really proved." The term *sophism* is often used in the same sense as fallacy; and an argument of this kind is called *sophistical*. Such is Hume's argument against miracles: "Testimony is a kind of evidence more likely to be false than a miracle to be true; (or, as it may be expressed in other words, we have more reason to expect that a *witness* should *lie*, than that a *miracle* should *occur;*) but the evidence on which the Christian miracles are believed, is testimony; therefore the evidence on which the Christian miracles are believed is more likely to be false than a miracle to be true." The *sophism* or *fallacy* here is, that what is spoken of in the *first* of these *premises*—is only "*some* testimony," not "*all* testimony," (or *any whatever*,) and by "a witness," not "*every* witness," but only "*some* witness;" and yet the conclusion is drawn to "*all* testimony" and "*every witness*," just as if it had been said, "food is necessary to life; corn is food, therefore corn is necessary to life;" or, "birds can fly; an ostrich is a bird, therefore an ostrich can fly."—*Whately.*

LORD BACON'S "IDOLS."—Nearly connected with *fallacies* in reasoning, whereby men impose upon themselves or others, are the *idols*, in the language of Bacon; that is, the *errors*, a blind regard to which *deceptive appearances*—like the worship paid to their idols (ειδωλα, images of their unseen deities) by the Heathen—leads men astray. These he classed into, 1, *idola tribus*, *idols of the tribe*, such errors as are incident to human nature in general—such as the love of system, the disposition to attribute effects to inadequate causes, &c.; 2, *idola specus*, *idols of the den*, errors such as are peculiar to individuals—such as a fondness for speculation, love of controversy, &c.; 3, *idola fori, idols of the forum,* such errors as arise from our social relations—as from the imperfection of language as the representation of thought, &c.; 4, *idola theatri, idols of the theatre,* errors that result from absurd speculation. The illustration of these occupies the first part of his "Organon;" as the removal of error is the first step to the discovery of truth.

DILEMMA (δις and λαμϐανω, *dis* and *lambano,* that which may be taken in *various* ways), is a complex kind of *conditional syllogism,* (consisting of two or more such syllogisms combined). A conditional syllogism is that which employs, in reasoning, *conditional propositions;* that is, propositions in which "the *antecedent* being assumed as true, the *consequent* is to be granted as true also." Of this Dr. Whately gives the following example:—Don Carlos claimed the Spanish throne, as heir male, against his niece the queen, by virtue of the *Salic* law, which excluded females; which was established (contrary to the ancient Spanish usage) by a former king of Spain, and was repealed by King Ferdinand. The opponents of Don Carlos argued, "A king of Spain either has or has not a right to alter the law of succession; if he *has* such a right, Carlos has no claim, because, &c.; if he *has not,* Carlos has no claim, because, &c.; therefore (on either supposition) Carlos has no claim."

FIRST, OR INTUITIVE PRINCIPLES OF BELIEF, WHICH LIE AT THE FOUNDATION OF ALL REASONING.—Dr. Reid, and many of the Scotch philosophers who suceeeded him, unnecessarily multiplied the *intuitive principles of belief;* Dr. Priestly and the materialists irrationally refused to admit any. Dr. Brown has well observed, that there must be intuitive truths, and illustrates the statement, in the case of our *personal identity,* as one. The belief of our identity, he says, is not the result of any series of propositions, but arises immediately, in certain circumstances, from a principle of thought, as essential to the very nature of the mind as its powers of perception or of memory; or as the power of reasoning itself, on which—on the essential validity of which, and consequently on the intuitive belief of some first truth on which it is founded, every objection to the force of these very truths themselves must ultimately rest. To object is to argue, and to argue is to assert the validity of argument; and therefore of the primary evidence, from which the evidence of each succeeding proposition of the argument flows. To object to the authority of such primary, intuitive belief, would thus be to reason against reason; to affirm and deny at the same moment; and to own that the very arguments which we urge are unworthy of being received and credited.

If, then, there must be primary and intuitive truths, it will be difficult to find any which has a better claim to this distinction than the faith we have in our own identity, as one continued sentient and thinking being; or rather, to speak more accurately, as one permanent being, capable of many varieties of sensation and thought. There is to be found in it, every circumstance which can be required to substantiate it, as a law of intuitive belief. It is universal, irresistible, immediate. Indeed so truly prior and paramount is it to mere reasoning, that the very notion of reasoning necessarily involves the belief of identity as admitted. To reason is to draw a conclusion from some former proposition; and how can one truth be inferred from another truth unless the mind which admits the one be the mind which admitted the other? In its order, as much as in its importance, it may be truly considered as the first of those truths which do not depend on reasoning; and is, itself, necessarily implied, perhaps in all—certainly in the greater number—of our other intuitions.—*Brown, lec.* xiii.

The truths of this order, which it would be unwise and absurd to attempt to prove by reasoning, seeing they are the first principles of the science of mind, and admit of no other evidence than the conviction which forces itself upon the understanding of all classes of men, are thus stated by Dr. Abercrombie:—

First or intuitive principles of belief.—"These are immediate results of a certain exercise of the understanding, but are not referrible to any process of induction or chain of reasoning, and can be considered only as an original and fundamental part of our constitution. . . . .

1. A conviction of our own existence as sentient and thinking beings, and of mind as something distinct from the functions of the body.

2. A confidence in the evidence of our senses in regard to the existence and properties of external things, or a conviction that these have a real existence independent of our sensations.

3. A confidence in our own mental processes—that facts, for example, suggested to our memory, really occurred.

4. A belief in our personal identity, derived from the combined operation of consciousness and memory, or a remembrance of past mental feelings, and a comparison of them with present mental feelings, as belonging to the same sentient being.

5. A conviction that every event must have a cause, and a cause adequate to the effect.

6. A confidence in the uniformity of the operations of nature, or that the same cause, acting in the same circumstances, will always be followed by the same effect.—*Abercrombie on Intellectual Powers*, p. 56. See also "Buffier on First Truths," *passim*, and Campbell's "Philosophy of Rhetoric," book I., chap. v.

Aristotle asserted first or intuitive truths as distinct from those arrived at by demonstration: "Thus, too, those things are to be regarded as first truths which command belief—not from other truths, but from themselves." Met, Book ii. They hold the same place in mental philosophy as axioms in mathematics. According to Locke, the existence of ourselves is known by intuition; the existence of God, by demonstration; the existence of other things, by sensation, (iv. 9, 2). Buffier says, such only should be considered first truths, as could be attacked only by a proposition not more certain; and as opponents would be compelled practically to recognise their authority. Such truths are properly called *principles* or *elements*, as on them reasoning is founded.

First or Intuitive Truths always Admitted.—Aristotle largely (says Beattie) treats of them in the fourth book of his Metaphysics, and first of his latter Analytics. He calls them "Axioms or dignities, principles, and common sentiments;" Αξιωματα, Αρχαι, Κοιναι δοξαι. Of these, he says, they are the *elements* of demonstration; and he even exemplifies them, as "It is impossible that the same thing can exist and not exist at the same time." Λεγω δε αποδεικτικας, και τας κοινας δοξας, εξ ὡν ἁπαντες δεικνυουσι. ὁιον, ὁτι παν αναγκαιον η φαναι, η αποφαναι. και, αδυνατον ἀυτο ειναι και μη ειναι. Met. iii. 2. He says *they are known by their own evidence.* Analyt. ii. 16. He further says, that unless some first principles are taken for granted there can be neither reason nor reasoning: Μηδεν γαρ τιθεντες, αναιρουσι, το διαλεγεσθαι και ὁλως λογον. Met. ii. 6. That it is impossible that every truth should admit of proof, otherwise proof would be extended indefinitely, which would render it impossible: ὁλως μεν γαρ ἁπαντων αδυνατον αποδειξιν ειναι, εις απειρον γαρ αν ϐαδιζοι, ωστε μηδε ὁυτως ειναι αποδειξιν. Met. iv. 4. And, finally—a sentiment which is of the highest moment in the discussion, especially, of matters which relate to the philosophy of mind and morals—that when men attempt to prove first principles, it shows that they are ignorant of the nature of proof: Αξιουσι δε και τουτο αποδεικνυναι τινες δί απαιδευσιας, εστι γαρ απαιδευσια, το μη γινωσκειν τινων δει ζητειν αποδειξιν, και τινων ου δει. Met. iv. 4.

II.—SUBORDINATE FACULTIES OF THE HUMAN INTELLECT.

These are Attention, Conception, Association, Abstraction and Generalization.

1. **Attention.**—The term Attention denotes the power of fixing the mind on the objects presented to it, whether these be objects of sensation or of reflection.

When Attention is occupied about external objects, it is more properly designated Observation; when employed in regard to objects of consciousness, it is Attention strictly so called.

The mental effort, which we denote Attention, is so essential to the carrying on of mental operations, that, without it, Memory could not exist; and while there is, doubtless, an original difference, in different individuals, in regard to memory, it is a general principle, that memory—in the *vividness* and *retentiveness* of the ideas it has stored up—will be in proportion to the amount of attention exercised when they were acquired.

Attention in its power of Intensity.—When attention is put forth by a very strong and determined effort, the individual becomes unconscious of the presence of other objects. Thus Archimedes, deeply intent upon his mathematical problem, was unaware of the capture of Syracuse, and unconscious of the presence of the Roman soldier who had entered his apartment.

Attention and Consciousness.—Attention is a voluntary act, and requires an active exertion to begin and to continue it; it may also be continued as long as we will. Consciousness, on the other hand, is involuntary and of no continuance, changing with every thought. This distinction is made by Reid, who says, that Locke often confounds attention and consciousness; and it is highly approved of by Stewart.

We are conscious of thought, volition, &c., but not of *mind* till there is an impression from matter on the organ of sensation; *then* we become conscious of *two* facts—the existence of the sensation, and the existence of the sentient being.

Attention in the Singleness of its Exercise.—The faculty of Attention can be exercised only about one object at one time. The well-known facts—apparently at variance with this principle—of a person dictating at once on various subjects to different persons, as Julius Cæsar is said to have done; of a teacher hearing more than one class at one time; of a pianist employing almost incredible quickness in fingering the notes of a complicated piece of music, and maintaining, all the while, a conversation with those looking on; or an extempore orator, arranging his ideas as to what topics are to follow, while giving utterance to his present thoughts in the most felicitous expressions, are all to be accounted for on the principle of the inconceivable rapidity of the exercise and transitions of thoughts, volitions, and other mental operations.

Concluding Inference.—A *habit* of fixed and undivided attention is of the highest moment in conducting the exercises of the human mind. The acquisition of this being one of the primary objects of education, the *exact sciences* are most important, apart from their practical utility; and therefore *the properly educated man* should be a *mathematician,* though not destined to a profession, as engineering, which requires it. But the *classics* have this paramount advantage, as a branch of *general education,* that while they afford an admirable course of discipline, in the formation of habits of *close attention, judicious analysis,* and *accurate investigation*—in the Greek language especially, from the delicate discrimination required in tracing the minute shades of distinction in its words;—they do all this, in connection with keeping the mind in close and continual contact with those noblest productions of the uninspired human intellect; that will live through all time, and furnish the seeds of magnificent thoughts and glorious sentiments to all generations.

2. CONCEPTION.—The term Conception denotes that mental exercise by which we acquire notions of our *formerly acquired* sensations, perceptions, and ideas; or, in other words, the power or exercise of mind which furnishes an *exact transcript* of what we have formerly known or felt.

Conception, therefore, merely implies *previous knowledge* of any thing as an object of perception or consciousness—not the *truth* or *falsehood,* the *good* or *evil* of that which is conceived.

But while conception implies, always, *previous knowledge,* it does not necessarily imply, that that knowledge should have been personal; for we may have a perfect conception of any thing from description, though it has never been submitted to our senses.

Conception is beautifully styled by Shakspeare "the mind's eye."

The difference between conception and imagination is illustrated at great length by Stewart; "Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind," 75-80.

3. Association.—By Association is meant that power of the human intellect, by which one thought is suggested to the mind by another, so as to produce a *train of thought;* or, in other words, the faculty by which the *succession* of our thoughts is regulated.

How thoughts arise in the mind is inexplicable; but that, when suggested, their connection and dependance are regulated by certain laws, is a fact—at once most clearly established, and, in its connections and influence, highly important in the science of the human mind.

The mind is thus shown to be the production of a God of *order,* no less than of a God of intelligence and power.

Principles which regulate Association.—Of these *some* are perfectly *obvious,* such as resemblance, analogy, contrariety, vicinity in time or place, and coincidence in sounds. *Other* principles which regulate association are discoverable only by particular efforts of attention, such as cause and effect, means and end, premises and conclusion.

The most obvious of the causes which create association of ideas—producing a train so extended that the last links, if viewed apart, would seem to have no connection with the first, is the presence of certain external objects which revive the recollection of former thoughts and feelings. Travelling alone upon a road, formerly passed over in company with a beloved friend, the objects as they occur, which had been formerly observed, and made the subject of conversation, will recal the conversation, and rekindle the feelings which it had produced, with almost their original vividness and reality. Entering a chamber in which we had witnessed the death of a dear friend, every object will reproduce the topics of discourse, and revive, in all their intensity, the emotions which had long since vanished. Revisiting the scenes of boyhood after a lapse of years—the places of amusement, or study, or employment—the persons with whom we associated—the conversations held with them, and the feelings excited, which all had passed away into oblivion, will, at once, become present realities.

This law of our nature is, in its exercise, exemplified in a fact recorded in Captain King's "Voyage." At Oonalashka, a knife was found which had been left at that desert and inhospitable spot by some former travellers, on the blade of which was stamped the letters forming the word "London." The sight of it called up, at once, the scenes of the metropolis, the friends left behind, the adieus at parting, and the hoped for joy, on returning, as if all had been actual realities.—*Stewart's "Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind,"* chap. v. part 1, sec. 4.

The influence of association is eloquently described by Dr. Johnson, in his visit to Iona. "We were now treading that illustrious island which was once the luminary of the Caledonian regions, whence savage clans and roving barbarians derived the benefits of knowledge and the blessings of religion. To abstract the mind from all local emotions would be impossible if it were endeavoured, and would be foolish if it were possible. Whatever withdraws us from the power of our senses—whatever makes the past, the distant, or the future, predominate over the present, advances us in the dignity of thinking beings. Far from me and my friends be such frigid philosophy as may conduct us, indifferent and unmoved, over any ground which has been dignified by wisdom, bravery, or virtue. That man is little to be envied whose patriotism would not gain force upon the plain of Marathon, or whose piety would not grow warmer among the ruins of Iona."

ARISTOTLE'S CLASSIFICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSOCIATION.—We try to recal an idea (*θηρευομεν*, *hunt after it*), and we are aided by *something present* (*απο του νυν*); or *something past* (*η αλλου τινος*); or from *resemblance* (*και αφ ὁμοιου*); or from *contrariety* (*η εναντιου*); or *contiguity* (*η του συνεγγυς*); or cause (*δια τουτο*); or *remembrance* (*αναμνησις*).

4. ABSTRACTION AND GENERALIZATION.—Abstraction is the power which the mind possesses of considering certain qualities or attributes of an object *separately from the rest;* or, in other words, the capability which the understanding has of *resolving into* their *elements* combinations presented to it.

Generalization, on the contrary, is the faculty of forming out of individuals or particular assortments, *genera* and *species.*

A Species is a number of objects bearing to each other a certain degree of resemblance, so that, possessing a sufficient number of characteristics in *common*, they may be designated by a *common appellation;* which appellation may be employed to denote *any of the individuals.*

A Genus is a combination of species; as a species is a combination of individuals.

To these powers, respectively, language is indebted for *particular* and *specific;* or *generic* and *universal* words.

Abstraction is of the very highest use in conducting the exercises both of imagination and reasoning, and its distinctive office in regard to each is pointed out at length by Stewart.—*Elements of the Philosophy of the Mind,* 84–86.

Abstraction and Generalization are thus defined and illustrated by Archbishop Whately:—

The process by which the mind arrives at the notions expressed by these "common" (or, in popular language, "general") terms, is properly called "Generalization," though it is usually (and *truly*) said to be the business of *Abstraction;* for generalization is one of the purposes to which abstraction is applied. When we *draw off, and contemplate separately,* any part of an object presented to the mind, disregarding the rest of it, we are said to abstract that part. Thus a person might, when a rose was before his eyes or mind, make the scent a distinct object of attention, laying aside all thought of the colour, form, &c. &c.; and thus, even though it were the *only* rose he had ever met with, he would be employing the faculty of abstraction; but if, in contemplating *several* objects, and finding that they agree in certain points, we abstract the circumstances of agreement, disregarding the differences, and give to all and each of these objects a name applicable to them in respect of this agreement, *i. e.* a common name, as "rose;" or again, if we give a name to some attribute wherein they agree, as "fragrance," or "redness," we are then said to generalize. Abstraction, therefore, does not necessarily imply generalization, though generalization implies abstraction.—*Whately's Logic,* 49.

Nominalists, Realists, and Conceptualists.—These terms, which constantly occur in metaphysical writers, require a brief explanation. It was the doctrine of philosophers, in former times, that *ideas* were things *distinct,* both from the outward *object* and the *mind* perceiving it; and so the *idea* of any particular *man,* for instance, was different both from the *man himself* and the *mind perceiving* him. Therefore, in forming the notion of the comparative nature of *men in general,* there must be before the mind some *species* distinct from the mind, which could not be *particular*, like the sensible species; but *universal*, so as to correspond with the universality of the notion and the generic term. This doctrine descended from Pythagoras to Plato and Aristotle; and from the latter to his followers the *schoolmen*, who held the existence of *universal forms* as *real*, and independent of the *conceptions* or other feelings of the mind itself. This was called universality *ex parte rei*, and those who held it were designated *Realists*.

It was first opposed by Roscelin of Brittany, and after him by Abelard; who held that there was no *universality a parte rei*, nor any thing that could be called universal but the *mere general terms* under which *particular objects* could be ranked. After him it was maintained by Occam, an Englishman. These were called *Nominalists*. The *conceptualists* believe that *particular ideas* are formed by *conception* into *a general one*, of which the *general name* is the expression.

No one *now* believes, that there is any *external entity* corresponding to the *name Man*, distinct from *all individual men*; yet war was waged to support or oppose these opinions respectively: Lewis of Bavaria, espousing the cause of Occam at the head of an army, and Louis XI. of France opposing him on the part of the realists. The opinion now commonly received is, that from *particular objects* we receive *particular ideas*, and from marking resemblances form *general terms*, which have no corresponding *general ideas or notions*. (See Lexicon under heads Nominalists, Realists, Conceptualists.)

III.—CREATIVE POWERS OF THE HUMAN INTELLECT.

These are Imagination, Taste, Genius.

1. Imagination.—Imagination is the faculty by which, modifying and combining our ideas, conceptions, and feelings, we form new mental creations.

The term *Imagination* is often, in common language, confounded with *sensation*—that is, it is used to denote the forming of *images* or *ideas of things*, by means of impressions made on the brain through sensation; but, properly, it depends on *memory*, so that as ideas enter the mind through the senses, memory retains them, and imagination compounds them.

It is often, too, used as synonymous with *conception*, even by Dr. Reid, who defines it, "in its most proper sense, as a most lively conception of objects of sight," and says of it, that it is a "talent of importance to poets and orators, and deserves a proper name on account of its connection with their arts; and that it is distinguished from conception as a part from the whole." But Stewart distinguishes them thus; that as conception gives an *exact transcript* of what we have felt or perceived, so by imagination we *modify* our conceptions, *combining* the parts of different ones together, so as to form *new wholes of our own creation.*

Materials for the Exercise of Imagination.—The *principal*, but not the *only* power of mind which furnishes materials for imagination to new mould, combine, and classify, is *perception* through the organ of *sight.* From this it derives its *name.* But, while pleasing images are, in greatest number, and intensest vividness, transmitted through the eye to the mind, the other senses—and indeed all the objects of our knowledge, whether external or intellectual—supply their proportion. The melody of the groves, and the fragrance of the gardens, no less than the loveliness of the forms of external nature, supply materials for the delightful creations of imagination.

IMAGINATION AND ITS MATERIALS.—Dr. Brown, after—in conformity with his system of classification—denying that imagination is a distinct, intellectual power of the mind, says—reverting, as usual, of necessity, to the current nomenclature—very beautifully and justly, "We not merely *perceive* objects, and *conceive* or *remember* them simply as they were, but we have the *power* of combining them, in various new assemblages—of forming, at our will, with a sort of delegated omnipotence, not a single universe merely, but a new and varied universe with every succession of our thoughts. The *materials* out of which we form them exist in every mind, but they exist only as the stones exist shapeless in the quarry, that require little more than mechanical labour to convert them into common dwellings, but that rise into palaces and temples only at the command of architectural genius."—*Lec.* 42.

Nature of Imagination.—Imagination is a complex—not a simple faculty of the mind, for it requires the aid of abstraction to *separate* qualities and circumstances that have been perceived in conjunction; and also that of judgment and taste, to form them into new and agreeable combinations.

Province of Imagination.—The principal regions for the exercise of imagination are the arts of poetry, sculpture, painting, and design.

Every day use of Imagination.—On the province of the imagination, and the importance of its functions in the ordinary and every day

life of mankind, Dr. Brown has the following just remarks:—"W
must not conceive, merely because the *functions of the imaginati*
are sublime, that they comprehend the whole office of imaginatio
or even its most important use. *It is of far more importance*
mankind, as it operates in the ordinary affairs of life—in those fan
liar feelings of every hour which we never think of referring
any faculty, or of estimating their nature in reference to oth
classes of feelings. What are all those *pictures of the future* whi
are for ever before our eyes, in the successive hopes, and fea
and designs of life, but *imaginations* in which circumstances a
combined that never, perhaps, in the same forms and proportio
have existed in reality, and which, very probably, are never
exist but in those very hopes and fears which we have forme
The writer of *romance* gives secret motives and passions to t
characters which he invents, and adds incident to incident in t
long series of complicated action which he developes. What
does, *we*, too, are doing every hour—combining events which a
never to happen; imagining motives, passions, and thinking o
little romances of which ourselves, it may be supposed, are t
primary heroes; but in the plot of which, there is a sufficient co
plication of adventures of those we love or dislike, connect
with the piece, or episodically intermingled. Our romances of r
life, though founded upon facts, are, in their principal circu
stances, fictions still; and though the fancy they display may n
be as brilliant, it is still the same in kind with that which for
and fills the history of imaginary heroes and heroines. The d
lest plodder over the obscurest desk, who sums up in the eveni
his daily tables of profit and loss, and who rises in the morni
with the sole object of adding a few ciphers to that book of pou
and pence, which contains the whole history of his life—even
while he half lays down his quill to think of future prices a
future demands, or future possibilities of loss, has his visions a
inspirations like the sublimest poet—visions of a very differ
kind, indeed, from those to which poets are accustomed, but
volving as truly the inspirations of fancy."—*Brown, lec.* 42.

Character of Imagination.—In its exercise, imaginat
is sometimes voluntary and sometimes involuntary. Ima
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niscence; and, on the other hand, we can deliberat
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deliberate recollections by the aid of conception and memo

Importance of a judicious cultivation of the Faculty
Imagination.—No power of the human mind more requi
wise and judicious regulation than the imagination. Wh

uncontrolled; or unduly indulged, there is produced that cheerless condition of our being called Melancholy; and when excited and unduly stimulated—when made the *ruler*, not the *subject*, of the judgment, that state of mind results which is usually termed Romantic; one that—while the former is the fell destroyer of the soul's peace—is utterly at variance with a due regard to the sober realities of *this* life, and which wholly unfits for those reflections and contemplations on Divine truth which are the means of producing a right state of soul in reference to the *future world*.

On this subject—the importance of keeping the imagination pure, Dr. Reid says, "As far as the direction of our thoughts is in our own power, (and that it is so in a great measure cannot be doubted,) it is of the utmost importance to give them that direction which is subservient to our improvement—not only in arts and sciences, but in virtue, and goodness, and real happiness. The human imagination is an *ample theatre*, upon which every thing, good or bad, great or mean, laudable or base, is acted. How happy is that mind in which the light of real knowledge dispels the *phantoms* of superstition—in which the belief and reverence of a perfect, an all-governing mind casts out all fear but the fear of acting wrong—in which serenity and cheerfulness, innocence, humanity, and candour, guard the *imagination* against the entrance of every unhallowed intruder, and invite more amiable and worthier guests to dwell. There shall the muses, the graces, and the virtues, fix their abode; for every thing that is great and worthy in human conduct must have been *conceived in the imagination* before it was brought into act. And many great and good designs have been formed there, which for want of power and opportunity have proved abortive. The man whose mind is occupied with these guests, must be wise, good, and happy."—*Reid on the Intellectual Powers, Essay* iv.

Under Imagination are to be regarded *dreams, and reveries, or day dreams.* To enter into the philosophy of these at length would be inconsistent with the nature and design of this work; it has been done fully and satisfactorily by Stewart, who shows that the same laws which regulate the succession of our thoughts when awake, influence them when asleep—that the power of volition is not then suspended, but loses its influence over the faculties of the mind and the members of the body, which, when we are awake, are subject to its authority—that sleep is accelerated by every thing which retards or impedes the exercise of the mental powers, and delayed by every thing which interests or excites them—that when we wish for sleep we withdraw the mind from all interesting thoughts; and the sounds which tend to produce sleep are those which withdraw thought from all interesting subjects—that as in sleep the vital and involuntary bodily motions suffer no interruption, so the mental operations, suspended on volition, are interrupted, and all others carried on as usual; and hence groups of images combined and modified in ominous variety of forms, compose the dreams or visions of the night, as well as reveries or day dreams; all the materials being previously supplied by the senses. These last, however, are more properly designated the productions of *fancy (phantasie)*; those momentary groups of floating images, indefinitely combined, that rise and pass away. It is chiefly in these that the *rapidity of thought* is illustrated. (See Stewart on the subject; and Brown, p. 276, on the "Philosophy of Dreams.")

Influence of Imagination on the Body.—To this, especially in certain states of the body, and to peculiar organization of the nervous system—in connection with certain credulous perversities of the intellect—are to be ascribed such wonders as those of mesmerism, metallic tractors, and pretended miraculous cures.

2. Taste.—The term Taste is used to denote that faculty of the human mind by which we are capable of perceiving and enjoying the grand, the sublime, and the beautiful, in the productions of nature; or of creating, as well as perceiving and enjoying them in the works of art.

The term *taste* is figurative, being borrowed from one of the organs of sensation; and so are many of the terms used to denote the feelings to which it gives rise.

The *sublime and beautiful* are not, in all respects, perfectly distinct, though often contrasted, as Dr. Brown says, by a kind of "antithetic arrangement;" and *grandeur* is a modification of the *sublime*. In a very great number of instances all these blend into each other; the grand and sublime being only one portion of a series of feelings, of which the beautiful is also a part. Beauty, in regard to *natural objects*, or *works of art*, is an emotion of *vivid delight*, referred to the object which excites it; and sublimity is often this very beauty, united with a feeling of *vague, indefinite grandeur* in its object, and a consequent impression of *delightful astonishment*, intermediate between *mere admiration and awe.* In relation to *moral actions*, it is often a combination of the *pleasing emotion of beauty*, with *admiring astonishment* and *love*, or respectful *reverence.*

Emotions of Taste.—The perception of these qualities—the grand, the sublime, and the beautiful—is attended, according to the constitution of our nature, with emotions of pleasure different from all others of which we are susceptible. These are designated emotions of Taste.

The student, in order to understand them, has only to examine and analyze his own feelings when contemplating a lovely landscape, with its cottages and curling smoke, and cultivated fields, and browsing cattle; its pellucid streams and verdant meadows, with the lordly mansion "bosomed high in tufted trees," and the church with its spire pointing to the heavens; or the lofty mountain, snow-capt, with its frowning precipices and tumbling cataracts; the boundless ocean, tempest tossed, heaving its billows to the sky; or the lowering clouds, when, amid the lightning's flash and the thunder's roar, earth, sea, and sky seem to be commingled in chaos-like confusion; or the descriptions of such scenes, especially in the word of God, as in the vision of Habakkuk, the song of Moses, and many of the Psalms; or the conduct of many of the great and good in every age, that will readily arise to his remembrance—especially of our blessed Lord, whose whole life is a series of illustrations of the truly beautiful, the grand and sublime; as when he wept over Jerusalem, and with a word hushed the tempest to repose.

The feeling produced by the *ludicrous* is the opposite of these—a feeling for which our language has no term different from the objects which produce it. Some slight increase or diminution of a beautiful feature may create a blemish or deformity, and the excess or defect of what constitutes sublimity may produce the opposite; and so may be accompanied by an emotion of light mirth, the opposite of respectful reverence, or instead of sublimity, what is expressed by its opposite, *bathos*. The congruities and incongruities which give rise to the feelings we term the ludicrous, may be in the *objects* of our perception, and so will produce a *caricature;* or in *mere* language, and so the *pun;* or in thoughts and images expressed, and so will be the ridiculous, the witty, and the humorous.—*Alison on Taste; Addison, in 6th vol. of the Spectator; Akenside's "Pleasures of Imagination."*

WONDER—ASTONISHMENT—SURPRISE.—These arise from the occurrence of new objects, or of familiar objects in unusual situations. When the object occurs simply, it is *surprise;* when the mind dwells upon it, it is *wonder*, the *former* being *momentary*, the *latter* durable. *Astonishment* is a higher degree of wonder. The opposites to these are weariness and languor, arising from the long-continued succession of the *same* objects, or of many *nearly similar*.

Novelty.—The emotions of taste are heightened, when, in addition to the qualities which excite them, there is superadded the charm of Novelty. The soul is so constituted by the Creator, that it receives emotions of pleasure from the impulse of new external objects, as well as from unwonted ideas, the result of consciousness.

Curiosity.—That principle in our nature which leads us to seek this gratification from new objects and ideas, is named Curiosity.

Importance of a well-regulated Taste.—The benevolent Author of our being has surrounded us, in his own works, with inexhaustible sources of pure and refined enjoyment, as well as in the works of our fellow-men whom he has endowed with powers fitted to produce them; and he has furnished us with faculties of soul, capable of the enjoyment which these respectively furnish, and implanted in us a principle which seeks that enjoyment; and when *He* is seen in all, and gratitude to him fills the heart, then our happiness is made subservient to his glory.

3. GENIUS.—By universal consent, the term Genius is understood to denote—not a single, mental faculty; but that state of mental excellence, which is the result of the combined possession of all the powers of the mind in their highest excellence.

Criteria of Genius.—Invention and discovery are the criteria of genius. The *former* means the power of producing what did not exist before in the precise form in which it is exhibited; the *latter* denotes the ascertaining the existence of what existed before in the same form and character, but was unknown to ourselves and others. Thus we say, that Napier *invented* logarithms; Archimedes, the screw; Galileo, the telescope; Watt, the steam-engine: and that Newton *discovered* the laws of gravitation; Kepler, the laws of planetary motion, and Columbus, America.

Varieties of Genius.—Since invention and discovery may be employed—and, in every age, have been employed—for the benefit and gratification of mankind, in regard to all the subjects to which the human mind is adapted, it is obvious that the phrase, "A man of genius," may be applied to the statesman, the legislator, the warrior, the philosopher; no less than to the sculptor, the musician, the painter, and the poet: while, in the *latter* class, a cultivated taste, and a creative imagination preponderate, in the *former* quickness of perception, penetration of judgment, and soundness of reasoning, are most conspicuous.

True application or perversion of Genius.—If genius be the high excellence of *all* the mental powers, though some may be more eminent than others—then it follows, that he who applies the powers of genius to any other objects than the true interests of his fellow-men and the glory of God, not only sins most deeply against himself and society; but is guilty of the highest ingratitude to his Maker, in perverting his noblest gift to his own dishonour and the injury of his creatures.

CHARACTERISTICS OF GENIUS.—It has been questioned whether genius is an original and native constituent of the mind, or only the eliciting and developing, by means of proper cultivation, the rudiments of thought, or the seminal principles of mental superiority which may be supposed to be inherent in all rational natures? This inquiry is answered, if the view above given of genius be the right one; that it consists in the possession, in a high degree of excellence, of those faculties that are employed in invention and discovery; for there can be no doubt that there are original distinctions in the mental faculties. And it accords with well-ascertained facts; for these distinctions usually display themselves *first*, and their high cultivation leads to their ultimate excellencies: so that the sublime displays of genius, in the various departments of science, literature, and the arts, are the combined results of originally superior mind, and suitable and judicious cultivation.

SECOND CLASS.

THE ACTIVE POWERS, OR POWERS OF THE WILL.

THE WILL, IN THE EXTENDED MEANING OF THE TERM.—The term Will, when taken—not to denote a *single power* of the human soul, or a *single act* of *that power*, but—in a large sense, as contrasted with *intellect*—to denote *a class* of powers or faculties, may be defined as that part of our mental constitution in which exist the powers that, when called into exercise, lead to *action*.

Aristotle was the first, whose writings have been preserved, who ascribed to the human soul the two great classes of powers—those of the *understanding*, by which *knowledge is acquired*, and those of the *will*, by which man *is excited to action*. The *two classes* thus embrace all the mental capacities; as to think, to imagine, to understand, &c., are different modes in which the *intellect* is exercised in *acquiring knowledge;* and to desire, to be averse, &c., are different emotions of the *will*, leading to *activity*. From him this division obtained currency through succeeding times; and Des Cartes, Malebranche, Locke, Edwards, Reid, Stewart, &c., have all recognised it.

THE WILL, IN ITS RESTRICTED SENSE.—The will, as denoting—not *a class of powers*, but *a simple exercise* of the soul, is usually defined as *that*, in our moral nature, which chooses or refuses, accepts or rejects; or that of which, in its exercise, the manifestations are the dispositions, the affections, and passions.

Dr. Reid thinks the simple acts of the mind, of which he considers willing as one, do not admit of *definition;* and he *describes* volition as "the determination of the mind to do or not to do something which we conceive to be in our power." This, however, is to describe an *exercise* of the will—not *the will itself.* Dr. Hampden defines moral *actions*, "those that give indications of passions, dispositions, sentiments, manners, and character;" and then says, "In these, we see that in which the power of man resides—his will to do or not to do, freely exercised. These phenomena are the simple *modifications of the will.*" Upham contemplates mind as consisting of intellect, sensibilities, and will; or the intellectual, sentient, and voluntary states of mind. He is convinced that each of these has something not possessed by the other, and that the understanding operates on the will through the sensibilities-under which name he includes the various forms of emotion and desire, as well as the feeling of obligation. Like Reid, he does not define the will, and questions whether the terms "preference" and "indifference" are properly applicable to it. He says, rather vaguely, that the prominent character of the will is *movement, determination*, or *action*, and not feeling; of which there is no more in the will than in the intellect, *that* being limited to the *sensibilities.* Tappan says of the will that it is one of those primary conceptions which preclude all definition; that it is known only by an intuition of reason; and he describes it as "a nisus, or internal effort of which we are conscious—the nisus of causation." He says, "It is a fact, that *before* the time of action, we can resolve, or purpose, or determine, or intend, or choose what to do. This determining, resolving, purposing, choosing, intending, is plainly *an affection of the will*, and is one of those primary affections of our being which are known by every one, and which, because primary, *does not admit of explanation or definition by any thing else.* This resolving is, the will holding itself in readiness to act, or collecting its energies for action, before the exertion of the causative nisus." According to this writer, then, the mind thinking is intellect; feeling, is sensibility; acting, is will. We think, we feel, we will; but the specific differences among these—where the one commences and the other terminates—and by what other simpler terms to express these mental states or exercises, we are unable to explain.—*Upham's Metaph. works*, 8vo.; *Tappan on the Will*, 8vo.

VOLITION.—*Volition* is an act of the will; or, the will called into activity.

The terms *will* and *volition* are often used synonymously; but Stewart and other accurate writers distinguish them, considering will as the *power*, of which volition is the *act.* "It is necessary to form a distinct notion of what is meant by the term *volition*, in order to understand the term *will;* since it is only by attending to what we experience while we are conscious of the *act*, that we can understand any thing of the nature of the *power.*"

WILL, DESIRE, COMMAND.—"Will and desire agree in this, that both must have an object of which we must have some conception; but they differ in several particulars. What we *will* must not only be *an action*, but *our own* action; whereas what we desire *may not be our own action*, nor *any action at all.* We may *desire* what we do not will, and *will* what we do not *desire;* nay, that to which we may have the greatest *aversion.* *Command* differs from *both;* for while the *object* of *will* must be an *act of our own*, and the *object* of *command*, the *action* of *another*, the *object* of desire may be *something that is not action at all.* But though they thus *differ*, both *volition* and *desire* are included in *command;* and while *desire* and *will* are *solitary affections*, *command* is a *social act.*"—*Dewar*, i. 358.

Dr. Cairns distinguishes volition into *simple* and *complex;* the former he defines as "a preferential feeling, directed to some change in mind or body, invariably followed by the operations which lead to that change, and including a belief that the change shall certainly take place;" and the latter as equivalent to what we more usually designate intention, which he defines as including simple volitions, acts of arrangement, and combination for carrying them into effect, and preference directed to create such changes. He illustrates the difference by the volition to fire a musket at an object, which is a complex one, consisting of a series of simple volitions, as to take up the musket, load it, level it, take aim, pull the trigger.—*Cairns on Moral Freedom.*

Another distinction of volitions, or acts of will, is into those that are *transient* and *momentary*, and those that are *permanent* and *durable.* *Single thoughts* may arise in the mind by distinct *acts of volition*, and, in like manner, *continued* and *successive volitions*—that is, trains of thought may be awakened by the same agency.

ACTIONS.—Actions may be described, when spoken of in reference to intelligent, moral beings, as the *results of volitions* which results will correspond in character with the *motive* which prompt them, and the *volitions* of which they are the expression. The term *motive*, though properly denoting that which *moves* the mind, is *ambiguous;* being used sometimes to mean that which excites the mind, and so the *cause* of the volition which produces the action; and sometimes the *intention*, *purpose*, or *end*, and so the *effect* of it

The will, therefore, is the test of the *moral qualities* of actions; for the *motive* both in the sense of *producing* volition as its cause, and *directing* it as its *end*, stamps their character as worthy of praise or blame, entitling to reward or subjecting to punishment, in the view of Him to whom thoughts and feelings are words, and motives and volitions are actions.

Accountability.—Actions, for which man is accountable, are the effects of volitions; *these*, when frequently repeated, so that a facility of performing them is acquired, are termed *habits*.

Characters of Actions.—Actions are voluntary, or involuntary, or mixed. It is the presence or absence of the will which stamps the character of the action, and fixes the amount of responsibility.

Principles of Action.—*That* in the will which incites to action is termed a *principle* of action. These principles of action are seated in the will, and are philosophically designated *motives*.

The Intellect and the Will, in their Relation to the Sciences of Logic and Rhetoric.—According to Dr. Campbell, in his "Philosophy of Rhetoric," *argument* is appropriate for the intellect; persuasion for the will. By the one (Logic) you convince the understanding; by the other (Rhetoric) you affect the feelings and excite the emotions. "To make me believe, it is enough to show me that the things are so; to make me act, it is necessary to show that the action will answer some end. That can never be an end to me, which gratifies no passion or affection of my nature. You assure me that 'it is for my honour;' now you solicit my pride, without which I had never been able to understand the word. You say, 'it is for my interest;' now you bespeak my self-love. 'It is for the public good;' now you rouse my patriotism. 'It will relieve the miserable;' now you excite my pity."

ETHICS AND LOGIC.—"*Logic*," says Campbell, "whose end is the discovery of *truth*, is founded in the doctrine of the *understanding;* and *Ethics*, (under which name may be comprehended economics, politics, and jurisprudence,) are founded in that of the *will*."

Lord Bacon more fully says, "The philosophy that regards the *intellect*, and that which regards the *will* of man, are, as it were, twins in their origin. For *light* in the *understanding*, and *freedom* in the *will*, arise and fall together. Nor is there exhibited in the whole range of things such a *sympathy* as that of the *true* and the *good*. We have arrived at the philosophy of the exercise and objects of the faculties of the human soul. It has two parts, and those perfectly known and universally recognised: the *Logic* and the *Ethic; logic* discusses about the *intellect* and *reason—ethics,* about the *will, appetites,* and *affections;* the *one* produces *decisions*—the other *actions*."—*De Aug. Scien.* v. 1.

First Truths in regard to the Moral Nature of Man.—Dr. Abercrombie says, that as the knowledge we obtain through our intellectual powers is two-fold—intuitive or First truths, and acquired information; the former, *not* the result of investigation or reasoning, and therefore incapable of proof from reasoning, but a part of our mental constitution, and established by the consciousness of all; so are there First, or intuitive principles of moral truth, recognised by every mind in what may be called its natural state, neither perverted by false philosophy nor under the obscuration of a deadening depravity, as well as truths which are the result of either moral ratiocination or of revelation. These, he says, are, first, a perception of the nature and qualities of actions, as right or wrong, just or unjust; and a conviction of certain duties, such as justice, veracity, and benevolence, which every man owes to his fellow-men. Every man in his own case, again, expects the same offices from others; and on this reciprocity of feeling is founded the precept, which is found to be one of universal obligation, to do unto others as we would that they should do unto us. Second, a conviction and acknowledgment of the existence and superintendence of the great Moral Governor of the universe—a Being of infinite perfection and infinite purity. Third, a feeling of moral responsibility, or a conviction that for the performance of the duties which are indicated by the conscience, or moral consciousness, man is responsible to the Governor of the universe; and further, that to this Being he owes, more immediately, a certain homage of the moral feelings, entirely distinct from the duties which he owes to his fellow-men. Fourth, an impression of continued existence, or a state of moral retribution beyond the present life. Without questioning, however, the position that there are first moral truths, as well as intellectual ones, or discussing the claim of these to be ranked in the number of them, it is obvious that some of them, at least, are capable of being established by reasoning.

DIVISION OF THE POWERS OF THE WILL, OR ACTIVE POWERS.

The Active principles of our nature may be thus arranged:—

First—The Animal Powers, or those which have their seat in the body.

Second—Self-love, the first of the great moving principles, that has its seat in the mind.

Third—The Desires, the movements of the active principles of our nature in reference to things in general.

Fourth—The Affections, which have for their especial object our fellow-men.

Fifth—The Passions.

And Sixth—The Moral Faculty or Conscience.

On Classifications of the Second Great Division of the Powers of the Human Soul, which are usually designated Powers of the Will, or Active Powers.—Dr. Brown classes all the powers or states of mind which had usually been termed Active Powers, or Powers of the Will, under the general term Emotions; and these he subdivides into *immediate, retrospective*, and *prospective*. The *immediate* he still further subdivides into those that do *not involve any* moral feeling, and those that *do involve* a moral affection. Of the *former* kind are *cheerfulness, melancholy, wonder* at what is new, *weariness* at what is long continued without interest, the *feeling* of beauty and its opposite—for which he has no corresponding and equal name—and the feelings of *sublimity* and *ludicrousness*. To the *latter* belong the vivid feelings, which constitute, to our heart, what we distinguish by the names of *vice* and *virtue*, of *love* and *hate*, of *sympathy* with the happy and miserable, of *pride* and *humility*. Under the head of *retrospective emotions*, he has two classes—*those which relate to others*, and those which relate to *ourselves*. In the *former* he places *anger* for evil inflicted, and *gratitude* for good conferred; under the *latter*, *simple regret* and *gladness*, arising from events which we cannot control, and *moral regret* and *gladness*, arising from our own actions—that is *remorse* and *self-approbation*. Under the head of *prospective emotions*, Dr. Brown ranges all our *desires* and *fears*; the *desire* of life, of pleasure, of knowledge, of power *direct*—as well as *indirect* as in avarice—of the affections of others, of glory, of evil to others; and these as including their *opposites* as objects of fear.

As in referring all the *intellectual states* of the mind to *two* heads, perception and suggestion, his object was to simplify, so was it in grouping all the *active powers* under *one*—that of Emotions; but it has been questioned how much has been gained, or whether any thing, to the science of mind, by *a new nomenclature*, which has not been followed by succeeding writers; nor, indeed, is it likely to be adopted, the ordinary arrangement and the terms employed having become so generally used—the *latter*, indeed, almost an integral portion of the language.

Dr. Abercrombie's classification is, in part, an expansion of Dr. Brown's. In his two-fold division of the powers or states of the human mind into *Intellectual* and *Moral*, he classes those which belong to the latter—that is, as he says, the mental states or powers of man as a moral being—into, first, desires, affections, and self-love; second, the will; third, conscience; fourth, man in his relation to God. It is apparent, at first view, that this division is no more logical than those it is intended to supersede; for the term *moral* is not *exclusively* applicable to this class of mental faculties or functions; nor is the *will* to be absolutely separated from *any of the others*; no more is *conscience*, or the moral faculty; nor are *desires* and *affections* to be excluded from the relation in which man stands to God. The terms *active*, *moral*, and the like, are used to denote those states or powers of which they are *most characteristic*; and the various operations of the powers of the Will are so connected in their exercise, as to render it impossible to use epithets which will not, in some degree, apply to one as well as to others. The chief thing for the student is to get a habit of affixing a distinct meaning to the term he uses, whether it be philosophically applicable only to one or to several mental exercises.

Archbishop Whately says, "The Active principles of our nature may be classed in various ways. The arrangement adopted by Mr. Dugald Stewart (Outlines of Moral Philosophy) is, perhaps, the most correct and convenient; the heads he enumerates are *Appetites* (which have their origin in the body), *Desires*, and *Affections*; these last being such as imply some kind of disposition relative to *another person*; to which must be added *self-love*, or the desire of happiness as such; and the *moral faculty*, called by some writers Conscience—by others, Conscientiousness—by others, the Moral Sense, and by Dr. Adam Smith, the Sense of Propriety."

In a note, however, to *a subsequent work*, his "Philosophy of the Active Powers," Mr. Stewart prefers the division into *original* and *acquired*; in the former he ranks the *animal*, including *instincts* and *appetites*; and the *implanted* or *instinctive* (though not animal, or having their seat in the body), embracing *desires*, *affections*, *self-love*, and the *moral sense*; but the two last he characterizes, besides, as *rational* or *governing*; not as if they differed from the *affections* and *desires*, for they too belong to *rational beings*, but as what constitute man a *moral agent*, capable of self-government.

DR. DEWAR'S CLASSIFICATION OF THE ACTIVE POWERS.—First, the Animal principles; second, the principles connected with both the animal and intellectual frame; third, the Intellectual; fourth, the Moral; fifth, the power which man has over his emotions and desires—that is Free Agency. Under the first he places the appetites; under the second, the affections and passions; under the third, desires; under the fourth, conscience; and under the fifth, free agency.

Dr. Cairns, in his treatise on Moral Freedom, says, "That division (into Intellectual and Active) if not now abandoned, is at least greatly broken down; the two sets of principles being usually regarded as having not only many affinities, but common elements, and perhaps a common origin. Nay, most accounts agree in representing the intellectual as the more original and elementary, by which the others (evidently complex, secondary, and derived), are essentially modified, and to which, perhaps, they may be traced." But have not some of the intellectual principles themselves "affinities, common elements, and a common origin?" The same writer says, "Under the common designation *intellectual*, a considerable variety of principles are included, assuming different forms, and exhibiting different appearances; while some of them are so blended with the operation of other principles, even those of the highest order, on which the moral character of actions unquestionably depends, as to manifest a natural affinity to them all, if they do not enter into and pervade them all. The facility with which they amalgamate with moral principles, indeed, shows that they either possess a moral nature themselves, or are immediately connected with something that does produce it." He then inquires whether there be not a *great central principle* in the mind to which all others are closely related, and that within the range of those denominated intellectual? And yet he says, "By a principle in the mind, is meant merely the mind itself, viewed as the origin of a particular class of thoughts and feelings." He further states, "We can scarcely expect any classification of the operations and principles of mind to be perfect; for the difficulties, in every science, are increased by the subtile and shadowy nature of mental phenomena; and from the unity of mind as a conscious principle; and therefore all successive thoughts and feelings should be viewed as so many manifestations and modifications of itself, or rather states, in which it exists." Granted, that perception is the mind in the state of perceiving; memory, the mind in the state of remembering; will, the mind in the state of willing; that the mind is a unit, a monad; that we cannot separate conscience from the intellect, as all duties rest upon opinion, or belief, yet we are compelled, as Dr. Cairns, Dr. Brown, and all other writers have experienced, to use separate terms as descriptive of these separate states, exercises, operations, and *feelings*.

I.—THE ANIMAL PRINCIPLES OF ACTION.

These are, Instincts and Appetites.

1. INSTINCTS.—Instinct may be defined, impulse without deliberation or thought prompting; and without idea of end or object in view. This class of powers is common to man with the inferior animals; and in certain species of the irrational creation, these instincts are truly wonderful.

Dr. Reid makes Instincts a separate class of powers from the animal, designating them *mechanical*; to which term Mr. Stewart justly objects, as applied either to the instincts of the inferior animals or of human beings. Dr. Reid, however, uses it figuratively, and under it he ranges—

Habits.—The class of active powers to which the term Habits has been applied, differs from instincts in this, that the *latter* are natural—the *former* acquired; but both classes agree in this, that they operate (at least when habits have become inveterate), without thought, intention, or volition.

Though the will of man has nothing to do in the *formation* of *instincts*, as it has in the formation of *habits*, the *former* being a part of our physical nature, implanted in us by the benevolent Author of our being for wise and important purposes, yet it has in the regulation of their exercise and the government of their gratification; and reason, as it supplies arguments, presents motives, and unfolds consequences, renders man responsible for the *exercise* of his instincts and habits, no less than for the *formation* of the *latter*.

On this subject—the government and regulation of the instincts and feelings, and habits of our *moral nature*, by the *will*, through our *intellectual nature*—the following remarks by Archbishop Whately are judicious and discriminative:—"The feelings, propensities, and sentiments of our nature, are not, like the intellectual faculties, under the *direct* control of volition. The distinction is much the same as between the voluntary and involuntary actions of different parts of the body. One may, by a deliberate act of the will, set himself to reason, to calculate, to recal historical facts, &c., just as he does to move any of his limbs. On the other hand, a volition to hope or to fear, to love or hate, to feel devotion or pity, and the like, is as ineffectual as to will that the pulsation of the heart or the secretions of the liver, should be altered." He proceeds to show how people mistake their *reflections* and *convictions* for *feelings*; their *belief*, for instance, that one *is to be pitied* for *pity*; and he shows that, as one cannot form a *will to quicken* or lower the circulation, but may swallow a medicine for that end, "so, though we cannot, by a *direct* effort of volition, excite or allay any sentiment or emotion, we may, by *a voluntary act*, fill the *understanding* with such *thoughts* as shall operate on the *feelings*. Thus by attentively studying and meditating on the history of some extraordinary personage—by contemplating and dwelling upon his actions and sufferings, his virtues, and his wisdom—and by calling on the imagination to present a vivid picture of all that is related and referred to;—in this manner we may at length succeed in kindling such feelings—suppose of reverence, admiration, gratitude, love, hope, emulation, &c., as we were already prepared to acknowledge were suitable to the case. So, again, if a man of sense wishes to *allay* in himself any emotion—that of resentment, for instance, though it is not under the *direct* control of the *will*, he deliberately sets himself to *reflect* on the softening circumstances, such as the provocation the other party may suppose himself to have received—perhaps his ignorance, or weakness, or disordered state of health—he endeavours to imagine himself in the place of the offending party ; and, above all, if he is a Christian he meditates on the parable of the debtor, who, after having been himself forgiven, claimed payment with rigid severity from his fellow-servant; and on other similar lessons of Scripture."—*Rhetoric*, 201, 202.

Thus, though the Will cannot call up a feeling, or an instinct, yet, when called forth, it can control and govern it, through the instrumentality of intellect.

2. Appetites.—These may be defined principles which operate on *will* and *intention;* but not as the result of *reason* and *judgment.*

Appetites are universal in sentient beings; because, according to the constitution of the nature of such beings, these principles are essential to their existence and perpetuation.

Viewed simply in themselves, Appetites are not good or evil, the subject of praise or blame ; but man, being endowed with reason and intelligence, rendering him capable of regulating and controlling them, is accountable for the operation of the causes which actuate them, for the exercise and government of them, and the results which they produce.

II.—SELF-LOVE.

By the term Self-love, is designated that principle or propensity of our nature, which leads us to seek our own interest, gratification, or comfort; or, in other words, to pursue what we think our happiness.

It displays itself under two aspects. The first is the deliberate regard to our own happiness, which is regulated by *reason* as regards ourselves, and *justice* as regards our fellow-men, which is properly denominated *prudence*. The second is the reckless pursuit of what appears to be for our own benefit, as paramount to all other considerations, and which is rightly designated *selfishness*.

As true *self-love*—that referred to in Scripture as the standard and pattern of the love we are required to exercise towards our neighbour, when it is said, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself"—differs from *selfishness;* in that the *latter* pursues *our own* interest, or pleasure, or advantage, without regard to others, and so is the object of moral disapprobation, even when its achievements are most splendid or apparently generous; whereas the *former* is regulated *by the affections*, which lead us to regard—*not ourselves exclusively or supremely*, but also the interest, pleasure, or advantage of others;—so does it differ from *conscience*, which directs to the pursuit of what is *right* and the avoidance of what is *wrong*, apart from all consideration of what is agreeable or advantageous.

When a man seeks his own fame, or power, or aggrandizement, as his chief end, without considering what may be the results to others—as Napoleon, and most of those did whom youth are taught to admire as heroes, such as Alexander and Julius Cæsar; or when a wealthy man bestows money to found an hospital, in order to gain the praise of men; or relieves the distressed to get rid of the sensitive feeling of pain which the view of suffering would excite, he is *merely selfish*. When he refuses to gratify his appetites or passions, from a regard to the satisfaction which the due regulation of them will have on the one hand, or the pain and regret which indulgence would inevitably lead to on the other, he is under the influence of *self-love*. And when he seeks the good and shuns the evil—does the right, and avoids the wrong, on account of the intrinsic goodness and rightness, on the one hand, or evil *and wrongness* on the other, he is guided by *conscience*.

SELF-LOVE DISTINGUISHED FROM AFFECTIONS AND APPETITES.—According to Butler, Mackintosh, and others, self-love is that cool and prudential regard for our own welfare which *weighs and estimates* the chances and means of happiness; and so is distinguished from affections or passions, which compel us to act *immediately*, without calculation of the consequences. This *self-love* differs from gratitude, friendship, or pity, in that the *latter* have *others* for their object; and from *appetites* which *merely* seeks gratification. To eat for health, and to eat for mere gratification, are the results of very different promptings, though the object of both is outward—the difference is in the *desire;* in the one case, *happiness*—in the other, the gratification which the *object* affords.

III.—DESIRES.

Desire has been defined, "The immediate movement of the mind towards an object which presents some quality on account of which we wish to obtain it, and which appears at the moment worthy of being sought."

Desire and Fear are the opposites of each other, as they regard *prospective* good and evil.

Wish, hope, expectation, confidence, are all Desire under different forms.

This species of the class of Active Powers differs from Appetites in that it is *not* necessarily accompanied by an uneasy sensation, as Appetites, in their exercise, uniformly are; nor do desires return at regular and periodical intervals. Another difference is, that *volition* is necessarily supposed in Desire; but there may be appetite without volition.

Desires are as various as the objects that excite them, and to which they are directed; thus the *desire of wealth*, though it may lead us to seek it as the means of procuring other gratifications, when rested in for its own sake, is *avarice;* the *desire of power*—over *men* as the conqueror, statesman, tyrant—over *minds* as the orator, is *ambition;* *the desire of superiority* is *emulation*—that is, a wish for the pre-eminence. So there is the *desire of society*, leading to the formation of friendship; and the *desire of knowledge*, of *life*, of *esteem* or approbation, of *moral improvement*, of *action*. Abercrombie says, "The mental condition which we call Desire, appears to lie, in a great measure, at the formation of character; and for a sound moral condition, it is required that the desires be directed to worthy objects; and that the degree or strength of them be accommodated to the true and relative value of each of these objects."

IV.—AFFECTIONS.

The class of powers of the will, designated Affections, embraces those emotions of soul which prompt us to be well or ill *affected* towards others.

General Division of the Affections.—Of the Affections, some have been designated *Benevolent;* that is, they prompt us to seek to do good to others, or to wish to promote their happiness. Others have been styled *Malevolent;* that is, they excite us, if not to injure others, to desire their misery, or to entertain displeasure towards them—at least to make our own happiness supreme, and their's subordinate; or to seek our own enjoyment at the expense of their's.

Dr. Abercrombie objects to the terms *benevolent* and *malevolent*, and would substitute the terms *uniting* and *defensive*, especially as he says, "The *due* exercise of the emotions to which it refers, does not *properly* include *what is called* Malevolence; they only tend to guard against certain conduct in other men; and when they are allowed to go beyond this—that is, to actual malevolence or revenge, the application is morbid." But this is another instance of the infelicitous substitutes, invented to supersede the terms in common use; as those he employs would class the affections, not by their *essential nature*, but by their supposed *final cause*—a ground too remote for classification; and the limitations contained in the language of his objection, "*due* exercise—*properly* include—and *what is called*," may warrant the use of the ordinary terms.

He justly defines Affections as "original principles of our nature, whose operation is distinct both from that of the moral principle and from reason; that is, from any sense of duty, or alculation of propriety or utility;" and yet he includes "justice" and "veracity" among the "uniting affections," which are certainly more properly to be classed among "moral duties."

Benevolent Affections.—There are two principles applicable to all the affections designated benevolent. First, their exercise is accompanied by an agreeable feeling.

Secondly, a desire for the happiness of the objects of them is inseparably attendant on their exercise.

This fact in our mental constitution may be familiarly illustrated thus: the affection we entertain for a parent, a child, a benefactor, and a person in distress, is quite different, both in the object which excites it, and in the nature of the emotion; yet these two things are essentially included in each, namely, the *accompanying sensation* is *agreeable*, and the *good* of the *object* is *desired*.

The *object*, therefore, of every benevolent affection must be some being, *capable of happiness;* for that which has no capacity of enjoyment may be an object of *liking* or *disgust*, but not of benevolent or malevolent affection.

Of the affections termed Benevolent, the first is—

Natural Affection—that is, the result of the relation between parents and children. This reciprocal affection is implanted in human beings by the Creator, and is not the result of ratiocination, but of the constitution of our nature.

Second—The Affection which leads to form the conjugal relation. Wisely and mercifully implanted by God, this is, beyond all others, the source of happiness to human beings; when duly regulated by the principles of religion, and carried into operation according to the primitive design of its great Institutor.

Third—Sympathy; that is, the affection which prompts us to "rejoice with those that rejoice," and to "weep with those who weep." This affection, like gratitude, is natural to mankind, and, accordingly, is universal; unless when depraving superstition or soul-hardening cruelty, have stifled its emotions and repressed its effusions.

Fourth—Esteem; that is, the feeling elicited by the contemplation, companionship, or enjoyment of the wise and good. Even in the most degenerate of our species, relics of this principle exist. When the object is the Infinitely Wise and Immensely Good, then esteem becomes religious veneration.

Fifth—Friendship; the principle in our nature which prompts to ardent, intimate, and inviolable attachment between kindred minds. This, even among the ancient Heathens, was the favourite theme of eulogy.

Sixth—Gratitude; that is, the feeling of thankfulness to a benefactor. This, also, is a principle implanted in our nature by the Author of our being; for, in all countries, in every state of society—among savages the most brutalized, no less than among the civilized in the highest stages of refinement—kindness manifested by deeds of benevolence will produce gratitude in emotion, expression, and act.

Seventh—Patriotism; the love of father-land. This, too, is an affection of the human being, implanted in our nature—so deeply, radically implanted, that we love every plant and shrub in our natal soil, every being and habitation of our birth-place—every thing pertaining to the region in which we drew our primeval air—all that characterizes the scene of our nativity, and the spot of our ancestral graves.

General Observation.—To *all* the benevolent affections, however delightful in their exercise, and important in their operation, *one* thing is applicable. Inasmuch as man's whole moral nature is depraved by sin, *even these* must be brought under the sanctifying influence of the Gospel of Christ, by the almighty agency of the Holy Spirit, in order to be kept *subordinate* in their exercise to the love which Jehovah claims and which is his due—love supreme; and in order to be, even in their subordinate exercise, *spiritual*, and so acceptable to him.

2. Malevolent Affections.—Of this class the first is—

Emulation—that is, a desire of superiority over rivals in any pursuit, accompanied by an uneasy sensation at being surpassed. Ethical writers place this among the Malevolent affections, because the desire of overcoming a competitor in the race for superiority—the prize being pre-eminence—is inseparably accompanied with the wish that the antagonist may be vanquished. When defeated, and dissatisfied, it is Envy.

When power is the object, the affection is designated Ambition; and so it blends with the kindred feeling of desire.

Second—Resentment; that is, a disposition, when injured, to resist and retaliate. When this is excited to a very high degree, it becomes Anger.

Resentment is either *instinctive*—that is, a sudden impulse, arising from the constitution of our nature—or *deliberate*—that is, the result of reflection upon injury, real or supposed. These two are designated *natural* affections, and have their counterparts in the inferior animals.

From these which are *natural*, arise, from the depravity of our moral nature by sin—

First—Anger in excess; that is, the affection which prompts us to wish and endeavour to injure others.

Second—Revenge; that is, the feeling which rejoices in the injury inflicted. When it prompts us to return wrong for wrong, it is Retaliation.

Third—Malice; that is, the affection which leads *deliberately* to wish the misery of others.

Fourth—Cruelty; the feeling which delights in the infliction of misery, without consideration of injury received—real or imaginary.

The Affections, with all that come under the designation *moral*, are to be considered either *philosophically*, as they *are*, or *ethically*, as their exercise is *right or wrong*.

V.—PASSIONS.

When affections are excited to a high degree of intensity, they are termed Passions.

Of these there are enumerated *ten*, as PRIMARY.

Five are designated as *grateful* or *agreeable*:—

First—Love; that which arises from the contemplation of *good*, either considered *simply* or as *possessed*.

Second—Desire; that is, love excited so as to lead to action.

Third—Hope; that which contemplates good as *future* and *attainable*.

Fourth—Joy; that which is produced by the *possession* of what is pre-eminently good. This, in its highest exercise, is *Delight*. *Cheerfulness* is a modification of joy—a perpetual gladness, the opposite of which is *Melancholy*. Both these feelings, and the objects which excite them, are beautifully depicted in Milton's L'Allegro and Il Penseroso.

Fifth—Pleasing Recollection; when the object which first produced the delight is *absent*, but *recollected*, and so the feeling is *perpetuated*.

Five are designated *ungrateful*, or *disagreeable*. These are the opposites of the former, being enkindled by the perception and feeling of *evil;* as the others are by the perception and feeling of *good.*

First—Hatred; that is, dislike of any thing *really* or *supposed to be* evil, whether present or anticipated.

Second—Aversion; that is, hatred in active exercise.

Third—Fear; the emotion which shrinks from evil, real or supposed, but which is *distant* or *future.*

Fourth—Grief; the passion which is awakened by evil *actually endured.*

Fifth—Regret; the unpleasant feeling produced by the recollection of some past evil, unprofitably endured or unjustly perpetrated.

These elements of our moral nature, which we designate Passions, as they are tainted and biassed to evil, must be the subject of a transforming influence—an influence which shall effect the *new creation* of the *world within*—rendering it right with God, right in itself, and in its relations to others; and when this, which is essential to individual and social blessedness, shall become universal, then only shall the restoration of primeval Paradise be realized in the world's holiness, peace, and felicity.

DR. CAMPBELL'S VIEW OF THE AFFECTIONS AND PASSIONS.—In his truly valuable and philosophical work on Rhetoric, when discussing "the cause of that pleasure which we receive from objects or representations, that excite pity and other painful feelings"—after disposing of several hypotheses—in giving his own, Dr. Campbell has some very judicious, *general remarks*, the whole of which (chap. xi. book I. sec. 2) are deserving of perusal. He says that all the simple passions of the mind may be divided into the *pleasant* and the *painful;* while the pleasures and the pains created by the different passions differ considerably from one another both in kind and degree. Of the *former* class are love, joy, hope, pride, gratitude; of the latter, hatred, grief, fear, shame, anger. By *pride* he means the feeling which arises from merited approbation; the opposite of *shame*, which is the feeling arising from deserved blame. He next observes, that there is an *attraction* or *association* among the passions, as well as among the ideas of the mind; for instance, almost all the other affections attract or excite desire or aversion of some sort. Those that have the least influence on these are joy and grief; joy less, as being the end of desire and the completion of hope; and grief, as resist-ing and spurning desire, which would instigate to activity. Then, pain makes a deeper impression than pleasure; and so if a group of passions are associated in reference to the same object, some of which are of the pleasant and others of the painful kind; if the painful predominate, there is a higher and a more durable pleasure than would result from these if alone and unmixed. This holds especially when the emotions are from sympathy and not from self; sympathy being not a passion, but that quality of the soul which renders it susceptible of almost any passion by communication from the bosom of another. By it we rejoice with those that rejoice, and weep with those that weep; and it is stronger in the latter than in the former; and this is a wise provision of the Creator in this world of woe, as the miserable need sympathy of which the happy are independent. And then pity is not a single passion, but a group, partly pleasant, united by association, and blended by centering in the same object; it embraces *commiseration*, which is purely painful; *benevolence*, or a desire of the happiness of the object pitied; and *love*, which is one of the noblest and most exquisite pleasures of which the soul is susceptible, and which is, itself, in most cases sufficient to give a counterpoise to the whole.

VI.—CONSCIENCE, OR THE MORAL FACULTY.

CONSCIENCE IN ITS NATURE.—This may be defined an original principle, implanted in our nature by the Author of our being,—an essential part of our spiritual constitution of the existence of which we feel a consciousness—which decides upon sentiments, feelings, and actions, apart from a consideration of the consequences to which they lead. It is *the judgment* of the intellect, that decides upon the *tendencies and consequences* of conduct as advantageous or otherwise; it is *the conscience* that approves or disapproves of the *conduct in itself;* and this feeling of approval or disapprobation arises without any acquired knowledge, or any actual law. The Apostle Paul beautifully expresses it: "For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, not having the law, are a law unto themselves; which show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile (among themselves) accusing or else excusing one another." Thus Conscience, as a judge, sits upon its tribunal; hears the pleadings of the thoughts, and gives its decision, accompanied by corresponding punishments and rewards.

CONSCIENCE COMPARED WITH REASON.—Conscience, therefore, holds the place among the *active or moral powers*, that *Reason* sustains among the *intellectual or mental faculties;* so that, whereas man *acquires* knowledge, *remembers*, *classifies*, and *combines* it, and then *Reason* compares, distinguishes, traces relations, and deduces conclusions; so *self-love* leads to seek our own gratification, and our *desires* direct to objects which will ensure it, and our *affections* carry forth our views to others, and then *Conscience*, the governing power, deals with the *desires and affections* as *Reason* does with the *series of truths*, preserving their harmony and order; and just as *insanity* may bring reason under *derangement* in the *intellect*, so may *depravity disorder conscience in the moral nature*. Self-love may degenerate into self-gratification; desires and affections may become momentary impulses; conduct may, in consequence, be pursued without reference to the future; and so there may take place a moral derangement in the feeling and approbation of moral relations; so that, as Abercrombie says, "the *intellectual maniac* fancies himself a king, surrounded by every form of earthly splendour; and this hallucination is not corrected even by the sight of his bed of straw, and all the horrors of his cell. The *moral maniac* pursues his way, and thinks himself a wise and a happy man, but feels not that he is treading a downward course, and is lost as a moral being."

The soundest modern philosophers assert the *existence* and *supremacy of conscience*, such as Butler, Stewart, Mackintosh, Brown, and Chalmers, proving that the better the philosophy of mind is understood, the more perfect is its accordance with the teachings of the Bible; just as the more perfect the philosophy of matter—the more accurate and profound the researches of geology, astronomy, ethnography, &c., the more striking and decided is their harmony with the word of God. "The question, Is an action *right?* is certainly different," says Whewell, (Pref. to Mackintosh,) "from the question, Is it *useful?* The question is not whether *right* actions *are* or *are not*, upon the whole, *useful;* for that we will suppose to be taken for granted; but it is, whether by describing them as *right*, we mean *nothing*

an that we believe them to be *useful?* If, by *right*
ivalent words, we intend some *quality* and *attribute*
useful and similar terms do not express, we must
he *faculty* of conceiving such a quality; and that
is the moral sense." He adds, "The words which
what is morally right, and the related ideas, cannot
laced by any different set of terms. *Right, duty,*
e *ought* to do, are not expressed to the satisfaction
one, by any phraseology borrowed from the consi-
n of *consequences*. . . . . . When I say, an act is my
give an entire assent to the *rule* which commands
do it, *whatever be the consequences*. . . . . . When we
ought to do any thing, we mean something different
vantage. This word *ought,* is the most *simple and*
universal expression of the *moral sense*."

CONNECTION OF CONSCIENCE WITH THE INTELLECTUAL
LES, AND BELIEF.—Belief, or opinion, is the result
mony established by evidence; and truth, to be
d, and virtue to be practised, on the one hand; and
be rejected, and vice to be shunned on the other,
parably connected. All duties rest upon opinion or
therefore, if there be no accountability for belief,
n be none for duties. Suppose a man do not believe
then he cannot love him, nor worship him; or sup-
believe that virtue and vice are but names, then
ot practice the one and shun the other. This—the
ion between the *belief* that *virtue* is *happiness,* and
suit of it, on the one hand, and the *belief* that *virtue*
npty sound, and the *reckless chase* after wealth on the
-was happily illustrated even by a Heathen.—*Hor.*
i. 28–35. (See Cairns on Moral Freedom, p. 18.)

CIENCE IN THE ONENESS OF ITS CHARACTER.—The
aculty is but ONE, because all the feelings that enter
contemplate the same things—the dispositions and
of voluntary agents.

MORAL SCIENCE OR ETHICS.

MORAL Science, or Ethics, being the application of the kno ledge of the human mind, and of its relation to God a our fellow-men—in order to *ascertain* the grounds, la and limits of our moral obligations, and to *enforce* th when ascertained—consists of several branches.

First, the existence and revealed character of God, Author and law-giver of morals. Second, the Holy Scr tures, which unfold man's nature and character as a mo being, in his moral relations to God and his fellow-m Third, the immateriality and immortality of the soul of m including the doctrine of the resurrection of the body; a so the everlasting life of man in his whole being. Four the supreme authority of the moral faculty, and of its ru namely, Revelation, the only and all-sufficient regulato moral beings and actions. Fifth, the criterion of morals a man's responsibility, as decided by the supreme moral leg lature. Sixth, the moral qualities and characters of mo actions. Seventh, Scriptural summaries of moral duties

MORAL SCIENCE, OR ETHICS, taken as a *general* te in its widest acceptation includes the whole of what rega man's sentiments, feelings, and conduct; in all the relati in which he stands—as a being intelligent, rational, a accountable—to God and to his fellow-men. It thus co sists of two parts: *the Science of Ethics*—that which inv tigates the principles of man's actions, as a moral bei and *Practical Ethics*, which is but another name for duties of practical religion. It is with the former we ha principally here to do; the latter belongs to *theology*.

The *science* of Ethics was cultivated in Greece, and afterwa in Rome; of the results of the studies of the philosophers, in *former*, we have summaries in the works of Aristotle, Plato, Xenophon as detailing the doctrines of his master Socrates; the *latter*, in the works of Cicero, Seneca, and Marcus Aureli These had not the benefit of revelation; but from them the scie descended to those who are called *the schoolmen*, and, as modified *them*, it forms the chief part of what is termed the *scholastic* *losophy.* This was the result of the tendencies of the later times of the Roman Empire to rest satisfied with the dogmas of the men of former ages. Those of two, Plato and Aristotle, had gained pre-eminence; Boethius, and others, tried to reconcile them and Christianity, which had now become universal, and was therefore the great object of human attention. Its claims were put forth to be received not only as a revelation for spiritual objects, but for philosophical speculations; and to make its teachings correspond with those of Aristotle and Plato, was the object of John Scot Erigena, in the reign of Alfred, of Anselm, in the eleventh century, and of Bernard de Chartres in the thirteenth.

An opinion prevailed, founded on the theory of Plato and the practice of Aristotle, according to Whewell, in his History of the Inductive Sciences, that all science may be obtained by reasoning; that by analysing and combining the notions that common language brings before the mind, we may know all that is knowable. Thus Logic came to embrace all science, and thus was confounded the universality of the theory of language with the generalization of facts. Universal science became invested with the authority of a religious creed; and thus not only were science and theology united, but all dissent was disallowed. "Error became wicked; dissent became heresy; to reject the received doctrines was nearly the same as to doubt divine revelation; and the scholastic philosophy claimed the assent of all believers." The external form, the details, the text of this philosophy, were taken from Aristotle; the spirit, the notions, and style of interpretation, from Plato; the combination of the two, identified with interwoven revelation, was *the scholastic philosophy;* so called because universally taught *in the schools* by those whose lives were spent there, and devoted to the study and teaching of it; and who were thence called the *schoolmen.*—(*Whewell—History of the Inductive Sciences.*)

ETHICS AND PHYSICAL SCIENCE.—The purport of the *physical sciences* throughout all their provinces, whether of *mind or matter,* is to investigate what IS. They consist only of facts arranged according to their likeness, and expressed by general names, given to every class of similar facts. The purport of *Ethics* is to answer the question, what *ought* to be; to ascertain the rules which should govern voluntary actions; and to which those habitual dispositions of mind, which are the source of voluntary actions, ought to be adapted. When we treat of *will, action, habit, disposition,* we treat of *facts* in human nature of which an *explanation* must be sought for in the *philosophy of mind;* that science which has for its object those laws of thought which alone render any other sort of knowledge possible; but when we use the word *ought*, we introduce the mind into a new region: it is a word, an equivalent for which is in all languages, so that it must have a corresponding idea; and it would be as reasonable to deny that *space*, *greenness*, &c., are significant terms, as to affirm that *ought*, *virtue*, *duty*, *right*, are words without meaning.—*Mackintosh on Ethical Philosophy.*

GENERAL PRINCIPLES PREPARATORY TO THE PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE AND REVEALED CHARACTER OF GOD.

The school for man, by God's appointment, is experience. In infancy, the senses receive *impressions* from external objects. These impressions are continually *repeated.* Thus *observation* is awakened. This teaches us that whatever shows *contrivance* or *design* in its structure, must have had *a Maker*, possessed of *intelligence* and *skill* to *plan*, and of *power* to *execute*.

For being conscious of thinking, willing, and acting, we are irresistibly led to attribute the same faculties to *others*, and to consider these as the means by which effects are produced. In this manner arises a conviction never to be effaced, that whatever manifests *arrangement*, for a *particular purpose*, must have originated in *thought*, *understanding*, MIND. There is an irresistible feeling that, without *skill* to *adapt* means to end, and *power* to carry designs into execution, the objects with which we are conversant could not have been formed as they are. *Thus* it is that we acquire the knowledge of the existence of agents, possessing *intelligence*, and *will*, and *active power*. The knowledge we thus acquire has, since Lord Bacon's time, been termed the result of *Induction*—the only true mode of obtaining knowledge either of matter or of mind.

Passing from the works of *human* skill—in which, from the traces of *design* and *power*, we infer the existence of an *intelligent designer*—to the works of *nature*, we see marks of *design* and *power*, which must have had their origin in *intelligence* and *might*, indefinitely superior to our own. Placed in the midst of objects, none of which could have existed otherwise than by the agency of a Being possessed *of infinite* intelligence and power—and all these, *parts* of one great harmonious *whole*—we conclude that *One Being*, infinitely powerful and wise, was their Author; and that Being is God.

Nor are these traces of design and power, evincing, in the adaptation of means to end, the existence of a Creator infinite in power and intelligence, found only in the objects with which *all* are familiar. The farther that discoveries are made, in every department of science, the more numerous and cogent are the proofs of the same great truth. The microscope and the telescope have not done more to enlarge the boundaries of knowledge, than they have done to add proofs of the great truth authoritatively announced by inspiration: "Jehovah our God, Jehovah is One."

CAUSE AND EFFECT.—God has placed all things in nature in certain relations to each other, which are fixed and uniform; or, in other words, they have been endowed with *capacities* of *acting*, and *capabilities* of being acted upon, according to certain *uniform laws;* so that their actions take place, in the *same manner*, in every instance in which the *same bodies* are brought together in the *same circumstances*. We have a *conviction*, which appears to be *original* and *instinctive*, of the general uniformity of these relations; and in this consists our belief in the regularity of the operations of nature. But the *powers* or *principles* on which the operations depend, are entirely *hidden from us*. . . . . When we find the *same events* occurring in the *same relations* and *sequences* to each other, we think there is such *a connection* as that, when we meet with the *former*, the *latter* will follow. The *first* we call *cause;* the *second*, effect. . . . . Our confidence in the *uniformity* of the *relations or sequences* of events, is an *instinctive principle;* by *experience* we ascertain *what the sequences* are which observe this uniformity. . . . . . The principle by which we infer that every effect must have a cause, is instinctive and original. But *how* the thing we call *effect* is produced by the antecedent we call *cause*, is unknown. *Physical causation* in nature is nothing more than the *observed uniform connection* between certain events and certain antecedent ones. Of *efficient causes*, or the manner in which the result takes place, we know nothing. In this sense, indeed, we may be said not to know the cause of any thing; even of events which appear, at first sight, most simple and obvious. Thus the communication of motion from one body to another by impulse, appears a very simple phenomenon; but how little idea have we of the cause of it! We say, "The bodies touch each other, and so the motion is communicated." But, in the first place, we cannot say *why* a body, in motion, and coming in contact with one at rest, should put the latter in motion; and, further, we know that they do not come in contact. We may consider it, indeed, as ascertained, that there is no such thing as the actual contact of bodies, under these circumstances; and, therefore, the fact which appears so simple, comes to be as unaccountable as any phenomenon in nature. What, again, appears more intelligible than an unsupported body falling to the ground? Yet what is more inexplicable, than that one portion of matter should act upon another at any distance? And even though a vacuum should be interposed between them?—*Abercrombie.*

KANT—HUME—PRICE ON IDEAS OF CAUSE AND EFFECT.—Kant says it was Hume's doctrine of cause and effect that led him to what he calls "the doctrine of pure reason;" or that there are ideas of the understanding itself—not from experience; but Dr. Price had shown that our notions of cause and effect are derived from the mind itself by intuition: "Our certainty, that every new event requires some cause, depends no more on experience than any other, the most obvious subject of intuition. In the idea of every change is included that of being an effect."—*Review of Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals*, sec. 2.

CAUSE AND EFFECT, ACCORDING TO DR. BROWN.—Every effect must have a cause, and as there cannot be an infinite series of effects, there must have been a first cause, and the first cause of all things is God.

In a philosophical sense, a cause is what produces and what accounts for an effect. In the jargon of the schools there were endless disputations about an equally endless variety of kinds of *causes* and *powers;* but a sounder philosophy decides that the true idea of a *cause* is "any combination of circumstances which is the *immediate* and *invariable* antecedent of a particular set of changes; and an *effect* is any kind of changes which is the *immediate* and *invariable* sequence of a particular set of circumstances." And the true idea of *power* is, "the *invariable relation* between similar antecedents and similar sequences, the invariable antecedent to a particular kind of changes." Thus immediate and invariable antecedents are *power*, immediate and invariable antecedents *in any sequence* are cause, immediate and invariable consequent is the correlative *effect*.

By an original and instinctive principle in our nature, we are led to expect from the same circumstances the same results; this is what we mean by cause and effect. There is a mystery attached to the terms *power* and *cause*, but groundlessly. *Power* is not *something* different from the *substance* in which we say it resides, but the substance *itself*, considered in *relation* to any *other* substance—just as *form* is not any thing *separate* from the *elementary atoms* of a particular mass, but merely the *relation* of a number of atoms as *co-existing in apparent contact*. Thus the *form* of bodies is the *relation* of the elements to each other in *space*, and the *power* of bodies is their relation to each other in *time*, and both are not *some thing real, distinct substances*, but *abstractions* of the mind. The ancients, as they supposed *ideas* to be different from the *objects*, so had they *substantial forms*—something equally *real* as the *bodies*, yet different from them. Both are now known to be equally *abstractions*, yet we are prone to give a *name* to some common *quality* of many *substances*, as *hardness*, *attraction*, &c.; and then suppose this to be something *real*, *distinct* from the substances, and then try to discover what it is. But the *immediate and invariable antecedent* is the *cause*, the *immediate* and *invariable consequent* is the effect, and the antecedent and consequent are *all* that is present in the given phenomenon.

It may be important to make this plain by illustration. The *prism decomposes rays of light*, but the *refracting power* is not any thing *different* from the prism any more than its *weight* or its *transparency*: there is not transparency AND a prism, but a prism giving a passage to rays; nor is there a prism AND refracting power, AND coloured rays; but a prism and rays of various colours, which we have perceived to be deflected, variously, from their original line and direction when they *approach* and *quit* the lens; and we believe that, in the *same circumstances*, there will be *the same results*. It is this knowledge of invariable antecedents and results that enables man to create a future for himself; and in this are seen both the wisdom and power of God.

A spark falling upon gunpowder will *cause* an explosion; water, falling upon salt, has *power* to melt it. What do we mean by *cause* and *power?* Merely that in all *similar circumstances*, *similar results* will follow; the explosion of gunpowder will be *followed* by the falling of a spark; the descent of water upon salt will be *followed* by the dissolution of the mineral—that is, when the *one* is present, a certain *change* will take place in the *other*. We say the spark has *power*, or *causes* the gunpowder to explode; but the *power* or *causation* is merely the *invariableness* of the change, leading to the belief of an *invariable sequence*, past, present, and future; and can only be ascribed to the will of God. He has *established laws* that regulate those sequences; what these are we know not; only that they are that which cannot exist without being followed by a certain event; and that when they do not, the event does not occur; and we are *so constituted* as that we cannot but believe that the invariable antecedent of any change is its cause. (See Dr. Brown on Cause and Effect.)

The Argument a priori and a posteriori.—When we proceed to the proof of the Being and attributes of God, by abstract reasoning, from the necessity of a great, first, eternal cause, we are said to reason *a priori;* when from the works of God, we infer the being and character of their Author, we are said to argue *a posteriori;* though the *former* of these barbarous terms is scarcely correct, the argument proceeding from the *effect* to the *cause*, as well as in the *latter*, though in a different mode. The little work of Lowman* is, beyond all comparison, the ablest form of the argument *a priori;* as Paley's Natural Theology, with the illustrations by Lord Brougham and Sir Charles Bell, is of the *latter*. Douglas says, "There are two inlets by which the belief of a Deity is received into the soul—the *philosophic* and the *moral;* the *principle* which refers every event to a cause, and the *form* which conscience assumes of a law, thereby carrying the mind necessarily to a lawgiver."

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* Republished by Clark of Edinburgh, and edited by Dr. Pye Smith.

Hume self-confuted.—Hume denied *the principle* on which the argument rests, namely, that "design and intelligence in the *cause* may be inferred with certainty from marks or signs of it in the effect." But as *the existence* of *other minds* is inferred, not from *intuition* of their *existence*, but from *marks* and *signs* of intelligence in action and conduct, it was argued, why did he compose, print, and publish, a book without having any reason, on his own philosophy, to infer the existence of any intelligent beings, capable of benefiting by its perusal? He who doubts not the existence of his fellow-creatures—and who does?—cannot doubt the existence of one supreme and original mind.

THE FIRST CAUSE—THE CONSTANTLY OPERATING EFFICIENT CAUSE—"*Of* HIM, and *through* HIM, and *to* HIM, are all things; to HIM be glory for ever.—Amen." Rom. xi. 36. When he *suspends* or *counteracts* the *laws* by which he *usually operates*, it is still the SAME GOD "who worketh all in all;" and all are equally parts of his *one harmonious plan.*

I.—THE EXISTENCE AND REVEALED CHARACTER OF GOD.

First—*Reason evinces the Being of God.*

Something now exists. Therefore, something eternally existed. Of that which now exists, a part is capable of thought, intelligence, judgment, and reasoning: this we call Mind. Therefore, mind must have eternally existed. The distinction is so great between *mind* and *matter*—their essential properties are so different, and though mysteriously united in the human constitution, they are so capable of separate and independant existence—that it is obvious the latter never could have originated the former; that no modification of *matter* could produce *mind*. Even a Heathen poet said, "*We* are his *offspring;*" and, therefore, that the Deity cannot be matter is at once a rational and inspired deduction. Therefore, a Being must eternally have existed, possessed of mind—that is, a spiritual substance, in which are intelligence, thought, and volition: Therefore, as there is *now* mind with consciousness, intelligence, and will, there must have existed eternally that which caused these effects; for nothing can exist without an adequate cause.

Matter, being essentially inert, cannot have been self-originated; it must have had an originator to give it existence, form, and motion; and that originator is God.

Man is a compound being, consisting of mind and matter. In regard to *neither* could he have been self-originated. In regard to *both*, he must have had a Creator. That Creator could not have been the universe around him; for all of it, with which we are conversant, is matter, and must, itself, have been brought into existence; and all minds, but the One Eternal Mind, must, in like manner, owe their existence to that Great, First Cause.

The result is, there must have existed eternally, a Being possessed of Infinite Perfection; of wisdom, goodness, and power; "the uncreated cause of all other existence, whether mind or matter." That Being is God.

Second—*Creation, in general, declares the Existence, Attributes, and Glory of the One God.*

"The Heavens declare the glory of God, and the Firmament showeth his handiwork. Day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night showeth knowledge." There is, indeed, no *speech*, nor *language;* their *voice* is not heard, yet "their *sound* is gone forth into all the earth, and their *word* unto the end of the world." The celestial bodies, in their magnitude, and the regularity of their movements—obeying the laws given them by their Creator, when he called them into being and gave them their motions, with undeviating regularity—"utter forth a glorious voice in the ear of Reason," proclaiming the wisdom and power of their eternal Author.

And what is true of the celestial phenomena, holds equally of *all* the works of God. "The invisible things of Him—even his eternal power and godhead, ever since the *creation*—have been clearly manifested by the *things which are made*."

It is true that it is by "Faith"—that is, the belief of testimony—that given in the first chapter of Genesis—that we understand "the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that the things which are seen were not made of things which do appear;" that is, were not moulded out of previously existing, or eternally existing materials; for, "In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth." And thus it is, that revelation supplies the deficiencies of reason, and proclaims, with authority, the One Eternal Creator.

Third—Man, the last and noblest of the works of God, attests the wisdom, power, and goodness of the Author of his being. This is evident, from a view of—

First—*The Intellect and its relations.* Man is a complex being, consisting of a body curiously formed; and of a mind, wonderfully adapted to that body, as the vehicle of its thoughts, purposes, and feelings. The organs of sense are so constructed in the body, in reference to *external nature*, and external nature is so adapted to them, as that they are the appropriate *media* of transmitting ideas and sensations to the mind. Without external nature, of what use were the senses? And without the soul, of what use were the senses? There is, thus, a delightful harmony, and a wise adaptation, between the world, the creation of God, and the senses, the production of the same God; and between both, and mind, the workmanship of the same Almighty and Infinitely Wise Being.

The oneness of purpose, arrangement, and adaptation, demonstrates one Author, Designer, and Governor, infinitely wise, benevolent, and mighty.

To illustrate this more familiarly and fully, let us take *one* of the senses, which is the medium of transmitting to the mind, ideas, through the faculty of sensation—the sense of sight. The relation between the *eye* and *light*, producing *vision*, is such, that the *medium* and the *organ* must have been *designedly* adjusted to each other. Then, in order that any *object* may be distinctly *seen*, it is requisite that an *exact image* of it should be formed in the *back part of the eye*. This is ffected by the *rays of light* proceeding *from each part of he object*, and passing *through the eye;* and then *converging* to one point in the part called the *retina*. This *mechanism* must have been the result of an *intentional adjustment* of the one to the other. But light is not only *refracted* but *reflected*, uniformly, in passing from one medium to another; the consequence of which would be, unless *counteracted*, that objects would appear *discoloured*. The *figure and construction* of the eye are such, that light, with all its different degrees of refrangibility, is made to *converge* upon the retina; and so *form the image* required for distinct vision. The difficulties overcome are extreme; but "He that formed the eye" was able to overcome them.

If the adaptation of the *senses* to *external nature*, and of the mental faculty of *sensation*, to the *senses*, proves that both the *universe* and the *human being* are the workmanship of Him who is wise and powerful, no less does the adaptation of the various *faculties of the mind to each other* establish the same great and glorious truth.

The adaptation of *memory* to *sensation* and *reflection* is, to an attentive observer, quite as striking as that of the *senses* to *external nature*, whence the materials for their exercise are supplied; or of *sensation* to the *senses*, which are the medium through which it receives its ideas and feelings. By *reflection* we receive ideas of *mind*, through the medium of *consciousness*, just as, by *sensation*, we acquire ideas of *external nature*, through the medium of the *senses*. Now, *memory* preserves both classes of ideas as in a depository; and *recollection* calls them up when they are required. Thus *memory* is wisely adapted to *sensation* and *reflection*, as the recipient of the ideas they transmit, without which they could not be the sources of *permanent* knowledge.

Memory, again, preserving and reproducing ideas, supplies the materials for the exercise of *judgment* and *reasoning;* for *judgment compares* the ideas furnished by memory *ascertains* their agreement or diversity; and *reasoning* deduces *conclusions* from the *results* of *judgment*. Each these powers, thus, is exactly adapted to the other—*jud ment to reasoning*, and *memory* to both.

So far, surely, the dependence of the faculties of the human mind upon each other, and the harmony of their operations, demonstrate the infinite wisdom and power of the One Eternal Mind, their Author, no less than the order, harmony, and dependance of the various departments of the visible and material universe. Then, as *memory*, preserving the ideas furnished by sensation and reflection, supplies the materials for the exercise of judgment and reasoning, so *attention*, strengthened by habit, invigorates memory; while the principle of *curiosity*—that is, the desire of knowing what yet we know not, and the *love of truth*—that is, of something not merely *new*, but in conformity with the *actual state* of things, awaken *attention* to exercise.

Next to these principles, which lead to the *acquisition* of knowledge, is the desire of *communicating* what we have acquired; for we might have been so constituted as to have possessed *merely* the desire of *accumulating*, and then of *locking up*, the treasures amassed; but it accords infinitely better with the condition of human existence, that he who possesses information should feel *atisfaction* in communicating it to others. And the Creator, who has implanted the *principle* in man which prompts him to *impart* the knowledge which he has gained, and the *feeling* which gives him delight in communicating it, has given him the faculty of *speech*, and the *powers* which lead to the communication of thought by the *invention of letters*.

Lastly, the *imagination*, by its power of modifying and combining ideas and sensations, employs them in forming new *creations*, and thus adds greatly to human enjoyment; and *taste* fills the soul with delightful emotions, from the contemplation of the symmetry, the immensity, the magnificence of the universe. But these, the *creative* powers, are entirely dependant, for the materials for their exercise, on those that are *primary and subordinate*, as they again are on the world *without us*, and the *world within* us. Thus the Creator, having *surrounded us* with *objects* of sublimity and beauty, and endowed us with the *faculties* of perceiving, remembering, and comparing their qualities, has given us the powers of *imagination*, *genius*, and *taste*, by means of which *we modify*, combine, and form them into fresh creations;

render to every one according to his works, are exhibited powers which, when duly cultivated, and properly regulated, raise the soul to the glorious and benignant AUTHOR OF ALL.

2. *The Will with the Moral Feelings.*

The Will is no less intimately connected with the intellect, than the powers of the intellect are with one another. The faculties of the understanding, in themselves and in their exercises—in their relation, connection, and dependance upon each other—evince the power and wisdom of the Author of Mind. The Will moves and acts according to the suggestions of these powers; and as it is supplied by them with the materials for its exercise, and is actuated by them, so it excites to activity the corporeal powers. In the harmony and adaptation of will to intellect, and in the suitableness of the bodily powers, to obey the impulses of the will, are manifest and striking indications of the wisdom of the Author of our being.

In like manner, the affections, sympathies, and passions of our moral nature, in their relation, dependance, and utility, equally prove that man is the production of the Creator, infinitely benevolent and wise. Without *some* of them, man could not have been a social being, or fitted for the social relations of life; and without *others* he would not have been capable of existing even as a solitary being.

Last of all, Conscience, or the moral sense—*that*, in man, by which he is compelled to pass sentence upon himself, of approval or disapprobation—is inseparably connected with both the active and intellectual powers, and adapted to them. By means of the Will, man carries his resolves—the combined results of his mental faculties—into effect; and conscience approves or condemns; and thus man becomes an accountable being—a moral agent—"a law unto himself."

Thus, as the *power* and *wisdom* of God are manifested in the *constitution* of the human mind, and the *adaptation* of its powers to *external nature* and to *each other;* and the divine *benevolence* is evinced in endowing man with powers rendering him capable of enjoyment, and furnishing him with the means of their gratification; so the *justice* of God, as the moral governor of the universe, and his purpose to by the existence and supreme jurisdiction of conscience—God's vicegerent in the human breast.

But, while the *world without*, and the *world within*, declare the being and glory of God their Author, it is to the Holy Scriptures we must turn for the full knowledge of his character—especially in reference to man as a creature, fallen, guilty, and lost. "He made known his name unto Moses, Jehovah, Jehovah Elohim, merciful and gracious, long-suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth; keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity, and transgression, and sin;—and that will by no means clear the guilty." And this his name—his revealed character, he displayed in all its glories in the incarnation, obedience, and death of Jesus Christ, the great God and our Saviour; for in him, as suffering, the just in the room of the unjust, God can be "just and the justifier of the ungodly;" can *pardon*, without clearing the guilty; can *accept and bless the sinner* who believes in him, and, at the same time, *condemn* the sin; and thus, Christ is made of God, unto those who believe on him "wisdom, and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption;" is the "*power* of God, and the *wisdom* of God."

Existence of God, mysterious as important.—Robert Hall says of the existence of God: "Our belief in the being of a God, is the belief of a very profound mystery. The very idea of such a being would appear incredible, were it not necessary; because the greatest absurdities would flow from supposing the contrary. Nothing can be accounted for, unless we admit the existence of a causeless cause—a presiding governor of the universe. We are compelled, therefore, to admit the less difficult of the two; or, rather to choose difficulty instead of impossibility; mystery, instead of absurdity; and hence we repose on this grand truth. This is the great mystery of the universe; which is at once the most certain and most incomprehensible of all things; a truth at once enveloped in a flood of light, and an abyss of darkness. Inexplicable itself, it explains all besides; it casts a clearness on every question; accounts for every phenomenon; solves every problem; illuminates every depth; and renders the whole mystery of existence as perfectly simple as it is otherwise perfectly unintelligible; whilst itself remains alone in impenetrable obscurity. After displacing every other difficulty, it remains the greatest difficulty of all; in solitary, unsurmountable, unapproachable grandeur."

The Ineffable absurdity and folly of Atheism.—To say there is a

God, we have only to see the impress of his being and attributes; but to be able to say, with "the fool," there is no God, we must have "roamed over all nature, and seen that no mark of a divine footstep was there; and we must have gotten intimacy with every existent spirit in the universe, and learned from each that never did a revelation of the deity visit him; and we must have searched into the records—not of one solitary planet only, but into the archives of all worlds, and thence gathered, that throughout the wide realms of immensity not one exhibition of a living and reigning God has ever been made. . . . . To pronounce there is 'no God,' we must break forth beyond all those limits that have been prescribed to man's excursive spirit, by the sound philosophy of experience; and by a presumption the most tremendous, even the usurpation of all space and time, affirm 'no God.' To make this out we should need to travel abroad over the surrounding universe till we had exhausted it, and to search backward through all the hidden recesses of eternity; to traverse, in every direction, the plains of infinitude, and search the outskirts of that space which is itself interminable; and then bring back to this little world of our's the report of an universal blank, wherein we had not met with one manifestation or one movement of a presiding God. For man *not to know of a God*, he has only to sink beneath the level of our common nature; but *to deny him* he must be a God himself. He must arrogate the ubiquity and omniscience of the godhead." —*Chalmers.*

"The wonder turns on the great process by which a man could grow to the immense intelligence that can KNOW that there is 'no God.' What ages and what lights are requisite for this attainment? This intelligence involves the very attributes of Divinity while a God is denied. For, unless this man is omnipresent—unless he is, at this moment, in every place in the universe, he cannot know but there may be in some place manifestations of a Deity, by which even he would be overpowered. If he does not know, absolutely, every agent in the universe, the one that he does not know may be God. If he is not himself the chief agent in the universe, and does not know what is so, that which is so may be God. If he is not in absolute possession of all the propositions that constitute universal truth, the one that he wants may be that there is a God. If he cannot, with certainty, assign the cause of all that he perceives to exist, that cause may be God. If he does not know every thing that has been done, in the immeasurable ages that are past, some things may have been done by God. Thus, unless he knows all things—that is, precludes another deity by being one himself, he cannot KNOW that the Being whose existence he rejects does not exist."—*Foster.*

Douglas's summary and improvement of the Argument.—"Fitnesses imply design; for fitness implies an end for which it is fitted; and perception and choice of an end, equally imply mind and design. The proof, indeed, for a supreme mind is short and simple. There are but three hypotheses. Whatever happens must happen either by chance, or necessity, or by design. These three condit exhaust all possibilities. Chance is the first refuge of ignora and necessity, the second. Every event has a cause; when mind ascribes any event to chance, it merely pleads its ignor of the cause. The plea of necessity is but a more learned i rance. Necessity is not a cause, but an effect; not power, but want of it; not being able to resist superior force, necessity, from being a cause itself, must exist by the appointment o ulterior cause, and that cause must be mind. Every effect have a cause; every true and ulterior cause must have a cho and therefore intelligence. Therefore, all effects, in the instance, originate from mind; and if there be any other ca but mind that deserve the name, they are merely instrum causes, acting with borrowed power." (Let the reader peruse follows, in Douglas on the Mind, p. 360 to end.)

The proofs from design, where defective, are supplied from ca tion; where both fail, moral proof comes in, from conscience. the light of natural religion is not from bright, to brighter. indicates the existence of God more clearly than his attributes natural attributes more clearly than the moral; simply becaus mind of man has lost its intellectual and moral light by the d ning influence of sin; and needs the illuminating and rene power which revelation reveals and supplies.

THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN USED BY CICERO.—The com argument, "The universe exhibits indisputable marks of de and is, therefore, not self-existing, but the work of one desig mind;" is in substance that of Cicero, that he who though universe an uncaused, fortuitous, undesigned effect, might eq fancy that the twenty-four letters of the alphabet, scatter random, might produce "the annals of Ennius."—*De Nat.* *Lib.* ii.

II.—THE HOLY SCRIPTURES.

That besides the revelation of himself which God given, in the universe *without* man, and the universe *w* him; displaying his being, wisdom, power, and goo in creation; and his rightful dominion and holy ju in the administrations of Providence and the decisio conscience, he has revealed his WHOLE character an WHOLE requirements—all that he is, and all that ma and all his thoughts towards man, both in reference to world and that which is to come;—that he has given a revelation has been all along *assumed;* nor is thi place for proof. Outlines of the evidences and doctr privileges and obligations of revealed religion—a handl much required—would demand a separate work. We proceeded upon the principle that God is a *spirit*, and that man is an intellectual, moral, and eternal being; and that God has given to man TWO BOOKS from which to learn all that he requires him to know; that these books are *perfect*, each in its *own place*, and for its *own purposes*—both admirably harmonizing in their discoveries, and these discoveries being suited to man's condition, as they were made to him; creation having the character of its Author written on it as in letters of light, and the Scripture being addressed to man as a fallen being, and revealing Jehovah the Saviour through our Lord Jesus Christ. That such a revelation was *necessary*, cannot be denied; and Leland has demonstrated—and the first volume of Horne's Introduction gives a summary of its evidences—that the Holy Scriptures contain that revelation, is amply evinced by the miracles that accredited the divine commission of the successive messengers; and by the whole chain of prophecy—stretching from the first prediction regarding the Messiah, over the entire series of historical facts, recorded as the fulfilment of successive prophecies, and recorded as well by others as the inspired historians—and reaching till the consummation of all things, as Paley, and Chalmers, and Leslie, and Keith, have demonstrated. That the disclosures of the Bible, on all subjects on which they touch, are perfectly at one with the discoveries of science, and the records of authentic history, Faber, and Wiseman, and Buckland, have incontrovertibly proved; while that revelation, as it consists of "what eye hath not seen, nor ear heard; neither have entered into the heart of man, but what God hath prepared for them that love him," is attested by every one who has been enlightened by the Holy Spirit, and brought to the enjoyment of the blessings they are the means of bestowing through Jesus Christ. And that the books themselves, which contain the inspired records, are genuine, authentic, and uncorrupted in the lapse of ages, is demonstrated by such evidence as that no other ancient writings can lay claim to a thousandth part of its cogency, and has been unfolded to the conviction of all who are not wilfully blinded by Taylor in his Process of Historical Proof, and Transmission of Ancient Books to Modern Times.

The book of Revelation was not given to teach the sciences, yet the discoveries of science are never at variance with the teachings of the Bible; and just in proportion as the sound principles of science are developed, and scientific researches are prosecuted upon truly philosophical principles, in that proportion has all science—geology, astronomy, ethnography, been found in exact accordance with the incidental notices of Scripture. And so is it with the moral and metaphysical sciences; the reveries of a preceding age have vanished before the lights of a sound intellectual philosophy, in the hands of the intelligent philosophers of the present day, all of whom are believers in revelation, just as the visionary theories in physical science had before disappeared before the experimental researches of Newton and his successors, who were, in like manner, as sound believers in revelation—the *one* book of God—as they were humble and intelligent students of the *other* book, the creation of God.

It is important that a correct view should be formed of the *distinct provinces* of the two books—that of *nature* and that of *revelation*, the *designs* for which they were respectively given, and the *lessons* to be learned from them. It would open up some interesting and instructive analogies. A beautiful specimen is given in the nineteenth Psalm, where *creation*—"the Heavens," and their luminaries, with the alternations of day and night—"without speech or language, or voice heard"—publishes to mankind the glory of God; but *revelation*—"the *law* of JEHOVAH, which is perfect—the *testimony* which is sure—the *statutes* which are right—the *commandment* which is pure—the *fear* which is clean—the *judgments* which are wholly true and righteous"—THESE convert, illuminate, and gladden the soul, and make it "wise unto salvation through faith which is in Christ Jesus." Thus, God made the worlds, and did not then leave them, but watches over all and actuates all by his unslumbering providence; and God, having given his word, continually watches over it, and by his good spirit causes it to "accomplish that which he pleases, and to prosper in the thing for which he has sent it." Then, again, the principle of inductive observation, employed in reference to creation, is the only means of obtaining a knowledge of its contents, and the character of its Author; and it is by the same principle—used by the help of criticism and biblical investigation—that we obtain a true knowledge of the contents of Scripture; and yet, as in the *former*, it is "by faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the Word of God, so that things which are seen were *no made* of things which do appear"—that as the world had a

Maker, he made all things by his word, and *created* them—not formed them out of pre-existing materials; so in the *latter*, to all the apparatus that human learning and ingenuity can furnish, prayer must be employed, and the teaching of the Holy Spirit must be enjoyed, in order to a right acquaintance with the "Mind of the Spirit."

THE CREATOR, WHETHER REASONED "A PRIORI" OR "A POSTERIORI," A NECESSARY TRUTH, AND ASSERTED BY REVELATION.—Something now exists; therefore something always existed. Granted, might the opponent say; but this *something*, why not the series of causes and effects which is now going on, and which appears to contain, in itself, no indications of beginning or end? The answer is, there *must* be a First Cause. There is an *intellectual necessity* for it. By the constitution of our minds we admit it. It cannot be demonstrated, because it is involved in our mental being. The mind cannot be satisfied with a *series* of successive, dependent, causes and effects, without something first and independent. We pass from effect to cause, and from that to higher cause, in search of something on which the mind can rest; for it is so constituted as that it *must* have a first cause.

One proof that this is an original principle in our nature, namely, to seek for a cause for every effect, is, that even the theoretical atheists feel irresistibly impelled to seek for a cause to every effect, and so for a first cause for all effects—the Deity, as the cause of the totality of effects, and the secondary causes in which they originate.

Is this idea of a first cause *a priori?* Is it *a posteriori?* Or are these but different expressions for a course of thought that is complicated—partly the one and partly the other? Is the idea gathered from the phenomena? Or, instead of being extracted from them, is it not assumed that they may become intelligible? Is not the idea a necessary one—not dependent upon observation for its *evidence*, but only for its *development?*

In proof of this, it is unquestionable that all the men most illustrious for their scientific researches, when they have resolved all into their elements, have arrived at the conclusion, that beyond all there must be a Being of necessary and unchanging existence—the uncaused cause of all. Ask Cuvier, and he will answer, an undevout anatomist is mad. Try, said Galen, if you can imagine a shoe made with half the skill which appears in the skin of the foot. Surely, says Sir John Herschell, were each of us to give utterance to all he feels, we should hear the chemist, the astronomer, the physiologist, the electrician, the botanist, the geologist, with one accord, each in the language of his own science, declaring not only the wonderful works of God disclosed by it, but the delights which their disclosure affords him, and the privilege which he feels it to have been to have aided in it.

Of the *act of creation* itself, however, science tells nothing; because, independent of revelation, it knows nothing, but "by FAITH"—the belief of the commencement of Genesis, and the illustrative comments on it scattered throughout the Bible—"we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God; so that things which are seen were not made of things which do appear." Neither the *matter* nor the *arrangement* existed, till God *produced the one*, and *imparted the other.*

III.—THE IMMATERIALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL; THE RESURRECTION OF THE BODY, AND SO THE EVERLASTING LIFE OF MAN IN HIS WHOLE BEING.

1. *The Soul is* IMMATERIAL AND IMMORTAL.

The intellectual and moral nature of man not only demonstrates that he is the workmanship of a Creator, infinitely powerful, benevolent, and wise; but proves him to be, in regard to the soul, a *spiritual* being, and formed for *immortality.*

1. We can form as clear an idea of *spirit* as of *body*—that is, of the essential *qualities* of the one as well as of the other; the *essence* itself of each being alike unknown. The *certainty* that we have of the existence of *mind*, through *consciousness*, is not less than that which we possess of the existence of *matter* by means of the *senses.*

2. The soul of man is *immaterial;* for thought, perception, intelligence, and reasoning, cannot be properties of *matter;* neither could these qualities be *superadded* to matter without an *immaterial substance*, in which, as *its qualities,* they should exist. *Matter*, being *divisible*, it pro-

duces, however modified, nothing but *forms;* not *thought,* or *sentiment,* or *feeling.* *Mind,* being one and indivisible, is present alike in every part of the body; is equally *independent* of all, and so is capable of *distinct and separate existence* when the body dies.

ARISTOTLE DISTINGUISHED OUR KNOWLEDGE OF MIND FROM MATTER.- *Και αυτος δε νους νοητος εϛὶν; ωσπερ τα νοητα. επι μεν γαρ των ανευ ὑλης, το αυτο εϛιν το νοουν, και το νοουμενον.* "And the mind itself is an object of knowledge, as well as other things which are intelligible. For, in immaterial beings, that which understands, is the same with that which is understood."—*De Anima*, iii. 5.

There have been made various efforts, and in various forms, to demonstrate the immateriality and immortality of the soul, without appealing to the authoritative announcements of revelation; the most recent discussions on which subject may be found in Lord Brougham's Discourse on Natural Theology, and the "Remarks" on it by Mr. Wallace; and the "Metaphysical Rambles of Warner Christian Search," a name assumed by the late Baron Sir William Cusack Smith. Stewart, in his "Essays on the Active Powers," condenses the amount of what reason can achieve into six proofs: man's desire of immortality, the result of hope; man's fear of immortality, the result of remorse; the soul's being formed for immortality; the growth of moral habits; the imperfection of the administration of justice in this world; universality of the belief of immortality. But as Douglas says, though they *prove* immortality, they do not *reveal* it; they may show that man is to live after death, but not *how* or *where.* It is the same as to God; the arguments of reason may prove him to be infinitely wise and powerful; but what are his thoughts towards us, and in what relation we shall stand to him after death, they do not inform us. When we have deciphered the hieroglyphics of the universe, and have learned that there is a God, and that we are immortal, we have still to have recourse to the clear and explicit writing of inspiration for information upon the true character of God, and upon our own, and all that it is of infinite importance for us to know in reference to eternity.

Immateriality—Our notions of Mind and Matter relative; but the EVIDENCE *for the existence of Mind the* STRONGER.—Stewart (Elements of the Philosophy of the Mind) says, "I I am asked what I mean by *matter*, I can only explai myself by saying, it is that which is extended, coloured, movable, hard or soft, rough or smooth, hot or cold—tha is, I can define it no other way than by defining its sensible qualities. It is not matter which I perceive by my senses, but only extension, figure, colour, and certain othe qualities which *the constitution of my nature* leads me t refer to something which is extended, figured, coloured The case is precisely similar with respect to *mind*. W are not immediately conscious of its existence; but we ar conscious of sensation, thought, and volition; operation which imply the existence of something which feels, think and wills. Every man, too, has an *irresistible convictio* that all these sensations, thoughts, and volitions, belong t *one and the same being;* to that being which he calls *him self;* a being which he is led, by the *constitution of h nature*, to consider as something *distinct from his body,* an as not liable to be impaired by the loss or mutilation of an of his organs."

" It appears, from these considerations, that we have th same evidence for the existence of mind, that we have fo the existence of the body; nay, if there be any differenc between the two cases, that we have *stronger evidence* fo it, inasmuch as the one is suggested to us by the subjec of our own consciousness, and the other merely by th objects of our perceptions; and in this light, undoubtedl the fact would appear to every person, were it not tha from our earliest years the attention is engrossed with th qualities and laws of matter, an acquaintance with whic is absolutely necessary for the preservation of our anim existence. Hence it is that these phenomena occupy ou thoughts more than those of mind; that we are perpetuall tempted *to explain the latter by the analogy of the forme* and even to refer them to the same general laws; and tha we acquire habits of inattention to the subjects of our con sciousness, too strong to be afterwards surmounted withou *the most persevering* industry."

"If the foregoing distinctions be well-founded, they establish the distinctions between *mind* and *matter* without any long process of metaphysical reasoning; for if our notions of both are *merely relative*—if we know the *one* only by such *sensible qualities* as extension, figure, solidity; and the *other* by *such operations* as sensation, thought, and volition—we are certainly entitled to say that *matter* and *mind*, considered as objects of human study, are *essentially different*, the science of the *former* resting ultimately on the phenomena exhibited to our *senses*—that of the *latter* on the phenomena of which we are *conscious*. Instead, therefore, of objecting to the scheme of *materialism* that its conclusions are *false*, it would be more accurate to say that its aim is *unphilosophical*. It proceeds on a *misapprehension of the proper object of science;* the difficulty which it professes to remove being manifestly placed beyond the reach of our faculties. Surely, when we attempt to explain the *nature* of that principle which *feels*, and *thinks*, and *wills*, by saying that it is a *material substance*, or that it is the *result of material organization*, we impose upon ourselves by *words*, forgetting that *matter*, as well as *mind*, is known to us only by its *qualities* and *attributes*, and that we are totally ignorant of the *essence of either*."

IMMATERIALITY—IMMORTALITY.—"Our feelings are states of something which is *one and simple*, and not a plurality of substances, near or remote; the principle of thought, therefore, whatever it may be, is not divisible into parts; and hence, though it may be annihilated, as every thing which exists may be annihilated by the will of Him who can destroy as well as create, it does not admit of that decay of which the body admits—a decay that is relative to the frame only, not to the elements which *compose it*. Now, there is no instance of annihilation; and, therefore, from the immateriality of mind there is, at least, a *negative* argument for its immortality; it cannot decay as the body; it will not be annihilated. The mere change of place in the particles of matter causes the death of the *body;* but this cannot imply the dissolution of the *principle of thought*, which is essentially distinct from *organized frames*, and by its nature incapable of that species of change which the

body exhibits; for what is not composed of parts cannot
separated; and there is no reason to infer, that the dis
lution of the *one* implies the annihilation of the *other*.
least the *onus probandi* rests on those who say it does."

But it is to the Lord Jesus Christ—"the living one," y
who was dead, and who is, notwithstanding, alive for ev
more—that we owe the *inspired* announcement of it; a
so the infallible demonstration; since no demonstration c
be more perfect than this, God hath said it; therefore it
true. It is on this account that it is said of him, "He ha
brought life and immortality to light," while he himself
declared to be the only foundation of the hope of blesse
ness in the immortality he reveals.

PSYCHOLOGY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE INFERIOR ANIMAI
—It would be difficult, with our present means of knowledge—
not impossible—to draw the line of demarcation between man a
the inferior animals with *exact precision;* to say the specific point
which all that characterizes the brute ends, and all that exclusive
characterizes the man begins; and from this, objections have be
made against the distinct existence, in an eternal state, of the hum
soul. Brutes have sensation: they remember; they reason; they e
press what is passing within them; but, as Whately observes, th
are incapable of employing common terms (that is, general term
formed by abstraction, as instruments of thought, by which alo
a train of reasoning is carried on. Even deaf mutes cannot car
on a train of reasoning till they get a system of arbitrary sign
for, as we think in words, language of some kind is indispensal
to our carrying on a chain of reasoning. Brutes have many of t
active powers: they have natural affection; they hate; they fe
gratitude and revenge. But they do not reflect; they are not infl
enced by motives; they have no moral sense; they are incapal
of moral law; and so of moral responsibility. What suppos
then, they are to exist in a future state? This no more militat
against the existence of human beings in that state—as the Bil
says they will exist, according to their character and conduct here
than the existence of brutes here, militates against our prese
existence.

2. *The Resurrection of the Body; and so the Everlasti Life of Man.*

Whatever intimations may be given by reason and co
science, of the immortality of the soul,—on the restorati
of the body to life after its death and dissolution in t
grave, they are wholly silent; whatever *analogies* in natu
may be traced to illustrate this doctrine when revelati

has announced it; such as the transition of the insect from the chrysalis to the butterfly; the revivification of nature, after winter, in spring; or the growth of the plant from the seed that has been corrupted in the earth. So little idea had the most enlightened of the ancient Heathens of the resurrection—whatever may have been their speculations about the immortality of the soul—that it would seem when the Apostle Paul announced IT at Athens, in connection with JESUS who is the "resurrection and the life," the people mistook the *former* as well as the *latter* for a new divinity, saying, "He seemeth to be a setter forth of strange Gods," (*ξενων δαιμονιων*,) because he preached unto them "Jesus" and "the Resurrection," (*τον Ιησουν* and *την Αναϛασιν*).

But in the Bible, "life and immortality are brought to light." To Moses, Jehovah called himself "the God" of the patriarchs long before dead; therefore death was not to them *annihilation*. Their souls were still living; were conscious, active, blessed; and their bodies *were to live;* for he was the God of their *whole being;* "God is not the God of the dead but of the living." So to Job—earlier than Moses; probably than Abraham—was the doctrine not only of his immortality, but of his resurrection, fraught with unutterable consolation: "I know that my Redeemer liveth, and that he shall stand in the latter day upon the earth; and—in MY FLESH shall I see God." But, in the New Testament, it is expressly revealed, exemplified, described; it is the will of the Father, our Lord declares, that of the *persons* given him he should lose *none*, but raise EVERY ONE OF THEM (*αυτον*) up at the last day; and in regard to *each* of them he should lose *nothing*, but raise (*αυτο*) IT up at the last day. (John vi. 39, 40.) And he rose from the dead, and became the first fruits of them that slept; and all believing on him—and who are, thus, heirs of the celestial inheritance—and transformed after his image so as to be "meet" for the enjoyment of it—for its companionship, occupations, and blessedness, shall be raised up like to him in glory—spiritual, incorruptible, powerful, and immortal in body as in soul.—1 Cor. xv. 35-58; Phil. iii. 20, 21; 1 John, iii. 1-3.

IV.—THE SUPREMACY OF THE MORAL FACULTY; AND OF ITS RULE, REVELATION.

We have before established the existence and supremacy of conscience; and we have, all along, proceeded upon the principle that the Bible is the revelation of the mind and will of God; thinking it no more necessary to prove the existence of the one book of God, Revelation, than that of the other, Creation, both testifying to their great and glorious Author, in the respective methods in which he intended they should; and both appealing to man, as an intellectual and moral being—the one to his reason, principally, though not wholly, and the other to both his reason and conscience; the discoveries of the one being usually designated Natural Theology, those of the other—as regarding what revelation *teaches*—Doctrinal or Dogmatic Theology; as regarding what it inculcates or *enjoins*, Practical Theology. Outlines of Theology, however, should form a separate work.

The precise office of the Moral sense is to declare—not what *is*, but what *ought* to be; not what the mind *thinks*, but what it ought to think; the one being *consciousness*, the other *conscience*. Now of the supreme authority of this principle in our moral nature, no less than of its existence, the *feelings* with which we contemplate *moral actions* in others, and in ourselves, is a proof. We entertain a feeling of *admiration* for disinterested benevolence, firm adherence to truth and duty, contempt of suffering in the cause of right when witnessed, which is quite different from any *calculation* of advantages; and we cherish a feeling of *indignant scorn* for deceptive fraud, unprincipled treachery, and outrage inflicted upon helplessness, utterly apart from any *estimate of any inconvenience or loss* as the result. We have a feeling of self-complacency or of remorse, which are as different from mere satisfaction or regret as the action which awakened the one, being entirely spontaneous, was different from that which produced the other, being that over which we had no control. (On this subject, consult Butler's Analogy, and Sermons; Mackintosh, "History of Ethical Philosophy;" Chalmers' "Sketches of Moral

Philosophy," and "Natural Theology," in his works, vol. II. and III.; Whewell—Introduction to Mackintosh.)

To *approve* a *rule* as *right*, says the last of these writers, is different from *liking* it as *profitable*; to *admire* an act of virtuous self-devotion as we are capable of admiring it, is a feeling so different from any *apprehension of any usefulness* the act may produce, that the comparison of the two is altogether incongruous. The moral faculty converts our perception of the moral qualities of actions into an affection of the strongest kind; nor can we be satisfied with any account of our moral sentiments which excludes this feature in the process; thus as *affections* are in their order superior to *desires* which characterize and refer to ourselves only, we maintain the moral faculty, the conscience—*the affection towards duty*—to be an affection of an order superior to both. Without the acknowledgment of this subordination, the language and feelings of men when they compare the claims of personal pleasure, of social affection, and of duty, are altogether unintelligible and absurd.

How and why Conscience obliges.—Douglas (on the Mind) says, Conscience owes its binding force to its *legislative* character; it *obliges* because it is a *law*, and law requires both conditions, moral fitness, and also rewards and punishments to complete its sanction. All laws owe their authority to the supreme law and the one lawgiver; and derive that obligation from the sanctity of the lawgiver's character, as well as from the awfulness of his justice; thus the eternal law and the supreme will enter into the constitution of morality; and the passage is short and unavoidable from ethics to religion.

It was Warburton, according to this author, who first pointed out the true source of the disputes about moral obligation; and also the true way of reconciling them. There is, first, the Sense, or Moral Instinct; secondly, Reason decides that its dictates are founded on essential differences in actions and feelings; and, third, the Will of God. "On these—the moral sense, the essential difference in human actions, and the will of God—is built the whole edifice of practical morality; each of which principles hath its distinct motives to enforce it; compliance with the moral sense being attended with grateful sensations; compliance with essential differences of things being the promotion of the order and harmony of the universe; and compliance with the will of God obtaining reward and avoiding punishment." These, he says, are all united; but different persons, running away with the cord he thought the strongest, hath affixed that to the throne of Heaven, as the golden chain that is to unite and draw all to it.

As Warburton thus pointed out the coincidence of what were supposed to be different sources of moral obligation, Butler demonstrated the supremacy of conscience or the moral sense in which all unite.

Revelation supplies the deficient Obligations.—But, says Douglas, conscience has lost her supremacy; it no longer retains the authority of a ruler, though still it records the sentence of a judge. The religion of nature makes no provision for the state of mental chaos—the moral world, without form, and void, and darkness on the face of the deep. It is necessary that the spirit of God should move over the ruins of a former existence, and restore all to light and harmony. Nature cannot cancel guilt; remorse, far from absolving the guilty, cannot even terminate itself, but only grows more vivid by reflection. Revelation, while it shows plainly our ruin, reveals the remedy. Other systems amuse the imagination, or occupy the mind with dogmas, or disputes; Christianity alone is the religion of an awakened conscience.

Rules of Conscience supreme and subordinate.—We must distinguish between a rule that *of itself* and *immediately binds* the conscience, and a rule that is *occasionally of use to direct* and satisfy the conscience. In regard to the *former*, the will of God is the only rule immediately binding the conscience. No one has authority over the conscience but God. All penal laws, therefore, in matters of *mere* conscience, or things that do not evidently *affect the civil state*, are certainly unlawful. But in regard to the *latter*, the commands of superiors—not only parents, but masters or magistrates—as well as private engagements, and the examples of wise and good men, are rules of conscience. But in regard to all these, it must be observed, that no judgment, or example, or command, is of any authority in opposition to Supreme law. The grand principle is laid down in this moral axiom: "We ought to obey God rather than man." All casuistry at variance with this, however refined in statement, and subtle in distinction, is, to use the comparison of Mackintosh regarding the system of Hobbes, like a palace of ice, transparent, exactly proportioned, majestic, admired by the unwary as a delightful dwelling; but gradually undermined by the central warmth of philosophic truth, and finally thawed into muddy water by the celestial rays of the word of God.

MORAL DISTINCTIONS ETERNAL.—That moral distinctions are not created by the will of God, is no modern discovery. The Fathers—as is shown by Cudworth, in his Treatise of Immutable Morality—taught it; the best of the scholastics maintain it; *and of the* reformers Melancthon wrote thus: "The dictates of

reason and of feeling—the law in the heart—are divine, no less than those written on the tables of stone."

THE MORAL SENSE, AND ITS ANOMALIES.—The moral sense and its operations are no more inconsistent with anomalies in moral operations, than blindness is with the power of seeing in the original faculty of sight.

V.—THE CRITERION OF MORALS—RESPONSIBILITY.

It is obvious that every feeling and action of a moral agent may be viewed, not merely as *phenomena*—something to be ascertained and accounted for—but as *right* or *wrong*; that as man is the creature of God, and so by the law of his being, is bound to yield back to him the amount of all the Creator has conferred upon him—as well as formed for society, and so is capable of giving and receiving benefit or enjoyment, and both as the result of will; according as these are yielded or withheld, there must be moral approval or disapprobation.

Hence arises the question, what is that quality in feelings and actions which secures approval or disapprobation—that constitutes them virtuous—that lays an obligation to perform them—that makes it duty to do or to forbear? To this question very different answers have been given; some making it consist in the benefit to society, as Hobbes; or in benefit to self, as Mandeville; or in its correspondences with certain fitnesses, as Clarke and Cudworth; or in utility, as Hume and Paley. The truth seems to be, that as there is an immutable and eternal distinction between right and wrong, God has endowed us with the moral faculty, in connection with reason, whereby we perceive and follow the one and avoid the other; and that when this is done, in the exercise of moral freedom, from a regard to the right and the wrong—which are perfectly developed in the revelation of God—we are said to do actions morally good, and accordingly we approve of such in others.

It is obvious that the same act will be differently regarded according to the person doing it, and the principle prompting it; as when the same generous act is done by a miser and a benevolent man; or the same heroic act by a coward and a courageous man; or when the object of the same act is different, as the slaying of a robber or of a friend. Dr. Brown says, we cannot separate the action from the agent; for the agent, and the changes he intended to produce, are all that constitute the action; if all these are right, we approve; if any of these are wrong, we so far disapprove; but why? It is the constitution of our nature; God has made us so. Dr. Brown beautifully elaborates this principle, (Philosophy of the Mind, Lecture lxxiv.,) which corresponds with the statement of the Apostle: "The Lord had respect unto *Abel (first)*, and *(then)* to his *offering;* but unto *Cain* and to his *offering* he had not respect." Gen. iv. 4, 5.

When the *will of God* is revealed, the *right thinking and feeling* man will regard it in all he does, and all *morally good actions* will be agreeable to it; but we are *created with a feeling of moral approbation or disapprobation;* and to this feeling the will of God, when revealed, appeals. Besides the *written* law, there is the law in the *heart.* We do not submit to the *will* of God as we do to his *power*—that is, not from a feeling that it is *impossible* to resist, but that it is *guilt* to wish to disobey; and this feeling is conscience, or the moral sense. Mackintosh says of Cudworth's reasoning, "Whatever judgment may be formed of it, it relates merely to the philosophy of the understanding, and does not attempt any explanation of what constitutes the very *essence of morality*—its relation to the *will.* That we *perceive a distinction* between right and wrong, as much as between a triangle and a square, is indeed true; and may possibly lead to *an explanation of the reason* why men should adhere to the one and avoid the other; but it *is not that reason.* A *command* or a *precept* is not a *proposition.* It cannot be said that either is true or false. Cudworth confounded the mere *apprehension* with the understanding that right is different from wrong, with the *practical authority* of these important conceptions, exercised over voluntary actions, in a totally distinct province of the human soul."

Criterion of Morals and Theory of Morals.—Ethical writers thus distinguish these phrases: discussions regarding the *former* relate to what constitutes the *distinction* between right and wrong; and the *latter* endeavours to ascertain the nature of the feelings with which we contemplate them.

MORAL RESPONSIBILITY.—Responsibility results from the possession of the moral faculty, in connection with moral freedom—that is, the power of acting voluntarily, without constraint or force. This moral freedom is indispensable to responsibility, just as other qualities are indispensable to the acceptableness of an action to God—such as the character of the agent, and its being according to law.

Jonathan Edwards says, "What makes sin hateful is, that it deserves punishment, which is but the expression of hatred; and what makes virtue lovely, is the same which makes it fit for reward, which is but the expression of esteem and love. But it is the inherent loveliness of virtue, and the inherent deformity of vice, that makes them deserving of esteem or disapprobation." But in this, this otherwise profound and accurate writer confounds the *essential virtuousness* or *viciousness* of an action, which is the reason with the *lawgiver* for enjoining it or prohibiting it, with the reason why the *subject of the law* is made responsible for doing or not doing it. It is not the *nature* of the action that constitutes the responsibility, apart from the *manner* of performing it as free or otherwise. The *intrinsic nature* of the action is the reason for enjoining or prohibiting it; when enjoined, it is the possession of the moral sense, in connection with moral freedom, that constitutes responsibility.

Is this moral responsibility connected with our *intellectual* nature? or with our *moral* nature? Or, as these, in their exercises and operations, are inseparably connected, and inextricably interwoven with, and essentially dependent upon one another—is it attached to both? Is there a *central principle* in the mind, according to Dr. Cairns, with which all intellectual and moral operations are connected, and from which they flow? Or is it the mind itself that is the *monad*—the *unit*—and only *variously exercised* according to the *nature* of the *various objects* presented to it? And so when objects that involve relationship to God and our fellow-men are presented, the mind itself brings us under obligation and accountability, from the character of the objects? Important inquiries!

Conscience, and the moral attributes of God.—The use of *conscience*, combined with *reason*, is to enable man to know the moral attributes of God; as from mind and its phenomena, in connection with the senses and external nature we are enabled to know his natural perfections. It is thus the Bible teaches us to reason from our own intelligence, and wisdom, and power, to the wisdom, intelligence, and power of God: "He that planted the ear shall he not hear? He that formed the eye shall he not see? He that teacheth man knowledge shall he not know?" That which is in the *effect* must be in the *cause;* and when the effect is indefinitely multiplied, *the amount* must be in the cause; therefore *infinite* wisdom, knowledge, and power must exist in God. Just so from the providence of God we are taught to infer his goodness; and from the moral feelings, the moral attributes of God—his justice, goodness, and holiness: "He left not himself without a witness; giving rain and fruitful seasons; filling men's hearts with food and gladness." He "loveth the righteous, but is angry with the wicked every day."

Conscience, says Douglas, is the revelation of nature, brief, oracular, and imperfect. Such as its edicts are, they are the pre-intimations of a more full disclosure of the Divine Will; they are propounded to us in the form of law, and as transcripts, however partial, of the great eternal law of God, which bears sway over all his intelligent creation. They make a marked distinction between *that which is* and *that which ought to be;* they are prophetic, as looking forward to the period when the *latter* shall supersede the *former;* and when the equity of God shall prevail over the iniquity of man. They carry the thoughts from the visible to the invisible—from the false opinions and unjust decisions which prevail on earth to the tribunal of an unseen Judge, to whom al secrets are open and all hearts are known. It is, however, but a momentary lightning which reveals to us for an instant far distant objects, and leaves us again in our usual state of dim-sightedness Besides, from the combining powers of the mind, the elements of thought, like the elements of matter, never remain separate; but enter immediately into new unions. The other faculties of the understanding immediately blend with the moral law, and *conscience* and *reason* appear but as *one conjunct power.*

SELF—IDENTITY.—Payne distinguishes *self* from *identity.* "The former," he says, "would seem to me to be the conception of mind as the permanent subject of our thoughts and feelings, &c.; the *latter,* of this mind as unchanging. The two statements cannot be affirmed to be identical; but on the false assumption, that substances are incapable of change. We might possess a mind, and yet that mind, though continuing to be the subject of our sensations, thoughts, &c., might be liable to suffer change, and actually to undergo it. Dr. Brown identifies these conceptions."—*Payne* p. 62.

MORAL EMOTIONS—MORAL JUDGMENTS.—Payne distinguishes these thus: "There is, in the mind, an original susceptibility of moral emotion, in consequence of which actions of a moral character are regarded with powerful feelings of approbation or disapprobation."—Page 375. The moral sense pronounces the judgment, and this is accompanied by a corresponding emotion.

FREE AGENCY AND FREE WILL.—God, says Douglas, governs matter by necessity; brutes, by their instincts; man, amidst the multitude of his desires, by reasonable and moral choice. In regard to this there are two questions generally mixed up: freedom of action, and the determination of the will; and the confounding of them leads to a great deal of logomachy. To do as we will is freedom; but besides freedom of action, some must have freedom of will; and thus seek freedom, not in free action, but free nonentity. The will is not free unless they will, to will; as each act of will, therefore, supposes a previous act of will, in order to make it free, they must have existed in a state of volition from all eternity; and yet the first will could not be free, because there was no previous act of will freely to determine it.

THE FREE AGENCY OF MAN, AND THE PRESCIENCE OF GOD.—"Quocirca, nullo modo cogimur, aut retenta prœscientia Dei, tollere voluntatis arbitrium, aut retento voluntatis arbitrio, Deum, quod nefas est, negare prescium futurorum; sed utrumque amplectimur, utrumque fideliter et veraciter confitemur; illud ut bene credamus; hoc ut bene vivamus."—*Augustine.*

VI.—THE CHARACTER OF ACTIONS, IN THEMSELVES AND IN THEIR RELATIONS.

1. Since there is a future state of existence, in which human beings shall live for ever, in happiness inconceivable, or in misery ineffable, it is evident that their blessedness or woe must depend upon the *state*, *character*, and *conduct*, possessed of which they depart from this world.

2. It is universally admitted that *actions* are to be estimated by the *state* and *character* of him who performs them; and by the *principles* in which they originate, and the *motives* whence they spring.

3. This truth, that actions are to be estimated by the principles or motives that excite to the performance of them, may be familiarly illustrated in the following manner; showing that one of the simplest acts that a man can be conceived as performing, varies in its character, and in the estimate to be formed of it, according to the motive which prompts it.

A purse is given to a man on the public road. This is the act; it is *one*, and *single;* but in how many ways may its moral aspect be viewed; and the *qualities* that characterize it as *good*, or *evil*, or mixed, be considered—qualities that render it praiseworthy or culpable!

It may have been the act of a *child*, giving away his *toy* which he no longer valued; or of an *idiot*, parting with that which had, for the moment, gratified him, but which now pleases him no longer. In either case, reason was wanting; the act, therefore, had *no moral quality*.

It may have been the act of a man yielding to violence, employed to extort it. In this case the act was *forced*, and the absence of *voluntariness* divests it of moral qualities; and so it comes under the same category as the former.

It may have been given as a *bribe*, the price of crime—either previously committed, or to be hereafter perpetrated. In this case the *motive* being base and execrable, the act was infamous and detestable.

It may have been the honourable payment of *a debt* justly contracted. In this case, the *principle* being according to rectitude, the *deed* was laudable.

It may have been a *gift*, given to relieve the distressed. In this case, the *character* of the *act* will vary, according to the *nature* of the *motive* which prompted it. If given from mere animal *impulse*, without consideration or judgment, it was a misuse of the bounties of Providence, of which the possessor was a steward. If given from an idea that there was *merit* in the act, and that it would gain *reward*, it was *mercenary*, and not disinterested benevolence. If given from *generosity*, under the influence of *love* to the Redeemer, regulated by *wisdom*, and done from a sense of obligation to the command of God, it had all the indispensable requisites to constitute a *good action*, and was profitable to man and acceptable to God.

4. Here, then, a most important inquiry arises, namely, what is it, in human conduct, that renders it—in motives and acts, in principles and effects—good in itself, and acceptable to God?

1. The *agent*—that is, the person performing the act—must be *good*; that is, he must be one *justified* by faith in the Lord Jesus Christ, and *created anew* by the Holy Spirit. Acts done by others may benefit mankind, but, unless they are the productions of "the new creature," they are not, in themselves, good, nor are they pleasing to God, "who judgeth the heart;" for "the carnal mind"—that is, every unrenewed mind—is "enmity against God;" and therefore *none of its* productions can be spiritually good, nor accept-

able to God, to whom thoughts are as words, and motives, actions; and who "requireth truth in the inward parts."

2. The *originating* principle must be good—that is, the action must spring from *a good motive*—more especially from the best of all motives, *love*. Love is the fulfilling of the law, and the essence of the Gospel. The most splendid actions, if prompted by *mercenary* motives—if done to gain applause, or if extorted by fear—are worthless in the sight of Him who "regardeth the heart," and requires love, his own reflected image there.

3. The action must be done in accordance with *the golden rule*, the law of God. As all that is pleasing unto God must come from God, so must it be—not accordant with self-imagination or human expedients, but with the requirements of God.

4. That an *action* be good, it is required that its *tendency*, *design*, or *aim* be good—that is, it must be directed to the glory of God. "Of him, and through him, are all things; and therefore to him are all things;" and "Whatsoever we do must be done to the glory of God."

The following passage from the thirteenth chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, very strikingly and beautifully illustrates the position that the *motive* is indispensable to a truly right action. The reader will remember charity (αγαπη) means not almsgiving, but love: "Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal. And though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries and all knowledge; and though I have all faith so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing. And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing."

VII.—SCRIPTURAL SUMMARIES OF MORAL OBLIGATIONS.

The grand, all-comprehending summary, is, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength; and thy neighbour as thyself; for on these two hang all the law and the prophets." They, therefore, embody the re-

quirements of Revelation; and all particular precepts a
but developments of these.

The obligations embodied in these "two great commandi
ments," including, of course, not only *positively* the requir
ment of what they enjoin, but *negatively* the prohibition o
the opposites, are *duties*, coming under the Ethical categ
ries of OUGHT and OUGHT NOT; being, *in themselves*, an
from *the relations they imply*, DEBTS which man OWES t
God, to his neighbour, and to himself. The most perfe
development of this "sum of moral obligation" is given i
the ten commandments, all of which proceed upon thes
principles that what is enjoined as a duty to our neigh
bour that is, to every fellow-man, (Luke x. 29–37,) is fir
a duty to ourselves; that what is *negatively* forbidde
implies, *positively*, the opposite requirement; and so th
prohibition against taking away *the life*, for instance, of ou
neighbour, contains not only the prohibition against takin
away *our own* life, but implies the injunction by all lawfu
means to preserve *both*; and, finally, that what is forbidde
in word or deed, by precept or example, is forbidden in th
thoughts and conceptions of the mind from which wor
and actions flow, and of which they are the expression.

This view differs from that given by Archbishop Whately, wh
(Logic, p. 167,) in reference to the very unreasonable demar
often made for *a specific precept*, or *prohibition*, for every *duty* o
sin, truly says that the proper answer is, that the Bible is not
code of *laws*, but a *system* of principles and motives to be applie
to particular cases, (by an enlightened conscience under the gui
ance of the Holy Spirit). But, then, in opposition to the adducti
of the sixth commandment as a prohibition of suicide, as sel
murder, he adds: "Suicide, if any one considers the nature a
not the name of it, evidently wants the most essential charact
of murder, viz., the *hurt* and *injury* done to one's neighbour
depriving him of life, as well as to others by the insecurity th
are in consequence liable to feel. And since no one, strict
speaking, can do *injustice* to himself, he cannot, in the literal a
primary acceptation of the words, be said either to rob or to mu
der himself."

This may be true, using the terms *justice* and *injustice* in the
conventional meaning, according to the usages of human societ
and the decisions of human law—in which sense they seem to
employed by Aristotle in the fifth book of his Nicomachean Ethi
in which the subject is copiously treated. But the "two gre
commandments" proceed upon the principle that *love to one's s*

is made the *standard* and *pattern* of *love* to *one's neighbour;* and *this*—love to one's neighbour—being represented as a *debt*, the *withholding* of which would be *injustice*, no less than the *practical violation* of the command by the committing of *murder; the other*—love to *one's self*—must be regarded, in like manner, as a *debt*, the *withholding* of which would be *injustice*, as well as *the practical violation* of the command to yield it, by the committing of *suicide*—that is, *self-murder*. The great logician of Tarsus—perhaps not very far below him of Stagyra in mental acumen and profundity of intellect, and who wrote in "words which the Holy Ghost taught him"—reasons thus, (Rom. xiii. 8–10): "Owe no man anything, but to love one another; for he that loveth another hath fulfilled the law; for this thou shalt not commit adultery, thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not bear false witness, thou shalt not covet, thou shalt not kill; and if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in this saying, thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." This is the all-comprehending precept, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself;" embracing, love to ourselves first; and next, love to our neighbour; and this love to our neighbour *as* to ourselves. But love to our neighbour is a *debt*—something *owed;* therefore, love to ourselves is a debt—something *owed*. *Murder* violates the principle in the *one* case—is injustice; suicide violates the principle in the *other*, and is equally injustice.

In the same manner is the principle applicable to each of the following precepts, the seventh requiring a regard to our own *purity* and that of our neighbour, as well as forbidding the violation of it, and that in thought and word as well as in act; and so the eighth, in regard to *property*, and the ninth, in regard to *truth*. Upon any other principle the law could not be a perfect rule of duty, as it would not enjoin the duties of the individual to himself.

It is *one* characteristic of the inspired book, to condense into a *single sentence* the essence of volumes; because such single sentence contains the *germ* to be *developed* in its *application* to the endlessly varying circumstances and conditions—modes of government and states of society, of the "all people, nations, kindreds, and tongues" that in succession dwell upon "the face of the whole earth," for whom that volume was written. In connection with the asserted *nothingness* of what the ancient people of God pre-eminently valued as paramount and supreme, what *is* of infinite value, in reference to *moral excellence*, is declared in regard to the *three-fold aspect* under which morality may be viewed; its originating *principle*, its *internal essence*, its *outward manifestation:* "Circumcision is nothing and uncircumcision is nothing, but FAITH which *worketh* by love; circumcision is nothing and uncircumcision is nothing, but A NEW CREATURE; circumcision is nothing and uncircumcision is nothing, but THE KEEPING OF THE COMMANDMENTS OF GOD." Gal. v. 6; Gal. vi. 15; 1 Cor. vii. 19.

TECHNICOLOGICAL LEXICON.

Ability and Inability; *natural and moral*.—**Ability** *(natural)* is power to do certain acts, in consequence of being possessed of the requisite means, and being unrestrained in their exercise; thus we say, ability to walk, the power of vision, &c. **Inability** *(natural)* is the opposite of this, as when we say of a blind man, He cannot see; or when an obstruction interposes between our sight and an object, or it is too distant, we say, I cannot see it. **Moral ability** is the *disposition* to use rightly the abilities which God has given; and **moral inability** is the opposite, as when we say, on the one hand, He delights in the law of God, and on the other, They have eyes full of adultery and *cannot* cease from sin. *Natural* inability *excuses* from moral obligation. *Moral* inability is that in which *the blame itself* consists: thus, The Heathen *cannot* hear the Gospel, for no preacher has been sent to them; and the not hearing of it, is not sin: but of the Jews our Lord said, Why cannot ye hear my speech? Even because ye *cannot* hear my word.

Abstract—Concrete.—*Abstract* is the *attribute* of anything, considered apart from that thing; *concrete* is the thing itself. *Abstraction*, the fixing of the mind upon a part of an object, separate from the rest of it; *generalization*, the grouping together the qualities of various objects that agree, and giving them a common name. The names that mark the specifically different qualities are *particular terms;* those that denote the agreeing qualities are *general terms.*

Abstract Truths—(See under *Truth.)*

Analogy—*(ανα* λογος, *ana* and *logos)*—the *resemblance* arising from relations; generalizing from *particular facts*, in *certain relations*, to others the same or similar; as Newton, when he discovered the *law of gravitation*, and found it *universal in our system*, pursued the principle and applied it to *all worlds* from *analogy;* and so when, in morals, we ascertain *the eternal and immutable distinction* between *right* and *wrong*—that the one is the object of the *approval*, and the other of the *disapprobation* of God, we infer from *analogy* that it is the same in *the whole intelligent creation of God.*

Analysis and Synthesis.—**Analysis**, (*ανα* and λυω, *ana* and *luo, to unfold; αναλυσις, analysis, unloosing,)* the *resolving* of a *compound* into its *component parts. Chemical* analysis, the resolving of a *compound substance* into its *elementary particles. Logical* analysis, the resolving of a *complex argument* into its constituent parts. Analysis of *a book—of a sentence* in Grammar—*of a speech*, &c., the separation of the parts of which, respectively, they consist, and into which they may be resolved.

SYNTHESIS, (*συντιθημι, synlithemi, I put together; συνθεσις, synthesis, combining.*) the *opposite* of analysis; the combining of *distinct parts* into *one whole*. *Chemical* combination, the bringing together of *particles* that are *capable of assimilating*. *Logical* synthesis, the collecting together *distinct arguments* so as to form a *chain of reasoning*. This, by some of the older logicians, was called *Genesis*, from the Greek word (*γενεσις*,, used in the Bible for *creation*, the arranging, in one harmonious whole, things before distinct and remote. *Analysis* is of principal use in *acquiring*; *synthesis* in *communicating* knowledge.

Analysis has a *peculiar* meaning in *Geometry;* it is "the process by which a proposition is traced up, through a chain of necessary dependencies, to some known operation, or some admitted principle. It is alike applicable to the discovery of truth in a theorem, as to the construction of a problem. Analysis, as its name imports, is thus a sort of inverted form of solution. Assuming the hypothesis advanced, it remounts, step by step, till it has reached a source already explored. The reverse of this process constitutes synthesis, or composition; which is the mode usually employed for explaining the elements of science. Analysis, therefore, presents the medium of *invention;* while synthesis directs the course of instruction."—*Dewar*.

ARGUMENT in logic, proof; in common language, a discussion.

ARISTOTELIAN *Philosophy*, (from Aristotle of Stagyra, 99th Olympiad, 384 B.C., the disciple of Plato,) called, also, PERIPATETIC, (*περι*, *peri*, about, and *πατεω*, *pateo*, I walk, from his *walking about* while delivering his lectures). As to MIND, it teaches that it is partly *sentient* and partly *intellectual;* and, therefore, there are two classes of virtues: to the *sentient* belong fortitude, temperance, &c.; to the *intellectual*, integrity, prudence, wisdom, &c. This *sentient* part has the form of the body; is inseparable from it; perishes when it dies; to it belong the senses, which receive *sensible species*, as wax receives impression from the seal; bodies sending forth as many of these species as they have qualities. As to ETHICS, for the *governing* and *governed* virtues of his master Plato, he substituted *a scale*, in which each virtue is at *the middle* between the *extremes;* as *fortitude*, between *cowardice* and *rashness;* and taught that virtue is not so much in the direction of the powers, as in the perception of the true character of the objects, and being governed by reason.—*Nicom. Ethics*, i. 2; ii. 5.

N.B.—Aristotle was reckoned all but infallible during the *middle ages;* a reaction took place—from confounding his disciples, the schoolmen, with himself—and it has long been the fashion to speak contemptuously of his works. But there is a counter-reaction of late years; and very few of the pretended modern discoveries in mental science are not found in his works; as intuitive truths, *immateriality* of mind, association of ideas.

ART—(See *Science and Art.*)

ASSOCIATION.—The relation existing among thoughts and feelings, according to which one suggests another, so as to produce a *train*; it affects the *order*—not the *origin* of our thoughts and feelings. The *laws* of association are the principles which govern the relations among the thoughts and feelings themselves.

BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY—From Francis Bacon, the same as the Inductive; called Baconian, because he was its great modern advocate; and thus led to the sound philosophy of the present age.

BERKELEIAN—From George Berkeley, bishop of Cloyne, who, from the doctrine formerly current in the schools, held the *ideal* system; or, that the material universe has no existence distinct from, and independent of the perceptions of the mind.

"Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind, that a man need only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, to wit, that all the choir of heaven and furniture of earth—in a word, all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, *have not any subsistence without a mind;* that their *being (esse)* is to be perceived or known; that, consequently, so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind, or that of any other *created spirit,* they must either have no existence at all, *or else subsist in the mind of some eternal spirit:* it being perfectly unintelligible, and involving all the absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of them an existence independent of a spirit. To be convinced of this, the reader need only reflect and try to separate in his own thoughts the being of a sensible thing from its being perceived."—*Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge,* works I., p. 89, 1843.

It has been hitherto pretty generally believed, that Reid, Stewart, and Brown, had supplied an ample confutation of "Berkeley's Theory;" but his latest editor says, "Berkeley's Theory does not depend on the truth or falsehood of that ancient hypothesis—(that of the philosophic scheme of ideas)—but on this fact, that there is no necessary connection in reason and language between our perceptions and the existence of external objects; since we know it not unfrequently happens, that objects *appear to be present* to the senses when disordered, although we know that they are *not present.* Reid has not refuted Berkeley, nor even struck at the leading root of his system; no other antagonist has assailed his doctrines with equal ability or success; Berkeley, therefore, remains unanswered." And very likely will remain so, unless some one shall undertake to *prove* an *intuitive* truth, or to argue that because the testimony of the senses, "*when disordered,*" may deceive us, there is no truth in their testimony; or from the *disordered consciousness* of an insane person, to the testimony of consciousness in general.

CATEGORIES—(*κατηγορια—prædicamentum, a predicament*)—propositions embodying the classes, in number ten, to one or other of which (so it was supposed) every thing could be reduced. (See p. 23.) Hence the term *category* came to denote, in general, *a* *complete enumeration:* and a thing is said to be *categorical* when it is *perfect* or *adequate* to what is intended: as when we say, Such a thing is to be put into such a *category;* and Such an answer is, or is not, *categorical.* (See *Predicable.*)

Cartesian—from René Des Cartes, of Touraine, 1596, who was first a warrior and then a philosopher. His works on Physics are fanciful; but he asserted the *spirituality of mind,* and taught the right way of studying it, by considering its qualities and operations. He taught that the *essence* of the soul is *thinking,* in opposition to which Locke asserted that thinking is the soul's *action.* His was *idealism,* without the denying of the distinct existence of matter. He was the first of the moderns to give the abstract argument for the being of God. His *Principia Philosophiæ* commences in doubting everything, himself, God, matter, mind, &c. The foundation (*δος πoυ ςω, dos pou sto* of Archimedes—that on which to rest the lever which was to upheave all old errors, and lay the foundation of a new moral universe) of Des Cartes was, *Cogito, ergo sum;* I think, therefore I exist; but he assumed existence in the *I:* this granted, he proceeded to prove the existence of God, and so on. By attempting *to prove intuitive truths,* he laid the foundation for the scepticism of Hume and Berkeley; the proofs, of course, being inconclusive, the facts were denied; matter by the one—mind by the other.

Cause and Effect.—**Cause,** that which produces an effect; **effect,** that which is produced by a cause. *Causes* are classed by metaphysical writers into various orders: *simple,* when the effect is supposed to originate in what is one and indivisible; *complex,* when *more elements* enter into the production of it; *proximate,* when the immediate cause is itself an effect of one more remote; and *ultimate,* when the effect is traced to the last in the series, beyond which we cannot go; *secondary,* when the effect is produced through what is but the means; and *primary,* when it is ascribed to that which first moves to what ends in the production of the effect; *apparent,* when the effect *seems* to result from what is not *really and truly* the cause; and *efficient,* when the power that produces the effect is seated in the cause to which it is ascribed.

Certainty, (*cerno, clear-seeing*)—the mental state of being sure that a thing is, or will be, or has been. It is applied to various things: mathematical *certainty,* that which results from *necessary truths;* physical *certainty,* the result of physical *causes;* moral *certainty,* that which is the result of moral evidence.

Common Sense.—This term, which was unhappily used by Dr Reid and others, to denote the faculty by which *intuitive truths* are perceived, had various meanings among the ancients. By the *Greek stoics* it was used to denote (*κοινονοημοσυνη, koinonoemosune*) the regard due to the *public good.* Besides this meaning, among the Latins, as among ourselves, it denoted the *knowledge of men and things,* which is essential to politeness.—(Hor. Sat. i. 3, 66 Quinctil. i. 2.) Lucretius used it in the same sense as Reid, Beattie *and others,* to denote the *instinctive* persuasion of truth which arises from intuitive evidence, and is the foundation of all reasoning.—(De Rer. Nat. i. 423.) As the terms *internal senses* were used to denote mental faculties by Hutcheson and others, and the faculty of intuition is common, Reid and Beattie seem to have been thus led to use the phrase "common sense," to denote the universally possessed faculty of perceiving first truths. It afforded, however, to Priestly and the materialists an occasion for ridicule; and has been, therefore, discontinued, except in its ordinary meaning.

COMPLEX, (*con* and *plico, I fold together*)—that which consists of many *folds*, or parts; as a complex sentence, or idea—that which consists of two or more simple ones.

CONCEPTION, the power which gives knowledge of our formerly acquired ideas; the *knowledge* thus acquired, as we say, "I have a perfect *conception* of his form and features."

CONCRETE—(See *Abstract and Concrete.*)

CONSCIENCE, the moral principle (*con* and *scio*, to have knowledge in one's self), by which we *recognise* our duties, and are made to feel the *obligation* to perform them; as well as everything connected with these duties and obligations—the *laws* under which we are—their *requirements* and *prohibitions*—the *sanctions* which enforce them, and the *motives* which excite to the performance of them; and which also *judges*, approves or disapproves, recognises as right or condemns, according as its dictates are regarded or contravened. *Mens conscia sibi recti*, the mind conscious of being right; more than an equivalent for censure or loss. *Ουδεν γαρ εμαυτω συν οι δα*, "I am not conscious to myself of anything;" and yet, however delightful, from being aware of the deceitfulness of his heart he did not rest therein: "Yet am I not hereby justified, but he that judgeth me is the Lord." 1 Cor. iv. 4.

CONSCIOUSNESS—the mind's being *privy* to its own thoughts and feelings, accompanied with the feeling of *satisfaction* when these are *right*, and of regret when these are wrong.

CRITERIA, (*κρινο, krino, I decide;* criterion singular, criteria plural)—the *test*, or decisive proof of anything.

DEMONSTRATIVE TRUTHS—(See under *Truth.*)

DEONTOLOGY, (*δεον, deon, that which* OUGHT *to be*, from *δει, dei, it ought to be*, and λογος, *logos, discourse*)—the science of *Ethics;* the science that explains moral duties.

DILEMMA—(See *Logic.*)

DUTY, *(due)*—that which is *owed;* that which OUGHT to be, from the relation in which man stands to God and to his fellow-men; that to which, by the constitution of his nature, and the law of his God, he is *obliged;* the withholding of which, or the doing of the opposite, constitutes *guilt.*

ECLECTIC, (from εκ, *ek*, and λεγω, *lego*, I choose out)—a sect that arose at Alexandria soon after the commencement of the Christian æra, *professedly* following no one in particular, but collecting from all; and putting Christianity upon a level with philosophical sects, and selecting from it, in like manner.

Effect—(See under *Cause and Effect.)*

Empirical—(See *Experimental—Empirical.)*

Enthymeme—(See *Logic.)*

Esoteric—Exoteric.—The *former*, (*εσοτερος, esoteros, inner,*) denotes the doctrines which the ancient philosophers communicated only to *the initiated;* the *latter*, (*εξοτερος, exoteros, external,*) the doctrines made known *publicly to all.* Pythagoras is said to have been the first who acted upon the distinction. Some of the early Fathers adopted the principle, in giving instructions to the *Catechumens, beginners*, (*κατα, kata*, and *ηχος, echos*, sound, *viva voce instruction,*) and the *Teleioi* (*τελειος, τελος, telos, an end,*) thoroughly *instructed.*

Eternal and necessary Truths—(See under *Truth.)*

Ethics, (*ηθος, ethos, mos, moral disposition or habit)*—the science that investigates *morals ;* in their *principle*, the moral faculty or conscience; in their *criterion*, the eternal distinction between right and wrong; in their *law*, the will of God; and in their *manifestations*, the duties of personal, social, and public religion.

Experimental—Empirical.—The *former* derived from the *Latin (experior, I try, put to the proof)*, and the *latter* derived from the Greek—in meaning the same, (*εμπειρω, I make an experiment)*; but the *former* generally used when the trial or experiment is duly made, according to established order, and with the view of ascertaining the truth or fact; the *latter*, contemptuously, in the sense of *quackery.*

Faculties—Powers.—These terms are frequently applied to mental operations indiscriminately; but, in strict propriety, the *former* implies either an *active* or *passive* capacity, the *latter* only an *active* one; and, therefore, while *both* terms, faculty and power, are used in reference to the *intellect*, the *latter* alone is generally used in reference to the *will.*

Fallacy—(See *Sophism.)*

Freedom, when the term *moral* is prefixed, is the liberty of acting as we please. This all men do, when not under *constraint or force ;* and *free agency*—the liberty of doing what we like—is essential to accountability. Dr. Cairns defines Freedom "as consisting in the relation or adaptation of an agent, to different kinds of changes; but especially of those which, in any given instance, actually take place;" which, being interpreted, means the power to act otherwise in any given circumstances. Freedom of *will* is *figuratively* applied to inanimate objects, denoting their unconstrained movements, as "The river glideth of its own sweet will." *(Wordsworth.)* It is used in reference to all *sentient beings*—as to the motions of birds, insects, &c., to mean those acts which the instincts of their nature prompt them to put forth. And it is employed regarding intellectual and moral beings, as *freedom of thought*, of *conscience*, &c.—that is, the uncontrolled liberty of thinking, feeling, and acting, without any constraint from *without.* It is applied to the *will* of man; it is *free*, when *inclined* to *good, it freely* chooses it, and acts accordingly ; or when *inclined* *vil, it freely* chooses it, and acts accordingly.

HARTLEIAN—from David Hartley, of Jesus College, Cambridge, 1698—that theory which accounts for sensation, by vibrations in the brain, through the medium of an invisible ether.

HOBBESIAN—from Hobbes, of Malmesbury, 1588, who taught the *selfish* system in morals; and who, in his book called Leviathan—the name he gives to *the people* of a state—makes the will of the magistrate the standard of right and wrong. As this proceeds upon the principle that there is no *necessary* or inherent distinction between right and wrong—as the will of the ruler creates it—the *Cudworthian*, from Cudworth, was written in confutation of it; and is that which asserts the eternity and immutability of moral distinctions. In opposition to Hobbes, Bishop Cumberland wrote his Treatise on Natural Laws.

HYPOTHESIS, (*υπο τιθημι, hypotithemi, υποθεσις, hypothesis, something laid down, I lay down*)—a supposition founded on analogy. In its *ordinary meaning*, as in mathematics, for instance, it means *simple assumption*; something taken for granted. As applied to *the opinions of the ancients*, something supposed, to account for something otherwise inexplicable—such as, for instance, the motion of bodies by means of an invisible fluid called ether; in this sense it is, *ignotum per ignotius*, the unknown thing, explained by something more unknown. In *philosophy*, when a fact which has no other explanation than the explanation it affords of some other, is assumed for the sake of explaining that other, this is called *hypothesis*.

IDEA, (*ιδειν, to see*)—*originally* denoted *images* which *visible* or *luminous* objects were supposed to throw off, and which, entering the eye, gave the sensation of sight. A better philosophy taught men that nothing enters the eye but the rays of light, which *paint* the *image* upon the *retina*; the result of which is the sensation of seeing; and then the term came to be used for *the notion* of the object thus received. Thence it came to denote *the notion* we have of *any object* by *any of the senses*; and, by a still further change, *any notion whatever*. Thus of an obscure sentence, we say, "I have not an idea of its meaning." *Innate* ideas were those supposed to exist in the mind, distinct both from the *mind* itself and the *objects* of sensation or consciousness: these are now known to be wholly imaginary.

IDENTITY—PERSONAL, (*idem, the same*)—that in which *the sameness* of every moral being consists, notwithstanding all the bodily and mental changes he undergoes, and which renders him *accountable* for all his thoughts, words, and actions, during the whole period of his existence as a moral being. The belief in this is intuitive. (See p. 30.)

IDENTICAL—the same with something else; as an *identical* proposition is one the same in *reality*, though different in *expression* from some other.

INDUCTION—(*in* and *duco*)—the investigation of facts, *one leading on to another*, so as to *deduce* a general conclusion. The term is used sometimes in the sense of *investigating*, and sometimes in the sense of *deducing inferences.* In the *first* sense it is r ing; in the *second,* it may be reduced to a *syllogism.* use is, the collection of facts, in which is form a view o theories. *Whately's Logic,* p. 226.

When, from a comparison of a number of facts, k experiment or observation to be true, the existence *general fact is inferred,* it is said to be by *induction.*—*Th*

INNATE (See *Idea,* and under the head, *Origin of ledge,* p. 20.)

INTELLECT, (*intelligo, intellectus, understanding.*—t man's spiritual being which gives him knowledge; thu the foundation (*under standing*) of immaterial qualities (*materia, mater, mother or parent*) is of material qualitie

INTUITIVE TRUTHS—(See under *Truth.*)

JUDGMENT, the *mental faculty* which compares thing *pression* of that comparison in a proposition; *intuitive* that which ascertains the relation *immediately; infere* ment, that which results from a comparison of proofs.

KANTIAN *Philosophy*—from Kant, a German writer. w cipal philosophical work is "The Critique of Pure Rea distinguishes the *sensible* faculties from the understar Cudworth had done so before him, and Plato and Ari done so before *him.* He also distinguished ideas arisin activity of the mind itself, from ideas of outward objec had Locke previously done. He teaches that even things, passively perceived by the senses, are know ceived only by the active power of the mind itself. αισθηματα and φαντασματα, there are νοηματα from standing alone. Old ideas wrapt up in novel phrase too frequently made the vehicle of Deism, denying the Pantheism, denying the being of God distinct from the

LAW, in common language, a rule of conduct enacted rity; in philosophy, certain circumstances of agreeme connected with the material and intellectual phenomen we say, the laws of matter, the laws of mind, the lav tation, the laws of association, the laws of planetary m These are not anything different from the phenomena t but the uniform mode of acting, by which the Deity g universe according to the constitution he has establi observe matter, for instance, to gravitate, invariably, centre; whether this is produced *immediately,* by the e the Creator, or *mediately,* by an intervening cause, *we* but in either case it is the result of his appointment. of gravitation, the laws of mind, are the invariable among the material and intellectual phenomena, esta Him "who worketh ALL in ALL."

LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.—Can the mind yield to, *motives at pleasure?* Or, must the strongest motive determine the mind? The *former* is the belief of the *L* *as those are called* who hold that man is a free agent;

of the *Necessarians*, who deny it; of which the following is a statement from one of the latest asserters of the doctrine, Mr. Mill, in his Logic: "Given, the motives, and the character, and disposition, of any person, the manner in which he will act may be inferred; so that if we knew the person thoroughly, and all the inducements acting upon him, we could foretell his conduct as accurately as any physical events."

Liberty—natural liberty, or *liberty of choice*, is when volitions are not irresistibly determined by any foreign cause: this is *moral freedom*, to do *what we will*. *Necessity* arises, either from *physical causes*, as when the finger is applied to the flame of a candle, *pain* MUST be felt; or *moral*—that is, the *inseparable connection* between *moral causes and effects*, as when we say of God that he *necessarily* acts from the best motives, and for the highest ends. In *this sense*, necessity is perfectly consistent with the *highest liberty*.

LIGHT "is a fluid compounded of seven simpler elements. These elements differ from each other, and from the compound, in several qualities, and particularly in colour. The particles of light are so extremely minute, that their existence is manifested only by indirect means. They move in right lines with immense speed, and, entering the eye through the pupil, impinge upon the posterior surface of the inner part of the eyeball. The substance thus affected by them is a nerve, which, extending to the brain, continues to it the effect produced. When this takes place, the mind is immediately conscious of an idea, which idea we call light; the *substance* and the *idea* bearing the same name." . . . . . Light often first impinges upon other bodies, and, *reflected* from them, enters the eye. But all the component parts of the light are not generally *reflected*, some being *absorbed*. Those which are reflected, impinging upon the eye, produce an *idea*. This idea is that of a *colour*, and that colour depends upon the parts of the light reflected from the object. When, therefore, a certain object is said to be of a certain colour, all that should be meant is, that it is capable only of reflecting those parts of light which, when they impinge upon the eye, produce an idea in the mind called by the name of that colour." Thus *white* is applied to the solar *light*, and to the *idea* produced in the mind by that light entering the eye; and the paper, or other substance on which it falls, and which is made visible by reflecting it.—*Lardner; Lectures on Locke*, 43, 44.

LOCKISTS—from John Locke, of Somersetshire, 1632, who first studied in Westminster school, and then in Oxford University—and whose "Essay on the Human Understanding" laid the foundation for the right mode of pursuing metaphysical studies. His great doctrine—sweeping away all the *idealism* of the schoolmen—was, that all knowledge is derived from sensation or reflection.

LOGIC—(λογος, *logos, reason)*—the *science* which developes the mental *principles* employed in reasoning; the ART which prescribes the *rules* by which the process of reasoning is to be conducted.

Reasoning, the process by which *one conclusion* is drawn from *two premises;* this applies to *all* reasoning. When *both premises* are *stated*, and the *conclusion expressed*, it is a *syllogism*, (*συν* an *λογιζω*, *syn* and *logidso*, to *reckon*, *collect*, *deduce.)* When *one premi* is suppressed, it is an *enthymeme*, (*εν* and *θυμος*, *en* and *thumos*, *the mind—not expressed)*; when *several* sets of premises a arranged in *a series*, so that the *conclusion* from the first is ma *the premiss* of the following, till we arrive at the *ultimate concl sion*; or when the *predicate* of one is made the *subject* of the fo lowing, and so on, till the predicate of the *last* can be predicat of the *subject* of the *first*, it is a *sorites*, (*σορος*, *soros*, *a heap* Dilemma, (*δις* and *λαμβανω*, *dis* and *lambano*, that which may taken in various ways,) is a syllogism so constructed as to conta two or more syllogisms, consisting of *conditional* propositions, which the *antecedent* being granted as true, the *consequent* nece sarily follows. It *generally* consists of *two* syllogisms; hence i name *di*lemma.

LOGOMACHY, (*λογος*, *logos*, *a word*, and *μαχομαι*, *machomai*, *contend)*—a dispute about words without real diversity of meanin

MACHIAVELIAN—from Machiavelli, an Italian, born in 146 secretary to the Florentine Embassy at Paris, whose book call *The Prince* was termed "the Bible of Catherine de Medici." taught the double doctrine—*exoteric* and *esoteric;* that the gover ing principle being *self-interest*, the great object of governors is hoodwink the people; and that the end sanctifies the means. Hen *Machiavelian policy*—deceptive, unprincipled.

MALEBRANCHE, a French philosopher, who, in his "La Recherc de la Verité," doubts the testimony of the senses as being deprav by original sin; and asserts the doctrine of seeing "all things God."

MANICHEISM—from Manes, a Persian, who taught that *matt* was eternal, and essentially evil, as *mind* was eternal and esse tially good; the doctrine of the two eternal principles, ever co tending, called also *Oriental* philosophy, because it came from t East. Hence came the self-inflicted tortures of the body, to bri it under mind; and hence some denied that our Lord took a *re material* body, and were called *Docetæ* (from *δοκεω*, to *appear* because they said our Lord's body was only *apparent*.

MATERIALISM, the system that denies the existence of mind a substance *distinct from matter;* and asserts that all mental oper tions are the result of corporeal organization. Priestly, and st more recently, Mill, are the principal teachers of this doctrine.

MEDIÆVAL *Philosophy*, that chiefly cultivated in the *middle age* extending, in general, from the fall of the Roman empire till t Reformation.

MENTAL, belonging to the mind; mental *principles*, those th enable us to *know* the laws which enjoin responsibility, and reg late freedom; mental *powers*, the powers or faculties of the mind those of the *understanding* and *will*—the *intellect* and *active powers* the *mind* and *soul*—the *head* and *heart*.

METAPHYSICS, (*μετα τα φυσικα*, *meta ta physica*, *after t Physics)*—a term often used to denote the *science of mind*, a generally connected in the thoughts of most people with the idea of *dark and mysterious* discussion, or *unintelligible abstruseness*. The name was first given to certain books of Aristotle, of which the history is the following: "Aristotle bequeathed by legacy his writings to Theophrastus, who left them, together with his own, to Neleus of Scepsis. The posterity of Neleus, being illiterate men, kept them for some time locked up; but, hearing that the king of the country was making a general search for books, to furnish his library at Pergamus, they hid them in a hole under ground, where they lay for many years, and suffered much from worms and dampness. At last, however, they were sold to one Apellicon, who caused them to be copied out; and having, according to Strabo, a greater passion for books than for knowledge, ordered the transcribers to supply the chasms from their own invention. When Sylla took Athens, he seized upon Apellicon's library, and carried it to Rome. Here the books of Aristotle were revised by Tyrannio the grammarian, and afterwards by Andronicus of Rhodes, a Peripatetic philosopher, who published the first complete edition of them. To fourteen of these books which it seems had no general title, Andronicus prefixed the words (*τα μετα τα φυσικα, ta meta ta physica*), the books after the Physics, either because in the order of the former arrangement they happened to be so placed, or because the editor meant that they should be studied *next after the Physics*."—(*Beattie, from Strabo and Plutarch.*) The succeeding philosophers explained it, as that, referring to *mind*, it should be studied next after *Physics* or Material Nature. Thus the word came to denote the science of mind; and because the schoolmen reduced that science to a series of subtle distinctions and discussions regarding unintelligible topics, the term came to be a synonym for something darkly mysterious.

MORAL, (*mos, mores, morals*)—refers primarily to *conduct;* MORALS, a course of *actions* originating in corresponding *dispositions;* MORAL PRINCIPLE, that which *originates* conduct; MORAL FEELINGS—EMOTIONS, those that are awakened by moral *principles*, and lead to moral *conduct;* MORAL GOVERNMENT—MORAL LAW, what regulates and controls moral conduct; MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, that which subjects A MORAL AGENT—that is, one capable of moral conduct, to rewards and punishment; MORAL ACCOUNTABILITY, the liableness of the subjects of law to the approbation or disapprobation of the lawgiver, on the ground of right, equity, and truth; MORAL FREEDOM, that which leads to moral conduct for which man is responsible—the possibility of acting otherwise in any given circumstances; MORAL ACTIONS, the actions of intelligent beings, the subjects of *law*, which must be *known;* actions which entail good or evil, reward or punishment, and which originate in liberty of choice.

MORAL TRUTHS—(See under *Truth.*)

MOTIVE, (*moveo, I move*)—that which excites the mind, *the cause* of volition; sometimes also the intention or end in view, the effects of volition.

Nature, very often used when the word should be God, a when it is said, "the works of Nature," "Nature has made pr vision for so and so." *Properly*, a principle in the mind—th which gives beginning to thoughts—as when it is said, "doth n nature teach us?" In this sense, the same idea is expressed b other terms, as power, capacity, capability, susceptibility, & Often, the general course of things as established by the Creato as "the laws of Nature," the "religion of Nature."

Necessity, (Greek *αναγκη* from *αναγω*, *ne cedo*, *I yield not*)- conveys the idea of *existence* and *opposition*; and the not *yieldi* thereto or being *destroyed* thereby. It is applied to differe things; but the meaning in common language is, *that which ca not but be*. It is either the result of *physical force*, and the it is termed *natural necessity*, as when we say, a heavy body mu fall from the power of gravitation; or it is the result of motiv that decide the mind to act in one way rather than another, an then it is *moral necessity*. The term is applied to *existence*, as w say, the existence of God is *necessary existence*—not in the sense *compulsion*, but *that*, the cause of which is *in itself*, not anothe and so *the opposite* cannot be conceived. The contrary to this *contingent* existence—that is, existence of which the cause is i *another*; and so it may be conceived *not to have existed*, or *to cea to exist*. The term *necessary* is applied to *truths*, such as are i mathematics; and to *relations*, as between cause and effect.

Nominalists—those who hold, in philosophy, that there are n *universal abstract things or ideas*, but only *names*, which, in them selves *particular*, become *universal* by their applicability to a such things. *Realists*, those who held that there are *univers forms*, as well as the terms which denote them. *Conceptualists*- those who consider *universal terms* to represent the *mental conce tions*, which are formed out of *particular* things, in those qualitie or properties, in which they resemble one another. The follow ing is Berkeley's account of the mode in which *abstract* gener terms are formed, which is approved by Hume and Stewart "The geometrician is demonstrating the method of cutting a lin into two equal parts. He draws, for instance, a black line of a inch in length; this, which in itself is a particular line, is neve theless, with regard to its signification, general, since as it is the used, it represents all particular lines whatever, so that what i demonstrated of it, is demonstrated of all lines, or of a line i general. And as that particular *line* becomes general, by bein made a sign, so the name *line*, which taken absolutely is *particula* by being a sign is made *general*. And as the former owes it generality, not to its being the sign of an abstract or general line but of *all particular* right lines that may possibly exist; so th latter must be thought to derive its generality from the sam cause, namely, the *various particular* lines which it indifferentl denotes."—*Berkeley. Principles of Human Knowledge*, *in work* vol. I., 78, 79, 8vo., 1843.

Notion, (*γινωσκω*, nosco, notum, notio, I know, the thing known;

—This term is, *properly*, more extensive in meaning than *idea*; and it would be *desirable*, were it *practicable*, to *distinguish* them, so that the *latter* should be restricted to our knowledge of objects of sense; the *former* used for our knowledge of things in general; as idea of a mountain, of a table, &c.; and notion of a truth, of a circle, or of a rule in grammar.

Obligation, (*ob* and *ligo*, *to bind*)—that which makes anything binding; *moral* obligation, that which binds man, as an intellectual and moral being to duty. (See Duty.)

Ontology, (*ον*, *on*, *existence*, the participle from *ειμι*, *eimi*, *to be*, and λογος, *logos*, *discourse*)—the science which explains *existences in general*, and the terms which express them.

Organon, (*οργανον*, *organon*, *an instrument*)—a name given to the *logic of Aristotle*, as being considered by the schoolmen *the grand instrument* for investigating truth; and which, for ages, so exclusively occupied all the philosophers and divines as to exclude every other.

The works of Aristotle, on Logic, are, "1, one book of the categories; 2, one of interpretation; 3, two of analytics; 4, two of last analytics; 5, eight of topics; 6, one of sophisms." These have been commonly published together; with Porphyry's introduction to the categories prefixed. The five predicables are explained by Porphyry; the ten categories by Aristotle. The Organon, therefore, was not written by Aristotle as *one work*; and many lost works, had they been preserved, would have formed a part of it. There is a very good account of Aristotle's Logic appended to Reid on the Intellectual Powers.

It is in reference to *this Organon* that Lord Bacon entitled his great work, which pointed out the true mode of philosophy—that of *Induction*, the Novum Organon—the *new instrument* of scientific research.

Oriental Philosophy—(See *Manicheism.*)

Perception, (*per* and *capio*, *I take in*)—the *power* by which we receive knowledge; the *knowledge* itself, as I have a distinct *perception* of a tree, or of a truth.

Phantasms—(See *Species, Sensible and Intelligible.*)

Philosophy, (*φιλοσοφια*, *philosophia*, *φιλος* and *σοφια*, *philos* and *sophia*, philosophy, the love of wisdom)—in a general sense, the study of the objects of knowledge, whether of matter or of mind.

The philosophy of anything, as the philosophy of *rhetoric*, of *trade*, of *history*, &c., means the first principles on which it is founded; that which constitutes it a science; the *rationale* of it.

Phenomenon—Phenomena, (*φαινω*, *phaino*, *I show*, *φαινομενον*, *phainomenon*, *something exhibited*)—used to denote all the *appearances* in nature, and all the manifestations of mind, which are the subject of philosophic investigation. The *explanation* of a phenomenon is the showing it to be necessarily included in some other already known, or supposed to be known; and *one phenomenon* is said to be the *cause of another*, when we conceive the *existence* of the one to be dependent upon *some power* the other. Thus we speak of the *phenomena* of the *ru the cause*.

Physics—Physical, (φυσις, *physis, nature*).—Phy science which investigates nature; generally *material* distinct from *mental*, or *intellectual*, or *spiritual;* but oft denote our intellectual *nature* AS SUCH, in distinction intellectual nature, regarded as *moral*—that which cons not only as an *intellectual* but as a *moral* and *accountable*

Physical, that which pertains to *physics*. *Physiolog physis*, and λογος, *logos*,) the science which investigates of anything in particular; as the physiology of mind is tigation of mind.

Platonic *System*—(from Plato, who was born in the of the 87th Olympiad, 430 B.C., the disciple of Socrates also, ACADEMIC (from the place in which he lectured—th Academus, an Athenian); as it regarded IDEAS, it ta they are thrown off like shadows, upon a wall, of me outside, seen by men lying bound in a dark cave wh see one spot where the shadows pass. In ETHICS, it ta there are three faculties in the soul—reason, passions, tites; reason is the *governing* power, which examines t means to be employed for attaining an end; the *governe passions*—the nobler, and the *appetites*—the meaner; thus constituted is like a *commonwealth*, the security of depending on the control of the supreme over the inferio the *governing* power directs the *governed* in general objects—result, *prudence;* when it fixes *the higher*, the their proper objects—*fortitude;* when it restrains *the in* appetites, within due limits—*temperance;* the right di all, without injuring the claims of others—*justice*. The CARDINAL virtues; and *virtue* is, thus, the *right direc mind*.

Pneumatology—(See *Psychology*.)

Powers—(See *Faculties*.)

Predicables, in logic, are propositions of such a clas *predicate* bears a certain *relation* to the *subject*. Of thes *five* classes. In the *first*, the *predicate* affirms the *genus ject*, as, This is a triangle; Jupiter is a planet. In the *predicate* asserts the *species* of the *subject*, as, This triang angled. In the *third*, the *predicate* affirms the *specific d* the *subject*, as, Every triangle has three sides and thr The *fourth* is, when the *predicate* is made to affirm the the *subject*, as, The angles of every triangle are equal to angles. In the *fifth*, the *predicate* asserts something *ac* the *subject*, as, This figure is neatly drawn. There n endless variety of propositions in each class, but in all, t of the *predicate* to the *subject* is the *same*.

A PROPOSITION is "a sentence in which something *predicated*)—that is, *affirmed* or *denied*, of another. It fore, either *affirmative* or *negative;* and in either case has a *subject*, a *predicate*, and a *copula:* the *subject* is the *thing* regarding which anything is *affirmed* or *denied;* the *predicate* is the *affirmation* or *negation* made; and the *copula* is the word which *connects* them. The *subject* and *predicate* are styled "the *terms* of the proposition, from their being, in natural order, the *extremes* or boundaries of it."

Psychology, *ψυχη, psyche, the soul,* and *λογος, logos, discourse.* **Pneumatology**, *πνευμα, pneuma, spirit,* and *logos, discourse.* **Psychology** is frequently used *now*, especially by German writers, who are very fond of such compounds, and by those who are conversant with such writers, as **Pneumatology** was used by the metaphysical writers of the last age, to denote the science that investigates the nature and properties of *spiritual substances.* Thus Dr. Doddridge wrote lectures on Pneumatology, which would now be called the Philosophy of Mind.

Pyrrhonism, (from Pyrrho, 300 B.C.)—universal *scepticism.*

Pythagorean *Philosophy*, (from Pythagoras, of Samos, 43rd Olympiad, 500 B.C.)—teaches the eternity of *matter*, and eternal *forms* or *patterns* after which all things were moulded; and an eternal *architect* who fashioned them. In Ethics it classes virtues into *private* and *social.*

Reasoning—(See *Logic.)*

Reflection, the *faculty* that gives us knowledge of mind; the mind's pondering its own conceptions; the *κινησεις κυκλικαι,* reflective mental movements of the Greek philosophers.

Scepticism, (*σκεπτομαι, skeptomai,* I inquire)—the system that asserts the impossibility of obtaining *certainty* in the knowledge of things; "ever learning, and never coming to the knowledge of the truth."—*Paul.*

Sensation—(See under *Senses.)*

Senses—The Five—the media of mind's communicating with the external world; the inlets of our knowledge from without; seeing, or sight, hearing, feeling or touch, tasting, smelling. The terms used to denote them are all *ambiguous*, expressing both the *organ* and the feeling or *sensation;* thus we say, "My sight is impaired," and "My taste is dull," as well as "a beautiful sight," and "exquisite taste." *Sensation*, in like manner, denotes both the *mental power* which receives the notion and accompanying feeling of an external object, and the *notion and feeling themselves.*

Scholastic Philosophy, the philosophy of Aristotle and Plato, engrafted upon Christianity—in the later times of the Roman empire, and subsequently to its subversion, when Christianity had become universal—by the teachers in *the schools* of Philosophy and Christianity, which then had become *inseparably blended together*, and whose teachers were called *the schoolmen.*

Science—**Art**.—**Science**, the investigation of *principles and laws* regarding any subject; **Art**, the *system* of *rules* for *practical operation.* Thus Logic is both a *science* and an *art;* in the *former* sense, it investigates the *principles* in the human mind on which is founded the *art of reasoning;* and in the *latter*, it gives the system of *rules for conducting* the operations of reasoning in all their varieties.

Socratean or Socratic *Philosophy*, (from Socrates, 77th Olympiad)—that of which Socrates was the author, who, himself, promulgated no *theory of ethics*, but whose grand object was to lead to the recognition of the *supreme lawgiver;* of *his laws* as the regulating *principle* of virtuous conduct; and of *conscience* as the interpreter of the laws. He founded no sect; but his disciples were the authors of the principal sects which arose after him. *Socratic dialogue*—method of instruction adopted by Socrates, by conversation convicting the opponent out of his own mouth.

Sorites—(See *Logic.)*

Species—sensible and intelligible—Phantasms.—The ancient philosophers supposed *images*, or *forms* of material objects presented to the senses, to be thrown off, *without the matter;* as *wax* receives the *impression* of the *seal*, without the matter. These were said to be the objects only of the *sensitive* part of the mind, and so were called *sensible species;* but by various internal powers they were retained, refined, and spiritualized, so as to become objects of *memory* and *imagination*, and then they were called *phantasms;* and when still further refined, so as to become objects of pure *intellection*, and so of science, they were called *intelligible species.*

Spinosists—from Benedict Spinosa, a Jew of Amsterdam, but of Parma by descent, 1632. His doctrine, in reference to *religion*, was, that as all things are by eternal necessity, miracles and revelation are included as parts of the great whole; and so the Jews were no more the people of God than others; and so there is nothing *peculiarly* from God in the Bible. As to *ethics* and *philosophy*, his books teach the *Pantheism* of some modern Germans, and of the Buddhists of the East, that God is in everything, and that all things are attributes of God; the same as the system of some of the ancients, that God is the soul of the universe; or, in modern times, that of Bolingbroke, which Pope versified:—

All are but parts of one stupendous whole,
Whose body nature is, and God the soul.

Stoic *Philosophy*, (from στοα, *stoa*, the *portico*, or public repository of Athenian arts, where Zeno taught 300 B.C.)—maintained that virtue consists in following nature; every particular virtue, being the discernment of the place it holds in the great scale of existence. Thus true fortitude is self-command; temperance, preserving right the powers of body and mind; justice, the succumbing of individual interests for the public good.—*Cic. De Finib.* iii. 19, 21.

Syllogism—(See *Logic.)*

Synthesis—(See *Analysis and Synthesis.)*

Testimony—the witness given to truths, or facts; to be estimated by the credibility of the testifier. It is recognised as a *ground* of belief in conclusions about contingent truths, as in the calculations of astronomy, and the links in a chain of mathematical analysis. Hume asserted that no testimony could authenticate a miracle; Campbell refuted him as to the assertion being a ground of objection to the Scripture miracles; Whately threw out the true point of Hume's fallacy; and Chalmers developed his suggestion so as to make it impossible for the sophism ever again to delude those who read and think. The characteristics of three great minds are exhibited in their several dealings with the subject; in the acute argumentation of the one, the profound thought of another, and the eloquent exhaustion of the suggested topic of the third.—*Campbell on Miracles*; *Whately's Logic; Chalmers' works*, vol. iii.

TRUTH—the conformity of *words*, or *signs* by which *things* are *expressed*, to the *things themselves;* the conformity of the *expression* of the sentiments and *feelings* to the sentiments and feelings themselves. A proposition is *true*, which expresses *things as they are.*

Dr. Beattie says, "That is truth which the constitution of our nature determines us to believe; and that is falsehood which the constitution of our nature determines us to disbelieve. But *believing* does not *make* the thing true; nor does disbelieving *make* it false. Truth and falsehood would have been as they are, though no beings capable of believing or disbelieving had ever been created." This *definition*, however, applies only to *first* or *intuitive truths*. *Intuitive truths* are those which are *perceived to be so at once by the constitution of our nature*; they give us ideas of *relations*, as *identity* and *diversity*, *resemblance* and *co-existence*, *space* and *time*, *quantity* and *number*, *cause* and *effect*. *Demonstrative truths* are those founded upon *axioms, or first truths;* it would be as absurd to attempt to *prove* the *latter*, as it would be to *assume* the *former.*

Abstract truths are such as relate to *mere relations*, as mathematical truths—two and two are equal to four. *Moral truths* are those that appeal to the understanding and *moral nature*, as, Virtue alone is happiness.

Eternal and necessary truths are such as do not depend upon created substances; as the three angles of a plane triangle are equal to two right angles; *contingent truths* are such as relate to created things, as the solar system consists of the sun, and, *at least*, eleven primary and eighteen secondary planets, with the comets.

UTILITARIAN *Philosophy*—that which makes the essence of virtue consist in utility; of which Hume was the modern expositor. But the term is frequently used for those *sciences and studies in general* which bear upon *practical advantage*, as distinct from the fine arts and classical literature.

THE END.

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